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Contents

Editorial

Farewell from the Editor-in-Chief
Henry Prunckun 1

Research Articles

Colin Rogers 3

Moral Panic and Perceptions of Community Fear: A Local Community Study Examining Drug Use
Rivver Baumgaertner, Emma Colvin and Philip Birch 21

Analytical Essays

The Ustaša in Australia: A Review of Right-Wing Ustaša Terrorism from 1963-1973, and Factors that Enable their Endurance
Kristy Campion 37

Solar Energy and Battery Development for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Leading to Increased Proliferation?
Tegg Westbrook and Harald Rostvik 59

Homicide Event Motive: A Situational Perspective
Belinda Parker and Amber C. McKinley 78

Book Review

Amber McKinley 96

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Editorial

This edition of Salus Journal (Volume 6, Number 2) marks my last journal after six rewarding years as Editor-in-Chief. In 2013 I was offered the opportunity to establish a new academic journal for Charles Sturt University’s Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security. Head of the School, Associate Professor Nick O’Brien, had an aspirational goal to publish a journal that would attract papers that would contribute to new knowledge in a wide range of police, criminal justice and national security topics. His vision was for publication of accurate and trustworthy research that met high research standards. He wanted all papers to be judged by a double-blind peer-review process that met best practice in ethical publishing, and—in the spirit of scholarly inquiry—for the journal to follow open-access principles. After six years and sixteen editions, I believe that Associate Professor O’Brien’s vision has been fulfilled.

Salus Journal, whose name honours the Roman goddess of safety and welfare, has been accredited by the Australian Research Council (ARC) as an Excellence in Research for Australia (ERA) journal. Each edition is indexed in EBSCOhost’s research database, RMIT Publishing’s Informit, Google Scholar, and the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ). Through the journal, scholars from all over the globe have been able to contribute to the body of literature on crime and justice.

I have appreciated the Advisory Board’s support and encouragement and I thank members of the Board for allowing me the freedom to manage the editorial matters that I consider have made Salus Journal a success. This success has been achieved with the help of a willing panel of international associate editors, the book review editor, and my assistant editor who collectively have assured its academic standard.

Looking to the future, I see the maintenance of high scholastic integrity as the main challenge for all scholarly journals, including Salus Journal. The emergence of what sometimes appears to be an avalanche of so-called “predator journals” makes it difficult for researchers to distinguish between a reputable journal and one that will publish simply to make a profit. Keeping vigil over the standard of scholarly inquiry rests with the new wave of open-access journals. Like Salus Journal, all open-
access journals must uphold ethical research principles so that researchers are encouraged to publish their findings and practitioners are confident in the trustworthiness of the published research.

I will hand-over the editorship of the journal at the end of 2018 to Drs Emma Colvin and Philip Birch, who joined the journal this year as Co-Deputy Editors. I hope they gain as much satisfaction as I have at the Editor-in-Chief’s desk.

Dr Henry (Hank) Prunckun
Editor-in-Chief
Salus Journal

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Sydney
Perceptions of Victims of Historically Reported Sexual Offences: Insights from England and Wales

Colin Rogers*

ABSTRACT

The current trend for reporting historical offences appears to be a global phenomenon which has attracted high media attention as well as criminal justice resources. This article critically analyses this phenomenon from the perspective of victims who reported such incidents to a police service in the United Kingdom. It explores reasons why individuals did not report historical sexual offences at the time they were committed and considers the reasons why they subsequently reported them. The results indicate a variety of reasons for reporting such incidents including those of non-belief from official agencies and the fact that the individual was too embarrassed. The complexity of decision making for the individual victim in reporting such incidents is thus highlighted. This provides some understanding and evidence for police, their partners and strategic policy makers to ensure provision is made for encouraging and accommodating such victims of this type of crime.

Keywords: Victims of crime; Historical reporting; Sexual offences.

INTRODUCTION

The plethora of individuals reporting historical sexual offences is not just a phenomena limited to the UK, (Guardian 2017) but appears to have spread across most developed countries. For example, in Australia TV celebrities face allegations, (Australian Guardian 2017), while in America, politicians and men in apparent positions of power appear to be the subject of such complaints (Atlantic 2017; New York Times 2017). One consequence of this is that there is inevitably an increase in workload for police and other criminal justice agencies (Hill 2015). Why individuals seek to report such matters now rather than at the time of the incident is the question that most observers and those agencies dealing with such victims may wish to understand. Despite anecdotal suggestions that the media has played a great part in encouraging victims to come forward now, especially since revelations concerning television personalities in the UK went worldwide (see for example BBC 2014a: BBC 2014b: BBC 2015),

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this research examines the reasons why victims of sexual assault are reporting historical offences.

The perceptions of victims may be at odds with this belief that media is a main driver for reporting such incidents, and there is a need for deeper understanding of the reasons why individuals did not report events contemporaneously.

This article is based upon original research undertaken with one police force area in England and Wales in 2016 and 2017 to establish why victims of such crimes within that force did not report the matters, and to obtain their perceptions of the way they were treated within the criminal justice system once they had made an official complaint.

RESEARCH CONTEXT

Like most police forces in England and Wales, the police force in question had experienced a rise in recorded historical sexual offences during the past few years. This echoed the general situation across the country and figure 1 illustrates the rise in recorded sexual offences across England and Wales from April 2002 to March 2016.

Figure 1. Total recorded sexual offences England and Wales April 2002 to March 2016.

Clearly, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of recorded offences of this nature. The question arises of course as to why this increase should occur so dramatically. It may be that high-profile media cases involving celebrities and a more open society willing to discuss previously taboo subjects, has driven many people to now report previously unreported sexual offences (see for example Weathered 2015; New York Times 2017; and Telegraph 2012).

Historical abuse or non-recent abuse is defined on the historical reporting website of the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children (NSPCC) as; ‘…an allegation of neglect, physical, sexual or emotional abuse made by or on behalf of someone who is now 18 years or over, relating to an incident which took place when the alleged victim was under 18 years old’ (NSPCC, 2016:).

However, the police service commissioning this study wanted to concentrate upon the adult experience, thus proscribing the research group to adults at the time of the original incident, and thus adults when later reporting the matters. In addition, the framework for defining what exactly was meant by historical sexual offences was confined to the reporting of three main types of historical offences, namely Rape, Sexual Assault and Serious Sexual assault. These are defined as follows:

1. **Rape:** A person commits rape if they intentionally penetrate the vagina, anus or mouth of another person with their penis without consent

2. **Sexual assault:** A person commits sexual assault if they intentionally touch another person, the touching is sexual, and the person does not consent

3. **Serious sexual assault:** (sexual assault by penetration) A person commits this offence if they intentionally penetrate the vagina or anus of another person with a part of the body or anything else, without their consent (Home Office 2003).

Given the serious nature of the alleged criminal offences the victims had suffered it was clear that in terms of conducting this research, there were some very serious considerations to be undertaken with regards to the methodology involved. Researching complex areas within any Criminal Justice System is fraught with ethical dilemmas, yet if the service provided to individuals, particularly those who are victims of crime, is to be improved, then serious attempts must be made to ensure ethical and correct approaches are employed. The main aims and objectives of this research...
were to undertake qualitative research to assist in understanding an individual’s reasons for:

- Reporting a historical sexual offence now
- Establish and understand the reasons for any delay in reporting at the time

Regarding the above, the police and other agencies were keen to establish whether the level of confidence in reporting such matters to the Police had a bearing, to establish the level and quality of service provision within the Force area by all agencies concerned with such matters.

For this to be achieved it involved interacting with individuals who may have experienced traumatic incidents and it was also clear that the research methods employed had to acknowledge this when it came to design. Given the nature of research itself, serious ethical concerns needed to be addressed.

**METHOD**

Researching sensitive topics in the criminal justice system, especially the police, can be problematic and has been discussed at length elsewhere (Rogers 2018). Much consultation between New Pathways, a victim support agency set up to support victims of sexual assaults, the Crown Prosecution Service, and the Police as to how best to conduct this research was undertaken with the major issue being to remove or minimise any potential trauma or upset for individuals. New Pathways were instrumental in offering to provide support for any individual who needed it throughout the research and after its completion and this was communicated to participants through the research process. Following consultation with the partner agencies, it was decided that the best approach would be a two-phased mixed methods approach involving the use of an initial questionnaire survey exploring quantitative data and phase two, which would involve the use of focus group activity, allowing for more qualitative and richer data to be obtained. However, the ethical problems and considerations surrounding this research were considerable.

**ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

The ethical considerations surrounding the interaction with victims of such crimes needed to be carefully considered. Questions arose involving how informed consent could be achieved, how confidentiality would be maintained and of course the use of sensitive and private contact details of witnesses. Serious ethical concerns needed to be considered and the
framework provided by Diener and Crandall (1978) were initially considered. In addition, more recent ethical considerations such as those provided by the Australian Research Council were utilised (ARC 2015).

In general, these revolve around four main principles, namely;

- Whether there is harm to participants
- Whether there is lack of informed consent
- Whether there is an invasion of privacy
- Whether deception is involved.

These four principles can, of course, overlap each other. The question arose about what exactly do we mean by harm? Clearly while the work of Lee (2009), previously discussed, did not expand the concept of threat to any great degree, the British Sociological Association (BSA 2017) when discussing ethical practice enjoins researchers to anticipate and to guard against consequences for research participants which can be predicted to be harmful. To consider carefully the possibility that the research experience may be a disturbing one. This includes the storage of and confidentiality of records. Similarly, researcher should be aware of what should happen if distressing or criminal revelations are revealed by participants during the study? Confidentiality therefore must have a limit. If further criminal acts or negligence were disclosed the participant had to know they would be disclosed to the proper authorities.

The same points made about famous historical research processes such as those carried out by Humphreys (1970) and Milgram (1963) appear to remain the same today, those of informed consent and confidentiality. However, ethical concerns do not only reside in such famous cases as the potential for ethical transgression is much more general than this. Notably such discussion seems more prominent when a disguised or deceptive observation is utilised. Of course, this implies that other such methods such as questionnaires or overt ethnography are immune from ethical problems, which is clearly not the case.

When it comes to informed consent, again problems mainly occur when the focus of research is disguised or covert participation. However, not all research is covert, and the SRA suggest that inquiries involving human subjects should be based as far as practical on the freely given informed consent of subjects. Participants should not be under the impression that they are required to participate, and they should be aware of their entitlement to refuse at any stage for whatever reason and to
withdraw data supplied. So, when we consider Milgram’s famous study (Milgram 1963), considering this, then it contains a lack of informed consent, because although participants knew they were involved in research they were not given the full information about the nature of the research and its possible implications for them.

Even the language of the research and therefore any research instrument devised for use, needs careful consideration. For example, within this research into historical sexual offence reporting, the word ‘offence’ may mean something different to the police as it implies an act of a criminal nature, while the word ‘incident’ smacks of official language. The language that should be used must also be respectful and understandable to the research participants. Bearing in mind these considerations and the individuals to be involved in this research the ethical considerations were quite challenging and involved much consideration. This involved consultation between agencies, partners the research team and the University’s Ethics Committee.

RECRUITMENT AND DATA COLLECTION
To protect anonymity and provide confidentiality for victims, the police would play a central role in the distribution of initial contact letter and the formulation of a database of people who had agreed to take part. The Police had constructed a database of individuals who fitted the criteria for contact within the definition of offences and this numbered some 300 individuals.

An initial contact letter was constructed which outlined the objective of the research and the reason why individuals were contacted. This letter also included a consent form to take part in the research, as well as further information explaining how the research programme would proceed in more detail. Anonymity and confidentiality were emphasised within these documents, and a stamped addressed envelope (SAE) with the Police address was also included for return of forms. From the beginning people were told about informed consent, that they did not have to take part and should only return the agreement to take part forms etc. if they wished to. Again, support from new pathways was emphasised.

Each of these people were then sent a questionnaire by the police with a separate explanation form and a further informed consent document which they were requested to sign to take part in the study. An SAE was again provided but, on this occasion, it was addressed to the academic researchers for statistical analysis to be undertaken.
The questionnaire contained a section asking whether the respondent would be willing to take part in further research involving a focus group approach, and if they wished to do so to provide a contact telephone number. They were informed that if they agreed they would be contacted by a research team member with 4 to 6 weeks of the return of the questionnaire. Seventeen participants completed the questionnaire survey for analysis and all but one stated that they would consent to taking part in further research. Consequently, an analysis of the questionnaire was undertaken and the result analysed.

As a result, phase two was undertaken which involved a semi-structured interview schedule being devised to further explore concepts in focus group research. Individuals were contacted via telephone by carefully trained research team members utilising a prepared script and asked if they still wished to take part in focus group research. The script included informing the individuals about the concepts of informed consent, anonymity support and confidentiality as well as what a focus group session entailed, and the length of the activity.

Due to the large geographical area covered by the police service in question, and the distances covered by the victims themselves, a central location was chosen, and the expenses incurred by the individuals were reimbursed by the university, along with provision for lunches etc. The subsequent focus group work was supervised by the senior researcher assisted by two members of staff from the university who recorded the comments of the participants by writing them down. The participants were each given a card with a letter on prior to the activity for the researchers to identify who was making a comment. By writing down the notes, it was considered that the anonymity of participants would be enhanced as no one could be identified by voice. By adopting the approaches outlined and being cognisant of the needs and sensitivities of the research and victims, it is believed that the best possible outcome was achieved in researching this sensitive and difficult topic.

RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

The final number of people who agreed to take part in the research was 30, which reflects the problems and difficulty of obtaining respondents to engage in research with difficult, sensitive and emotive topics. However, the police and other agencies wished to proceed with the research even if the results were to be considered purely indicative. All of these individuals were female, despite there being evidence to suggest that males also report historical sexual abuse (Home Office 2017).
Reasons for not reporting the incident initially.
To establish the main reasons why victims did not report the incident initially they were asked to identify the three reasons why they did not do this. For analysing this question and the following question relating to reasons for later reporting the matter, each response was coded with a value, which would allow for a volume to be ascribed to the reasons. For example, if a respondent chose a reason as being their first reason, they would indicate by placing a 1 alongside it, their second reason with a 2 and so on. When being analysed these numbers would equate to an allocated value. Therefore a 1 would score a 3, a 2 would score a 2, and a 3 would score a 1. These values were then added together to provide a core applicable to the reason for not reporting the incident. The results can be seen in the figure 2.

**Figure 2. Chart showing reasons for not reporting the incident initially.**

As can be seen, the highest weighted scores relate to three main reasons for not reporting the incident in the first place. These were:

- Thought no one would believe me
- I was too embarrassed to report it
- I was afraid of the perpetrator.
Subsequent open questions regarding this area of investigation were asked of the respondents in the questionnaire survey as well as being micro explored in the follow up focus group exercise.

For some, they thought that they could deal the situation without recourse to official agencies, while others were mindful of the effect the incident may have upon their family life. Others felt they needed close family support first:

*Waited for husband to return, just wanted to go to bed* (Respondent 4).

*I was away from home and alone. I wanted my husband to be the first to know so I waited to get back home to inform him* (Respondent 9).

*My husband was receiving chemotherapy during the entire year when the more serious sexual assaults occurred* (Respondent 16).

There is perhaps a trend identified here that in such circumstances the victim seeks the support and comfort of close family immediately following such an incident, rather than contacting the police or other agencies about the incident. A further complication in the decision to report or not is the closeness of the perpetrator to the victim. Fear of the perpetrator appears to be another major reason why victims did not report the incident initially.

*Within my job role I should have made sure I was safe before entering the perpetrators home. I should have left immediately rather than be polite* (Respondent 2).

*I felt fearful and affronted and assaulted enough that it affected my days when I need to report it to an authority* (Respondent 14).

During this part of the research, respondents were asked the specific question regarding whether a lack of confidence in the police was a reason for not reporting the original matter. The idea of lack of confidence in the police as a reason for not reporting it was not a strong indicator according to the respondents who took part in this research. This reason was joint 4th out of the six main reasons for not reporting the matter to the police. However, for those who suggested this may have been a reason for not reporting the matter, there were some clear reasons.
Police would not believe me, and shame at myself (Focus group A). 
Yes, because of previous contact with the police, preconceptions etc (Focus Group B).

Had suffered a mental illness previously, and they did not believe me when I reported the second incident (Focus Group A).

It would appear from this that those victims who had had some form of previous contact with the police were reluctant to report the incident for fear of being not believed and from the shame at having to report the matter. During focus group work, individuals who indicated that they were not so confident of reporting to the police were asked why this was the case.

Preconceptions especially of first contact officers, officers were ignoring me, laughing, and joking with others, not taken seriously (Focus Group A).

The first officer was just not skilled in the area and did not know what to do.

It needs a sensitive response rather than just a response (Focus group C).

Initial response seemed ill prepared not competent didn’t know what to do (Focus Group B).

Clearly the perception that officers brought pre-conceived ideas and were not sufficiently aware of what they should do as first responders to such an incident has for these individuals provided a negative perception of police. The Other Reasons category for non-reporting included diverse reasons which were closely associated with the three main reasons, such as not wanting family to know.

Reasons for later reporting the incident.

Having explored some of the reasons for not reporting the initial incident to the police, it was important to try to understand why victims felt they were now able to report the incidents. A similar question was devised to that, asking why the initial incident was not reported and was analysed using the same coding method. The results can be seen in figure 3.
The top three reasons for now reporting the incidents indicated by respondents were as follows:

- Support given by other people
- I felt the police would believe me now
- I now realised it was a crime/other reasons.

Support given by other people was perhaps the strongest theme to emerge throughout the whole of the research. Many of the respondents and the focus group participants pointed to the support close relatives and friends gave to them as the drive to report the incidents. They used words such as ‘lack of strength to go through the process’, ‘emotional ties to close relatives’, ‘understanding from friends’ and the fact that their family and close friends would believe them.
My son reported the incident as I didn’t want to. I was too embarrassed (Respondent No.3).

The colleagues of the person who attacked me supported me because he had tried it on with his female colleague in work. I was friendly with her and she backed me up. So I reported it (Focus Group B).

The area of close support from family and friends with regards to victims supporting such incidents is clearly important and should not be underestimated. The second main reason why individuals stated they reported the matter later was a confidence in the police and that they felt the police would now believe them. This is quite an important finding, as one of the reasons for victims not reporting these incidents originally was a lack of confidence in police. Trust and confidence in the police is a major factor in people engaging with them. The idea of procedural justice rests upon this belief, along with the fact that individuals believe they will be treated with respect and will be allowed to have their say (Sunshine and Tyler 2003). The fact that this is the second highest reason for victims now willing to report these matters to the police appears positive.

When I found out that it was happening to other women I felt more confident to go to the police (Respondent No.10).

This particular police force were great, one particular DC was really good (Focus Group C).

The police officers and CID were sensitive to my situation and let me take my time. They kept me informed of progress until the end. I know they did everything they could and were very thorough in their investigation (Respondent No.5).

The third highest reason for reporting the incident now was the realisation it was actually a crime. However, what this may be interpreted as is that victims realised they had been a victim of a crime and that they wanted to report it to prevent it happening to other people. This again was quite a strong theme in both questionnaires and focus group work.

I had to report perpetrator to stop him doing to others what he did to me. He has a history of sexual assault against vulnerable women and no-one was brave enough to report him to the police. I was prepared to go to court but CPS said his word against mine and they didn’t want to put me through it (Respondent No.5).

I was concerned that the man who attacked me may do it to someone else. I was my word against the man who attacked me, so
I was acutely aware it would be impossible to prove. I was never afraid to report the crime, I just needed to speak to my husband first. He had been having a beer with the man the weekend before the attack (Respondent No.9).

I realised it had happened to someone else and wanted to prevent it happening to others (Respondent No.12).

**Media Impact**

Notwithstanding the fact that the main reasons for this research was to examine reasons that victims of sexual assault are now reporting historical offences, one needs to consider the role the media may or may not play in assisting that process. Therefore, the role and impact of the media upon the decision to subsequently report the incident to the police was explored in both questionnaire survey and focus group engagement. While there was some indication that the media reporting of events may have provoked some response from victims, it was not as strongly supported by victims as one would have thought. For the purposes of this research, it was being regarded as the least of the reasons for subsequently reporting incidents by victims.

However, the role and impact the media may have had was to encourage support from others to facilitate the reporting of offences rather than provoke reporting directly from victims themselves.

*Media may have played a part, but it was friends and family who encouraged and supported me to report* (Focus Group C).

*Media made me realise that so many victims of this sort of crime* (Focus Group D).

One reason individuals did not suggest that media exposure to high profile sexual offence cases did not encourage them to report may be that of how it is presented. Mejia, Cheyne and Dorfman (2012: 471) state that 80 percent of television news stories on social issues in the United States of America (USA), such as sexual abuse, are framed as ‘episodic’, where emphasis is placed on the individual’s role in the problem, while only 20 percent are framed as ‘thematic’, which emphasise the larger social conditions behind the issue. Framing in this way, affects the audiences’ perception of the problem, as those who see ‘episodic’ news stories are more likely to suggest that the solution to the problem lies with the individual, while those who see ‘thematic’ news stories are more likely to
believe that organisations, the government or institutions are also accountable (Mejia, Cheyne & Dorfman, 2012: 471).

CONCLUSION

Notwithstanding the limitations of this research, with small numbers, based in a particular geographical area, there are some useful insights into the ways in which victims of historical sexual offences view their experiences and their perceptions. The main reason for individuals not reporting sexual offences at the time of their original occurrence appears to be that the victim thought that no-one would believe them. This was closely followed by the fact that they were too embarrassed to report the matter and that they were afraid of the perpetrators. Thus, it is the perception that the victim has of themselves within this sample, not believable and embarrassed, that appears to be the main issue that prevented them from reporting such incidents at the time. These findings are not too dissimilar to other findings in this area (Herbert 2009).

Regarding the role of the media, this research suggests that the influence in prompting people to report previous sexual offences may not be as strong as first thought, while the support of family and friends appears to be the strongest determinant in this process. This was a surprising result as it was thought the role of the media, especially the reporting of alleged historical celebrity offences, would have been more prominent. However, it is unclear whether the influence of the media played a part in the role of family and friend as supporter for subsequent reporting. Women’s experiences of the criminal justice system in general have historically highlighted the inadequacies in that process in responding to them as a specific group of victims (Walklate 2007). It appears that in this instance this may also have occurred. This is disappointing for as Mawby (2007) points out, changes occur over time within the criminal justice system about the view of victims and their needs, with the victim becoming more important to the Criminal Justice System with the innovations of victim’s charters etc. in the UK (Zedner, 2002).

Given the current climate involving the reporting of historical sex offences, one would have thought the victim experience in this research would have been far more positive. This, too, despite evidence that most victims of all crimes are somewhat emotionally affected in some way by their experience of being victimised (Hoyle 2012). Efforts have been made to improve police response to victims of crime as a whole, but also with specific victims such as those who are victims of sexual abuse. These include special interview suites and specially trained officers (Zedner
2002). However, all research should raise more questions than perhaps answers. Future research into this topic could examine the ways in which victims perceive the whole of the criminal justice system, as well as the possible influence of such recent topics as compensation for victims of crime and legislation to protect victims and witnesses from harassment (Home Office 1997).

In terms of impact of the research project, the results formed part of a strategic reappraisal by the police force in question as to how they dealt with victims of crime in general, and historically reported sexual offences, with an emphasis upon training and educating police officers in early contact procedures. Indeed, the influence of the research also impacted upon the community safety partnership itself and influenced other agencies about how they managed the expectations of such victims of crime to ensure that such victims are treated with respect and dignity when reporting historical sexual offences.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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Moral Panic and Perceptions of Community Fear: A Local Community Study Examining Drug Use

Rivver Baumgaertner, Emma Colvin† and Philip Birch

ABSTRACT

Through a small-scale exploratory study, this paper presents findings from research that examined perceptions of the prevalence of drugs, both illicit and licit, and associated fear of crime. Through qualitative focus groups with members of a regional town in New South Wales (NSW), Australia, the study sought to examine perceptions of drug use based on personal knowledge and again, after official data of actual detected drug use was presented to compare the impact official data had on participants’ perceptions. The study also sought to gauge the fear of crime experienced by participants’ pre and post the presentation of official data on drug use, thus supporting an examination between the relationship of moral panic and the fear of crime. Using thematic analysis as the analytical approach, the study found that original perceptions of prevalence were inflated when compared to community perceptions/understanding post presentation of official drug use data. However, presentation of official data did not alter participants’ levels of fear regarding drug use and related crime. This research provides evidence that fear of crime levels do not necessarily reduce when a more accurate perception and understanding of drug use and associated offending is harvested.

Keywords: Fear of crime, community safety, moral panic, perceptions of crime

INTRODUCTION

This paper presents findings from a small scale exploratory qualitative study into community perceptions of the prevalence of drug use and fear of crime from associated drug related offending. This paper will commence by placing the research into the broad landscape of drug related research and perceptions of offending literature, this will be followed by a brief description of the research design and subsequent method. The findings of the research are framed around the aim of examining community perceptions on the prevalence of licit and illicit drugs in which three research questions were addressed:

- What is the community perception of licit and illicit drug use and related fear of crime in a regional town in New South Wales?

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• In what ways are community perceptions proportional to the actual nature and extent of licit and illicit drug use in a regional town in New South Wales? And,

• To what extent are do community perceptions of use of licit and illicit drugs and fear of crime change when presented with statistical evidence of the actual nature and extent of use in the regional town in New South Wales?

The conclusion sets out the value of the findings for policy makers and key stakeholders in drug and alcohol service provision and community safety; and finally, it posits areas for future research.

CONTEXTUALIZING THE STUDY

The research presented in this paper originated from concerns raised by some organisation within a region of New South Wales, Australia, in which the study was conducted, where it had been indicated there was a high level of illicit drug use in the town. Of those organisations, many expressed concerns about what this means for the community and the surrounding region. Through three focus group with community members, the study presented in this paper examines these perceptions and concerns. These perceptions will be analysed in relation to the available statistical and empirical data on drug use in the region to provide a nuanced understanding of the rates, risks and responses to licit and illicit drug use in the NSW regional town under examination.

The use and abuse of licit and illicit drugs is multi-faceted impacting on the social, health and economic wellbeing of individuals, communities and wider society (Collins & Lapsley, 2008). Many Australians, according to Ritter, King, & Hamilton (2013) have developed a propensity to the use of both licit and illicit drugs. For example, the consumption of alcohol is significantly common and entwined in a variety of social and cultural events (Manning, Smith & Mazerolle, 2013), with the use of licit and illicit drugs causing significant harm to individuals, families and the broader community (Manning et al, 2013; Collins & Lapsley, 2008). The most recent statistics available reveal that in 2004-2005, licit and illicit drugs costs Australia around $55.1 billion (Collins & Lapsley, 2008).

While the latest National Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS) (2016) published by the Australian Institute of Health and Wellbeing found that more than 17.1% of Australians consume alcohol at a degree that places them at greater probability of harm because of alcohol-related disease or injury (AIHW, 2016). Furthermore, alcohol attributed
to over 150,000 hospitalisations a year and over 5,000 mortalities (AIHW, 2016). Additionally, the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) estimated that in 2015-2016, were almost 250,000 victims of physical assault by individuals intoxicated by alcohol (ABS, 2015). On the other hand, around 8.5 million Australians aged 14 years and older had used an illicit psychoactive substance in their lifetime while the use of cannabis continues to be the most commonly used illicit substance by respondents 14 years and older in the previous 12 months (AIHW, 2016).

Furthermore, it was reported that there was a slight increase in recent methamphetamine use amongst those aged 14 years and older there had been a decrease in recent use of methamphetamine ice from 2.3% in 2013 to 1.4% in 2016 (AIHW, 2016). In terms of community perceptions, the NDSHS reported that individuals’ perceptions of methamphetamines have changed substantially from 2013 to 2016 (AIHW, 2016). Australians now believe that methamphetamine is the drug of most concern to the community than any other drug including alcohol (AIHW, 2016). This is a significant increase from 16% in 2013 to 40% in 2016 (AIHW, 2016). Similarly, a larger number thought methamphetamine caused the most deaths (AIHW, 2016). It is the first time that methamphetamine has ranked number one for most likely to be associated with a drug problem (AIHW, 2016). In relation to drug related crime and disorder, in 2016, 9.3% of the population had been a victim of an illicit drug-related incident in the previous twelve months (AIHW, 2016). This was a slight increase from 8.3% in 2013 (AIHW, 2016). Nevertheless, the social harms drug use can invoke can be wide ranging.

Licit and illicit drugs may perpetuate mental health problems, violent and aggressive behaviours as well as family breakdown and dysfunction (McKetin, Lubman, Najman, Dawe, Butterworth, Baker, 2014). While the health costs of drug use often comprise emergency department presentations for serious harm; the use of mental health facilities and rehabilitation for long-term harms (McKetin et al, 2014). The use of licit and illicit drugs is also associated with increased the risk of taking part in risk-taking behaviours and the chance of contracting or spreading blood borne diseases such as HIV/AIDS (AIHW, 2016). Moreover, the economic harms include, associated criminal acts, decreased productivity, courts, prisons and police costs (McKetin et al, 2014).

Scientific evidence on the relationship between drugs and crime is contentious with the debate of whether drug use is a causal factor for crime being contested. For example, the Drug Use Monitoring in Australia
(DUMA) run by the Australian Institute of Criminology noted that while some offending is directly linked to illicit drug use, it does not necessarily reflect that drug use is a precursor to crime (Schulte, Mouzos & Makkai, 2005). Nevertheless, other research has offered a strong link between illicit drug use and crime (Halstead & Poynton, 2016). Halstead & Poynton (2016) found that perpetrators that reported using illicit substances at a higher prevalence in comparison to the general population.

While, the offending population is more likely to use illicit drugs in comparison to the general population (Halstead & Poynton, 2016). A large proportion of offenders attribute their criminal activities to illicit drug use, according to Gannoni & Goldsmid, (2017, p. 1) who note “in Australia, three out of every four offenders detained by police test positive for at least one drug (excluding alcohol).” With the NSW Inmate Health survey reporting that 84% of incarcerated individuals had used an illicit substance (Payne, 2007). In relation to specific drug use, regular amphetamine users were more likely to commit property offences (53%) than non-user offenders (Degenhardt, Roxburgh, Black, Bruno, 2008).

In 2014-2015, principal illicit drug offences were the most common in the nation representing 20% or 83,160 offences, while in relation to age, 20–24 year olds were the highest group to commit illicit drug-related offences (Gannoni & Goldsmid, 2017). Moreover, illicit drug use is one of the primary contributors to recidivism, with recidivism being linked to unemployment, low levels of education, homelessness or unstable accommodation, limited social support and services (Payne, 2007). Such social problems can instigate moral panic, a concept devised by Stan Cohen (1972) to outline societal reaction of the Mods and Rockers, which has since been applied to a raft of social ills, for example illicit drug use.

MORAL PANIC AND DRUG USE: COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS AND FEAR OF CRIME

According to the Scott & Marshall (2009, p. 148), moral panic can be defined as “the process of arousing social concern over an issue – usually the work of moral entrepreneurs.” Typically, moral entrepreneurs operate within mass media, for Cohen (2002) the media creates and present news to the population influencing and shaping the perceptions of the community. Albeit the presentation of news should be fair and just, as noted by Birch, Ireland & Ozanne (2018, p. 338) “the media is a powerful social institution, which can set the social and political agenda. Therefore, the media has a responsibility to represent individuals and groups in a fair and just manner, free from stereotypes and negative connotations.”
However, the media’s representation of the nature and extent of the deviancy are significantly intensified (Cohen, 2002, p.7). The media present the perception that members of the community are likely to become a victim of the deviant act with such focus contributing to the generation of “concern, anxiety, indignation or panic” by members of the community (Cohen, 2002, p.7).

As noted earlier, moral panic was first applied to the Mods and Rockers in 1960’s Britain, however the concept has since been applied to other social problems for example, child abuse, HIV/AIDS epidemic and young people and crime. Contemporaneously, moral panic has been applied to aggression (Boyd & Carter, 2012) and drug use (Critcher, 2008; Eversman & Bird, 2017). Specifically, the work of Zajdow (2008) extensively explores moral panic in relation to heroin overdoses and subsequent deaths in the late 1990’s. Zajdow’s study argues that powerful groups in society helped inform media on the heroin problem by exaggerating its claims and using stories of addicts (Zajdow, 2008). The study found that although there was an increase in heroin overdoses and subsequent deaths, there were elements of moral panic through the media’s exaggerated representation of the problem (Zajdow, 2008). This exaggerated representation of heroin use has arguably, more recently, been extended to the use of the drug ice.

According to the mass media, Australia is in the midst of a nationwide ice epidemic (Healey, 2016) and while ice use does cause some individuals to become violent and aggressive (McKetin et al, 2014), ice users are often depicted by the media as being more aggressive than any other licit or illicit drug user (Weidner, 2009; Degenhardt et al, 2008). Furthermore, media and the community perceive ice use as causing significant mental health problems (Weidner, 2009; Degenhardt et al, 2008). Such media reporting of ice use may influence and shape the perceptions of community members on the prevalence of ice use in the community resulting in community members inaccurately believing that there is a high likelihood of becoming a victim of drug related crime involving violence. Invariably, this increases the fear experienced by community members with regards to the communities in which they live (Healey, 2016). The relationship between moral panic and fear of crime is well documented (e.g. Eschholz, 1997; Ungar, 2001) and while the term, fear of crime, is problematic, it is defined through understanding fear and physical harm. Garofalo (1981, p. 814) stated that:
We can define fear as an emotional reaction characterized by a sense of danger and anxiety. We restrict our definition to the sense of danger and anxiety produced by the threat of physical harm. Furthermore, to constitute fear of crime, the fear must be elicited by perceived cues in the environment that relate to some aspect of crime for the person.

It can therefore be surmised, that media influences on community perceptions creates moral panic and exacerbates fear of crime disproportionate to actual levels of victimisation (Healey, 2016). Moral panic is created and perpetuated through the mass media’s use of sensationalised headlines and melodramatic vocabulary (Goode & Ben-Yehuda, 2010), while the media have a propensity to disregard health expert’s advice and actual statistics (Weidner, 2009). What such studies illustrate is how the media misrepresent and exaggerate statistics when communicating news on issues such as drug use as well as broader crime and disorder issues.

Weatherburn (2011) advises that the media may abuse official crime and health statistics through a number of ways. This includes, constructing the idea that crime is increasing, the selective use of statistics and the selective reporting of statistics (Weatherburn, 2011). In addition, official statistics may not accurately represent the complete nature and extent of crime, that is, police may not arrest all people committing a particular crime or may choose to apply discretion and not arrest or record a particular crime (Weatherburn, 2011). The current study builds on the themes of community perceptions, fear of crime and drug use by examining community perceptions on the prevalence of licit and illicit drugs in a regional town of NSW, Australia.

METHODOLOGY

Utilising a qualitative framework, the primary data collection technique used in this study was focus group interviews. This method of data collection was adopted as focus groups are recognised to elicit participants’ perceptions on the prevalence of licit and illicit drug use in the community and related fear of crime (Kruegar & Casey, 2009). Further to this, focus groups allow participants to engage in interactive discussions in which unique and significant data is generated where it may not have been created in other research methods (Hennink, 2014). This accordingly translates into in-depth understandings of participant perceptions (Hennink, 2014). May notes, “focus groups are an important research tool
as it assists researchers in investigating group norms and dynamics” (May, 2011, p.137).

The overarching aim of the study was to examine community perceptions on the prevalence of licit and illicit drugs. This aim informed the following research questions which guided the data collection:

1. What is the community perception of licit and illicit drug use and related fear of crime in the New South Wales regional town?
2. To what extent are community perceptions proportional to the actual nature and extent of licit and illicit drug use in the NSW regional town?
3. In what ways are community perceptions of use of licit and illicit drugs and fear of crime changed when presented with statistical evidence of the actual scope and nature of use in the New South Wales regional town?

**Sampling and recruitment procedure**

Three focus groups were established for the study. The focus groups included eight participants in each of the focus groups, with a total of 24 participants. This study adopted a purposive sampling framework using snowball recruiting with local council members of the regional town provided support in this process. All participants either worked, studied or lived in the local government area of the regional town used in the study and were drawn from council employees, night time economy workers, and university students. 58% were males and 42% were females. The age of focus group participants ranged from the youngest being 20 to the eldest being 77 years old. The average age (mean) of focus group participants was 36 years old.

**Data collection, analysis and ethics**

The focus groups were conducted using several prompts to stimulate discussion, these promotes included: How prevalent are drugs in the community? What drugs do you most associate with a ‘drug problem’? What drugs, if any, do you think are causing a problem in the community? How do you see the community being impacted by drug use? How many people do you think are seeking treatment for illicit drugs? Where do individuals go to seek help within the community? What do you think are the main factors contributing to drug use in the community? Do you think drug-related offending is a problem in the community? Have seen drugs being dealt or know of drug dealing in the area? Do you know anyone
addicted to drugs and how this has their addiction affected their relationships?

Thematic analysis was undertaken as it could be applied across a range of theoretical and epistemological approaches, and because of its theoretical freedom and versatility (Braun & Clarke 2006, p.5). The thematic analysis provided an emphasis on what was said in the interviews, rather than how it was said and included a framework approach outlined by Ryan & Bernard (2003). This approach allowed for the development of an index of central themes to be used to construct the analysis. One of the researchers led on the data analysis and identified the themes in the analysis, while the remaining two researchers verified the themes through a second round of data analysis. The data analysis yields three central themes from the data collection: 1. Community perception and fear, 2. Community understanding of drug use, 3. Official data and community understanding.

Approval from the Human Research Ethics Committee at the Charles Sturt University, Australia was gained prior to commencement of fieldwork.

FINDINGS

Theme one: Community perception and fear

The theme centred on gaining an understanding and insight into community perception of licit and illicit drug use and related fear of crime within the regional town the study was conducted in. The dataset within this theme revealed that most of focus group participants suggest that the prevalence of illicit drugs in central west NSW regional town was considerably high. Participants feel that illicit drug use is of major concern to the community and that drug use is primarily concentrated in certain areas of the main metropolitan areas of this region. Furthermore, participants had heightened levels of related fear as all 24 participants expressed a high fear of becoming a victim of crime, in particular from ice users.

There was a consensus among participants that ice use is widespread in their community and the consequences are significant, such as high crime rates. A common pattern found within the dataset under this theme the prominence of ice. For all focus group participants, it was unanimously recognised that ice is the drug of most concern and causes the most problems in their community. This is illustrated by one participant from focus group three who stated “it’s very prevalent, quite often, you only
have to walk around and see someone on something. I don’t know what, but you can hear their tempers, the way they talk”, “you probably think ice.”

In each focus group, participants perceived illicit drugs were easily accessible and obtainable in their regional town. This was illustrated by Focus group one participants who believed that there was frequent drug dealing in the area. Participants within focus group one also alluded to knowing of actual drug dealing being conducted in the area and that it was common to know where drug dealing occurs amongst this group of participants.

Overall, based on their knowledge of drug use in their regional town participants were primarily concerned with violence associated with ice use. The focus group participants associated quite strongly that ice use resulted in users becoming aggressive and violent. Throughout the focus group interviews, participants repeatedly focused on ice as being a major contributor to the high levels of domestic violence in region. Participant six from focus group two proposed “people affected by ice are committing domestic violence and impacting families.”

In sum, the data analysis yielded that the participants thought drug use was rife within the region and that ice was the drug of most concern. This perception of drug use in the region led many participants to agree with the notion that this increased the risk of being a victim to a violent crime.

**Theme two: Community understanding of drug use**

The second theme to emerge from the dataset involved understanding what the participants thought the nature and extent of drug use was in their region. What the data analysis revealed was focus group participants thought the extent of drug use was high and that the nature of this drug use centred on ice. All 24 participants unanimously indicate that ice is the drug of most concern and causes the most problems in the community. For example, Participant three, focus group three explains “it’s very prevalent, quite often, you only have to walk around and see someone on something. I don’t know what, but you can hear their tempers, the way they talk”, “you probably think ice.”

An interesting finding from the focus groups was how participants primarily focussed on the use of ice in the community, rather than licit drugs such as alcohol. Alcohol was only considered as an issue when prompted by the focus group lead in which one participant in focus group
two simply stated, “drinking does have its problems.” These findings from the dataset presented in this paper highlight both the disproportionate and less severe perception, among participants in terms their personal knowledge of the nature and extent of drug use.

**Theme three: Official data and community understanding**

Finally, the third theme revealed through data analysis centred on the impact official data made on participants in terms of influencing their understanding of drug use in the area and subsequent fear of crime. This finding is captured under the following theme: Official data and community understanding.

The central premise of this theme led to identifying whether knowledge of licit and illicit drug use in the regional town increased or decreased peoples’ perception of drug use in the region as well as their fear of crime. Of those who took part in the study, the views and understanding of the participants’ changed slightly with knowledge of the actual nature and extent of crime. Nevertheless, their fear of crime remained the same. Participants, even upon presentation of the official drug data, still perceived ice use as the drug causing the most harm to the community than any other licit and illicit drug, and contribute to their fear of crime, in particular, of being a victim to violence. For example, upon presentation of the official data one focus group participant commented “that’s not what I was expecting. Looking at the statistics it’s a pretty small amount.”

Further to this, participants perceived ice use as a significant contributor to domestic violence and non-domestic violence despite statistics highlighting alcohol is a more significant factor. This highlights participants’ perceptions on the consequences of victimisation from ice use may not reflect relative levels of victimisation experienced in the central west regional community this study took place. In sum, fear of crime did not alleviate for the participants of the study when presented with official data on drug use, allowing for a more accurate understanding of drug use to emerge.

**DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION**

While this is a small-scale study that examines the perceptions of a particular regional community in New South Wales, Australia, the findings of this study are of value. First, those who took part in the study reported that illicit drug use was a significant issue within their region. Despite participants not being aware of official data and statistics, theme one and two of the data analysis revealed that all focus group members considered
ice to be a significant problem. Those who took part in the study offered a limited understanding of the true nature and extent of drug use in the area, in particular with the issue of alcohol. Participants perceived illicit drugs, particularly ice use as causing more harm to the community. These findings are reflective of the results reported in the National Drug Strategy Household Survey (NDSHS) (AIHW, 2016) where the community perception of the drug ice was the drug of most concern to the community (AIHW, 2016).

This finding was the first-time alcohol had been considered a less serious problem to the community compared to illicit drugs (AIHW, 2016), a finding reflected in the study presented in this paper. Nevertheless, statistics from the Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research (BOCSAR) and the latest NDSHS (AIHW, 2016) reveals that alcohol causes more harms to the community than illicit drugs. This is important to note as there was no consensus within the focus groups that alcohol use was a problem in their region. Alcohol was only considered as a potential problem after the focus group leader promoted participants of the view about alcohol.

Furthermore, while participants believed the drug ice was the main problem within their regional town, the available official statistics shows that the town where the study took place, has relatively low rates of ice use in the community. The official statistics also showed that the rate of victims of non-domestic alcohol-related assaults was significantly high in the region in which the study took place, thus, reaffirming that alcohol causes more harm in the community than illicit drugs. Nevertheless, the participants failed to recognise a more accurate understanding of the nature of the problem. BOCSAR identifies there were 439 victims of alcohol related assault per 100,000 population in regional town that took place in the study from July 2016 to June 2017 (BOCSAR, 2017). This was significantly higher than the NSW average rate during the same time period of 294 per 100,000 population (BOCSAR, 2017). Further to this, according to BOCSAR (2017), the rate per 100,000 population of incidence of ice use and possession was far lower in the regional town in which the study was conducted compared to other drug related offences such as the use/possession of amphetamines (excluding ecstasy) (BOCSAR, 2017).

The perception and understanding of drug use within the region were impacted on in a limited way when those who took part in the study were presented with official data related to drug use, nevertheless the impact on fear of crime was not. As Garofalo (1981) noted, fear of crime is a
response to anxiety and physical harm induced by the perception that crime is occurring in your locality, which in turn reflects many sentiments offered by the focus group participants.

These sentiments were consistent amongst the participants both pre and post presentation of the official drug use data. Given that the feelings of fear of crime did not change, the implications of such findings are just presenting the actual prevalence of crime/drug use may not be enough to alleviate community fears. However, as noted earlier in the paper, the media can be responsible for creating and sustaining community views on a range of social problems (Cohen, 2002) with the work of Zajdow (2008) and Healey (2016) contextualizing this within the use of drugs, in which moral panic can be engendered. For example, Healey notes how the media has labelled Australia as being during an ice epidemic. Perhaps the impact on community perception of drug use and their subsequent fear of crime may be altered through more accurate media reporting than simply through the presentation of official data. There may also be a role in community policing with regards to the role of elevating fear of crime. The work of Roh & Oliver (2005) and Cordner & Melekian (2010) has considered the role of community policing in the reduction of a community’s fear of crime as well as effective strategies to be employed in this endeavour.

In conclusion, the community’s perception of drug use and their subsequent fear of crime is a common problem that stimulates an inaccurate understanding of the contemporary nature and extent of crime and disorder of drug use. Further research would benefit from examining the effects of more accurate media reporting on drug use and the effects on community views and feelings of safety, as well as the role of community policing in positively impacting on drug use perceptions and related fear of crime. This type of evidence could inform policy development in the areas of crime prevention and community safety and stimulate effective outcomes for the community.

NOTE

1. Organisations not disclosed to retain the anonymity of the region in which the study was conducted.
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REFERENCES


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The Ustaša in Australia: A Review of Right-Wing
Ustaša Terrorism from 1963-1973, and Factors that Enabled their Endurance

Kristy Campion‡

ABSTRACT

From 1963–1973, the Ustaša, a Croatian terrorist organisation, would find an unlikely safe haven in Australia. There, they established new Ustaša networks which trained new members, financed chapters overseas, launched incursions into Yugoslavia, and waged a terrorism campaign against the Yugoslav migrant community in Australia. In ten years, the Ustaša was found to be directly responsible for fifteen attacks, and inspired dozens more. It was not until 1973 that the Ustaša campaign in Australia came to an end, with a change in government, provoking a review of Australia’s law enforcement agencies. The Ustaša operated in Australia due to five major factors. Firstly, there was political sympathy for Croatian independence, which led to a reluctance amongst some officials to admit the Ustaša existed. Secondly, there was the political alignment of the Ustaša, which was favourably right wing at a time when Australia’s main enemy, communism, was on the left side of politics. Competing security jurisdictions and obscurity also undermined collaboration and counterterrorism efforts. Another factor was community relations, undermined by the language barrier and Yugoslav fear of retribution. Finally, strategic Ustaša targeting decisions enabled it to avoid provoking public censure.

Keywords: Ustaša, Ustash, Australia, terror, right-wing, history

INTRODUCTION

The Revolutionary Croatian Ustasha Organisation, otherwise known as the Ustaša (meaning ‘insurgent’), waged a decade-long campaign of terror in Australia from 1963 to 1973. Initially, its presence was ignored, then tolerated, and finally, suppressed. The full scope of Ustaša-inspired terrorism in Australia is rarely recognised but has new significance in a time when right-wing violence is unfolding in other Western countries. The Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIIO) directly attributed fifteen attacks to the Ustaša, however, this research found that there are another twenty-five attacks which could possibly be linked to Croatian extremism. In reviewing Ustaša terrorism, this paper

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demonstrates the endurance of right-wing terrorism in Australia during a particularly turbulent period in history.

This paper identifies five factors which allowed the Ustaša to thrive in Australia and launch attacks. Firstly, there was existing sympathy to the Ustaša cause, given that they championed Croatian independence so soon after recognition that all peoples had the right to self-determination. Secondly, the Ustaša were ideologically aligned with right-wing politics, which, given the great communist threat of the Cold War, was convenient if not serendipitous. Thirdly, no one person or agency was in charge of counterterrorism in Australia during this period, with competing jurisdictions among law enforcement. Fourthly, Yugoslav language proved a barrier for law enforcement when liaising effectively with the community and attempting to penetrate the Ustaša. Finally, the tactical decisions of the Ustaša in targeting the migrant community and Yugoslav symbols minimised general outrage at their activities. These factors enabled the Ustaša to endure in Australia until a change in government provoked an overall review of Australia’s security apparatus in 1973.

The primary process for identifying these factors was the historical method. This included reviewing records from the National Australian Archives, Queensland State Archives, Trove, and Hansard. These were contextualised against the broader historical milieu and record, especially regarding strategic targeting. Public statements gave indications of political sympathy, while ideological alignment was signposted through leadership statements and resourcing decisions. The jurisdictional obscurity was reflected in various security reviews, driven perhaps by the media highlighting the community relations issues.

BACKGROUND TO CROATIAN EXTREMISM

The Ustaša arose from Croatia’s long fight for independence. Until the end of WWI, Croatia was part of the Austria-Hungary Empire. Before the end of WWI, the Croatian parliament declared independence, becoming the State of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians. The Kingdom of Serbs soon joined it. In 1929, King of Serbs, Alexander I, began a dictatorship following the assassination his political adversary, Stjepan Radic, in parliament. Radic, and several others, were shot by members of the Radical Party (Miljan 2016). In 1931, Alexander I renamed the country Yugoslavia.

In response to the dictatorship, the nationalist Ante Pavelić founded the Ustaša in 1929. The group was anti-Yugoslav, pursuing complete
Croatian independence. Its ideology was not purely nationalistic and separatist: it was also fascist, racist, ethnic and religious (Korb 2010). The Croats desired a one-party state of Croatian Roman Catholics, excluding the 1,925,000 Orthodox Serbs, which resulted in a surge of ethnic cleansing (Mirkovic 2000).

The Ustaša had influential benefactors, including the Internal Macedonia Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO). The IMRO was formed in 1893 and desired an independent Macedonia of Slavic and Orthodox Christians (Law 2009, 154). Following World War One, Macedonia was divided between Greece and Yugoslavia. The IMRO began focusing their attacks to these two nations, supported by Bulgaria, which had lost territory to Yugoslavia; and Italy, led by Benito Mussolini who desired an unstable Yugoslavia, donating £70,000 to the cause (Miljan 2016, 10).

Because of the IMRO, the Ustaša received support from Bulgaria and Italy, in addition to Hungary and Austria, both of whom bore grudges against Yugoslavia (Law 2009, 156). The IMRO trained the Ustaša in terrorist tactics, assassinations, and bomb-making, while Mussolini supported them financially. The price for Mussolini’s assistance was high: if the Ustaša were successful, Mussolini would claim Dalmatia (Laqueur 1977, 76).

The Ustaša, now trained and funded, launched a terrorist campaign against Yugoslavia. In 1934, they assassinated King Alexander I and the French Foreign Minister Lous Bathou, which forced Mussolini to renounce them. Leaders took refuge in Austria, which refused to extradite them (Lewis 2014, 188). Outrage at the assassination led to League of Nations passing the Convention of the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (1937), which was signed but not ratified.

The Ustaša were suppressed until World War Two, when, in 1941, they allied with the Nazi Party of Germany. That same year, the Nazis invaded Yugoslavia, and allowed the Ustaša to administer the territory. Pavelić became dictator and adhered to Nazi policy. Concentration camps appeared under the so-called Black Legion (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1973a, 542). Camps such as Jasenovac claimed 100,000 lives - mostly Jews, Gypsies, and Serbians. The brutality of the Croatian camps challenged the systematic extermination of other camps, as internees were killed one by one, with hammers, bludgeons, knives, and bullets (Highim 2001, np).
In 1945, a Communist-supported resistance arose in Yugoslavia, calling themselves Partisans, led by Marshall Josip Tito. The last battle of the European theatre in World War Two was the Battle of Poljana, where a mixed force of Nazi and Ustaša forces were routed by a Yugoslav Partisan force. After the war, Marshall Tito became the President of Yugoslavia, driving a modified national communist agenda for the six republics, including Croatia. Pavelić ordered the Ustaša to flee abroad to Argentina, Canada, or Australia.

USTAŠA IN AUSTRALIA

The term Ustaša has been used here to refer to the Croatian extremist movement, although the Ustaša did not constitute a single organisation in Australia. After WWII, CIA files suggest that the Ustaša movement internationalised and expanded, reaching out to Croatian separatist movements around the world (CIA 1972). As a result, it was an evolving network of organisations. There were three major groups in Australia, and later, two minor organisations.

The first was the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP), established in 1956 by Ante Pavelić in Argentina. In Australia, it was run by Fabian Lovokovic, who established twenty-five branches, and published Spremnost magazine (Blaxland 2015, 124). Secondly, there was the Croatian National Resistance (HNO). It was originally founded in 1957 in Spain by General Vjekoslav ‘Maks’ Luburic, the commander of Jasenovac. In Australia, it was run by Srecko Rover. He, and his father Josip, were original Ustaša leaders, immigrating to Australia in 1950 (Cain 1994, 206). HNO published a magazine called Obrana. Thirdly, there was the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB).

It was run by a Catholic official, Father Rocque Romac, through the Croatian Catholic Welfare Centre; and by Srecko Rover. Romac was integral to weapons and terrorism training in New South Wales (Cain 1994, 206). Later, in 1972, two more organisations surfaced. One was the Union of United Croatian Youth of the World (SHUMS), which published Uzdanica, and had around a hundred members. Its emergence coincided with the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (HIRO) (Blaxland 2015, 149). According to a sympathiser, these groups wanted ‘to destroy everything that is Yugoslav and free the state of Croatia from Yugoslavia’ (NAA M132:330a).

By 1962, Marshall Tito was seventy years old, and some Croatians thought the time was again ripe for independence. Operating from
Australia gave the Ustaša three tactical advantages. Firstly, insurrection on foreign soil and with foreign citizenship gave the terrorists some measure of protection from the Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS). Secondly, it gave them the capability to launch attacks directly into Yugoslavia. Thirdly, it allowed them to launch attacks against the large Yugoslav migrant community in Australia. As counterterrorism was not the central task of either ASIO, the Commonwealth Police (Compol), or the State Police Special Branches, this was a further, if somewhat unintentional, advantage for the Ustaša, who would have faced the ruthless YIS had they operated solely in Yugoslavia (Blaxland 2015, 158).

EARLY CAMPAIGN, 1963–1967

The Ustaša campaign began inconsistently, with sporadic conflict within the migrant community. One known attack occurred in May 1963, at the start of the cane cutting season in far north Queensland. A group of masked and armed men burst into Yugoslav canecutters barracks armed with knives and guns. They damaged the dwelling, targeting political pictures and symbols. No one was hurt, and attackers were never uncovered (QSA 39:37399a). The attack was seen as criminal, despite the long-simmering political rivalries in migrant communities.

Right wing groups were considered by the ASIO Director General Spry, as ‘good anti-communists’, aligned against ASIOs primary enemy. Due to this, only four officers were tasked to Croatian extremism in 1963 (Blaxland 2015, 125). This was convenient for the Ustaša, especially when photos surfaced of uniformed Ustaša training with the Australian Citizens Military Force (CMF) in Wodonga in April 1963 (NAA M132:330b). One Ustaša member was holding an Australian-made Owen submachine gun, with the group posing in front of an armoured vehicle. Officials claimed that the Ustaša were on a picnic and had accidently stumbled upon the CMF force (“Govt Links to Croat Fascists” 1963). The Spremnost claimed it was a five-day exercise, and wrote this poem:

Hullo Wodonga you are our centre
You are the nest of Croat Ustashi
Fellow campers of Ante Pavelić
Wodonga again calls you,
All the camps which have been broken down will again rise.
(“Poem for Terrorism” 1972)
After the poem, Dr Jim Cairns of the Labour Party made a speech in the House of Representatives, presenting the Wodonga photos, *Spremnost*, and other evidence implicating several members of the Liberal Party with the Ustaša. The Attorney-General dismissed his concerns. Prime Minister Harold Holt maintained that there were law enforcement agencies capable of dealing with terrorists, to which Cairns demanded why he ‘did not use them?’ (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1964b). In fact, ASIO was closely monitoring Croatian extremism, however, it was not for prosecution and was not being shared with Compol, who did have the powers to lay charges (Blaxland 2015, 127).

Ustaša training camps were established in NSW, run by the HOP. This same group was thought to be responsible for training the Croatian Nine, who were members of the HRB. After training in NSW, nine HRB members travelled to Yugoslavia on 5 July 1963, and launched a sabotage mission near Trieste. YIS, which routinely tracked Croats, captured the Croatian Nine (Cain 1994, 206).

Though of lesser consequence, there were other signs of unrest. On 24 November 1963, a group of Croatians smashed the windows of the Yugoslav consulate in Sydney. The consulate suspected that Croatians were Ustaša, and informed ASIO (Blaxland 2015, 126). Some officers, according to Blaxland, were sceptical, believing YIS was involved, attempting to foster hostility and outrage against the Ustaša (2015, 143-144). This isn’t unlikely, as many consulate staff were allegedly YIS officers or collaborators.

Despite these isolated events, the Ustaša campaign really began on 7 May 1964. A young Croat called Tomislav Lesic carried a suitcase bomb towards the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney, where he intended to leave it for later detonation. It exploded prematurely, damaging his legs and rendering him blind. Lesic claimed the suitcase was given to him by communists, although few believed him (“Disabled Croat demands Rights” 1966). This attack put the Ustaša in the national headlines, along with suspicions of government leniency.

After the failure of the suitcase bomber, on 12 May 1964, a Brisbane teacher, Louis Gugenberger, claimed he received a death threat from the Ustaša. Gugenberger had independently investigated the Ustaša and had posted his evidence to the Department of External Affairs for translation (QSA 39:37399b). The threats, which were both verbal and written, were considered so serious that the Police of the South Coast recommended that
Gugenberger receive a firearm permit and taught him how to shoot (QSA 39:37399c).

Another victim who came forward was a Yugoslav priest, Father Marko Gjokmarkovic, of the Holy Spirit Church in New Farm. He too had received threatening letters from the Ustaša. Father Gjokmarkovic believed it because of his opposition to the HOP, and criticism of the Ustaša (QSA 30:37399d). Subsequent Queensland Police investigations yielded nothing. That month, Attorney-General Bill Snedden dismissed fears, saying that the publicity given to the Ustaša “far outweighed its significance” (“Croatian Group Leaders Warned” 1964).

Further obscuring Ustaša’s presence were opportunists invoking the Ustaša as an excuse for criminality. One high profile case was that of Milan Novakovic. He was a Serbian farmer in Dimbulah, Queensland, who stabbed and killed local Croatian, Gojko Radalj. Novakovic said that he killed Radalj in self-defence, alleging that Radalj was a member of the Ustaša (QSA 39:37399e). Though he escaped conviction, the Queensland Special Branch believed that Novakovic ‘merely concocted this story to impress upon the jury at his trial that he was a peaceful citizen being hounded by a terrorist organisation, and thus gain sympathy’ (QSA 39:37399f). Novakovic’s solicitor later reported that six cars of armed Yugoslavs had cruised past Novakovic’s house. When one car was pulled over by police, a knife, shotgun, and cartridges were found.

Two more Ustaša-related events took place towards the end of 1964. A Melbourne police station received bomb threats and were warned that their officers would be shot if they investigated the Ustaša. Shortly after, three alleged Ustaša broke into a Sydney home, demanding the whereabouts of a female communist, whom they intended to murder. The victim refused to expose the woman and was tortured (QSA 39:37399g).

In January 1965, Brian Bolton reported in the Sunday Truth that the Ustaša were setting up more training camps, this time in north Queensland (QSA 39:37399h). Specifically, these were in Dimbulah and Atherton (though it would take six years for these claims to be proven) (QSA 39:37399i). There, younger Ustaša men trained in guerrilla warfare under the leadership of older Ustaša. Though there was an investigation by Queensland’s Special Branch, little evidence was found, and security agencies continued monitoring the Ustasa without much collaboration.

On 19 February 1965, Ustaša member Ambroz Andric bombed a Yugoslav Settlers Association dance in Geelong West Town Hall,
Victoria. He broke the window to the hall, and threw in a pepper bomb, followed by a bomb containing ammonia concentrate and pyridine ("Ustashi Supporter" 1965). While some suggested it was only a stink bomb, ammonia concentrate is severely damaging to the lungs if inhaled. It seemed to indicate the Andric wanted to cause harm and disruption, rather than fatalities. During the trial, witnesses received death threats for testifying against Andric. To lend weight, the top Ustaša leader in Australia, Srecko Rover wore his Ustaša Gestapo badge in the public gallery in support of Andric. Andric was nonetheless convicted of the attack.

By 1965, the campaign was gathering traction. On 19 March, an Australian Croatian called Josip Senic was detained from international travel because his passport was invalid. A search revealed he was in possession of extremist literature, including the membership book for the HRB. Undeterred, Senic travelled to Europe illegally. He would go on to mastermind more attacks, abroad and at home.

On 17 November 1966, an anti-Ustaša campaigner called Marjan Jurjevic had a lucky escape. A book bomb had been posted to him, which was supposed to explode upon opening. Instead, it detonated prematurely in the General Post Office mail chute. This was fortuitous in two ways: firstly, it thwarted the assassination of Jurjevic, and secondly, it prevented the bomb detonating in the mailroom, where six people worked ("Politics behind bomb outrage" 1966).

The year of 1967 was a particularly active time for the Ustaša. On 1 January, Ustaša managed to smuggle gelignite into the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney. Surprisingly, given their previous mishaps, they successfully detonated the explosives, though the building was empty, and no one was injured. A note claimed: ‘We missed you this time, you communist bastard but we shall not miss you next time’ (Blaxland 2015, 136). Compol raided several extremists following the bombing, but it took over a year for the documents to be translated by ASIO (Blaxland 2015, 136-137).

On 19 February, a bomb was thrown into a meeting held by the Yugoslav Settlers Association in Fitzroy, without casualty (Blaxland 2015, 137). In March that year, the house of Josip Senic was raided by Compol. While seizing over 700 documents, police found that Senic was a top man of the HRB, and that the Australian organisation was keeping the European chapters afloat financially (NAA A6980:S203532c). The only consequence of this was Senic being denied a passport a year later.
On 19 April, a bomb was detonated in a flat in Darlinghurst, while a Yugoslav couple slept inside. They escaped injury. On 24 April, a petrol bomb was thrown through the St Kilda home of ALP candidate Brian Zouch, causing significant damage but no fatalities (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c). On 10 May, ammonia bombs made another appearance, being thrown through the open doors of the Geelong Trade Hall during a Yugoslav Settler’s dance (“Ustashi Bomb” 1967). The Free Settlers Association President condemned the Ustaša, but no further action was taken.

In September 1967, Queensland Police confirmed the presence of the Ustaša, and suspected that small groups of men were quietly drifting up to Queensland in preparation for a new wave of violence. It turns out they were only partly right: rumours surfaced of a Ustaša training camp in the Atherton Tablelands; several years later, another such camp was found in Mackay, disguised as a picnic area (QSA 39:37399j).

On 1 December 1967, a fountain pen bomb exploded at another Yugoslav social function at Richmond Town Hall in Victoria. It is difficult to tell who the target was, between Marjan Jurjevic, political adversary Dr Jim Cairns, and the Yugoslav Consul-General, Nicholas Zic (“Boy Hurt in Pen Bomb Blast” 1967). The bomb prematurely detonated, disfiguring a child. A note from the Ustaša claimed the attack was ‘just letting the Yugoslavs know that they were around’ (Blaxland 2015, 138). It was later revealed that the Andric brothers had built the bomb.

LATER CAMPAIGN, 1968–1972

There were only three major attacks related to Croatian extremism in 1968. On 8 November, a bomb was thrown into a South Melbourne home, though no one was reported injured (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c). Contrary reports indicate that the South Melbourne bomb blew up the station wagon owned by Yugoslavs, but they could also present as two separate incidents (QSA 39:37399k). On 1 December 1968, Croatians gathered at the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney, smashing windows and trying to burn it down. Apparently, William McMahon, the Federal Treasurer at the time, stumbled upon Ustaša arsonists. McMahon allegedly told a newspaper that ‘they seem a good bunch’ and ‘They have a good cause’ (NAA M132:330d), further encouraging a permissive atmosphere.

The campaign in 1969 began with murder. In March, a Yugoslav migrant Yago Despot and an Australian Charles Hughes were shot dead in
their Caulfield home. Prior to the murders, there were claims that they had a story about the Ustaša. No one was ever convicted (NAA M132:330e). The following month, in April, a bomb was detonated in the home of Danica Solunac in Mona Vale, injuring her and her 13-year-old daughter (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c). After the attacks, the new Attorney-General, Ivor Greenwood, refused to admit the Ustaša had a presence in Australia.

In May, there were numerous threats to businesses stocking Yugoslav goods, including David Jones. Ustaša gangs also began racketeering in the Yugoslav community. For example, a Yugoslav café owner had his Moonee Ponds café destroyed by Ustaša thugs for refusing to pay extortion costs. Rumours of bashings persisted (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972d). In June, a large explosive charge was detonated in front of the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney by Joseph Senic. He was assassinated a year later in West Germany, allegedly by YIS (“Yugoslav agents ordered murder” 1972).

The Ustaša had cause for concern, with deepening Australian-Yugoslav government ties, in the form of the Yugoslav-Australian migration agreement. In response, on 28 November, the Ustaša bombed the Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra. This was followed by an attempt to burn down the Immigration Office in Canberra three days later (Blaxland 2015, 141). It was later revealed that Compol had petitioned Attorney-General Greenwood to prosecute and deport Croatian terrorists, without success (QSA 39:37399l). The Senator Lionel Murphey claimed Greenwood was, at best, irresponsible; and at worst, complicit (“Senate Statement on Terrorism” 1973).

The following year saw increased activity by suspected Croatian extremists. On 2 January 1970, a gelignite bomb was detonated outside a Serbian Church in Canberra. Two Croats were convicted of the crime, but not deported (NAA A12389f). A few months later, in March, a Yugoslav concert was being held by Croatian singer and pioneer of Yugoslav music, Ivo Robic. Ustaša leaflets were showered from a balcony with a hit list of prominent Yugoslavs (NAA M132:330g). On 20 October, the Yugoslav Consulate in Melbourne was bombed, resulting in serious damage to the Consulate and twenty homes nearby, even though one of the devices was successfully defused (NAA A12389f). Finally, in November, Prime Minister Gorton received letters from Croatian extremists threatening to sabotage the new Westgate Bridge. A joint ASIO-Compol meeting
identified the need for proper coordination, but this did not occur (Blaxland 2015, 145).

There were four prominent attacks against Yugoslav interests in 1971. The first was on 17 January, when the Soviet Embassy in Canberra was fire-bombed as USSR support for Tito made it an Ustaša target (Blaxland 2015, 146). On 4 July 1971, a bomb damaged the Serbian Orthodox Church in Melbourne, causing $3000 worth of damage (NAA A12389f). On 23 November 1971, a Yugoslav Government-owned business, Adriatic Trade and Tourism Centre on George Street in Sydney was bombed (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c). Finally, 19 December, a suburban cinema in Newtown, Sydney, was bombed while screening Yugoslav war films (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c).

All of this activity was building to a crescendo. In 1972, the Ustaša were at their most active. On 11 January 1972, Croatian extremists targeted the Free Serbian Orthodox Church in Canberra, bombing a statue of a Serbian war hero, General Draza Mihailovic. This was followed by an unruly protest in front of the Southern Cross Hotel, and a flag burning. In March, there was brawling on the streets when a Yugoslav migrant in Footscray was assaulted by a Serbo-Croat, Miso Bobinac (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1973e). On 6 April 1972, there were two coordinated bombings in Melbourne by the Ustaša. One bomb targeted the ANZ Bank Migrant Advisory Centre, and the other targeted the home of Marjan Jurjevic. A Liberal senator, George Hannan, insinuated that Jurjevic had planted the bombs himself (“Senator Hannan apologises to anti-Ustasha man” 1974).

Through the preceding nine years, successive governments had refused to publicly admit the Ustaša were operating in Australia. This was put to the test on 3 June. That night, a young Croatian called Ivan Mudrinic had a late-night interview with Sergeant Robert Turner of the Crime Car Squad (NAA M132:330h). Mudrinic had some serious questions to answer – most importantly, why he had 231 sticks of gelignite under his bed.

It was found that Mudrinic helped Ustaša members to hide a significant Ustaša weapons cache in the Warburton ranges. The cache contained hundreds of rolls of gelignite, with half in a wooden box and half in a nylon bag; three rolls of fuse wire; two electric detonators; two tins of gunpowder; a green alarm clock; a walkie-talkie; and some books on politics and guerrilla warfare (NAA M132:330i). Two days later,
Mudrinic returned alone and removed the cache, reaching out to Marjan Jurjevic and police authorities. Investigators suspected that it may have been a YIS plot to incriminate Croatians. Nonetheless, four men were charged in relation to the Warburton Range explosive cache.

Despite the conviction, Attorney-General Ivor Greenwood was still publicly denying the existence of the Ustaša and the rumours of their training camps ("Ustasha Investigation" 1972). Later that same June, nineteen Croats, including Ambroz and Adolf Andric, and a number of other Australians, travelled to Yugoslavia via Germany and Austria. They planned to undertake terrorist missions against the Tito Government. The group expected to find the citizens supportive of the resistance, but it was the reverse. The terrorists engaged in a running battle with Yugoslav security forces near Bugojno, killing thirteen Yugoslavs before the fifteen of the terrorists were killed, and four were captured (CIA 1972, 3).

Following the nineteen, the Yugoslav authorities provided an aide de memoir to the Australians, which resulted in dozens of premises being raided by Compol. Though a great deal of material was seized, no charges were laid (QSA 39:37399m). The Ustaša training camps had now become an international problem for the second time. That same year, Interpol allegedly approached the NSW Bomb Squad, informing them that a number of Australian Croatians were involved in terrorism overseas, and they considered Australia the international headquarters for Ustaša terrorism (QSA 39:37399n).

A big police raid came in August 1972, where dozens of Yugoslav premises were raided in Sydney and Melbourne, targeting Croatian extremism. The raids yielded hundreds of documents and other materials, but translations incurred a lengthy delay, and eventually no charges were laid (QSA 39:37399m). On 30 August, the Australian Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, sent an urgent message to Compol. The Ustaša, angered by the failure of the Bugojno group, were planning a new round of attacks. In the ‘Fourth of September Plot’, the Ustaša intended to bomb international Yugoslav diplomatic missions simultaneously, while another cell would ‘deal’ with the diplomats. No attack was recorded for that date (QSA 39:37399o).

However, on 16 September, two Yugoslav travel agencies in Sydney, Adriatic and Andria Travel, were bombed, leaving sixteen civilians injured. This event would prove to be one of the catalysts for government action. For the first time, the Ustaša had indiscriminately harmed pedestrians indiscriminately. Still, there was resistance to recognising the
Ustaša. Liberal MP Bill Wentworth stated that it was ‘impossible to know if the bombings were done by the coms or not.’ He also claimed: ‘It could be that the communists are endeavouring to create a ring wing plot just like they did with the Australia First movement during World War II’ (QSA 39:37399k).

By 22 September, ASIO had sent some agents to Queensland to examine the training camps (QSA 39:37399p). That same month, a document was published called the “Croatian Struggle,” which detailed methods for Croats to use against Yugoslavs in Australia. This included harassing night calls, verbally abusing Yugoslav women, mailing abusive letters and postcards, subverting Yugoslavian housewives, disturbing the consulate with trivial calls, vandalising ships and trains, and disrupting logistics. The purpose was to divert Yugoslav Consulate attention from the Ustaša network (NAA M132:330j).

On 4 October 1972, with the net closing around the training camps, the Dimbulah Bridge was bombed. Close to one hundred sticks of gelignite were used for the bombing. It was only poor explosive placement that prevented the bridge from being destroyed (QSA 39:37399q). On 8 December 1972, a car bomb was detonated outside the Serbian Church in Brisbane, killing an American man, Thomas Patrick Enwright. Queensland Police held two competing theories. The first was that the American man was simply the wrong victim, and the bomb had been intended for the thirteen Serbian men inside the church. The second theory was that that Enwright detonated the car deliberately, as part of a suicide attack (“Wrong Victim Theory” 1972). Given the Ustaša’s history of premature detonations, it is also possible that Enwright accidentally triggered the blast. Some Liberal senators also blamed the bombings on the communists.

An ASIO Special Report over the period from 1969 to July 1972 further substantiated the scale of terrorist activity. Around 175 attacks were recorded, of which 25.5% included the use of explosives and incendiaries. The main culprits were the Ustaša, and several left-wing groups including the Provo, the Peoples Liberation Army, and the Worker-Student Alliance (NAA A12389). The language barrier, and the ongoing threat to Yugoslavs and their families, made peaceful Yugoslavs reluctant to interact with police. The report concluded that the Ustaša represented a present and continuing threat.
THE MOVEMENT FALTERS, 1973

A year passed without any further significant attacks but understanding of the Ustaša *modus operandi* had deepened. Messages circulated Queensland Police warning of potential Croatian attacks around significant dates in the Croatian calendar. These included April 10, the date when an independent Croatia (under the Nazis) was announced in 1941; and April 21, the date when General Luburic was assassinated in 1969 (QSA 39:37399r).

It was a tense time for the Yugoslav community: many naturalised Croatians were tracked by police, suspected of Ustaša activity (QSA 39:37399s). The magnitude of the Ustaša problem was finally being realised, in addition to an awareness of cooperation issues between ASIO and Compol. The two agencies didn’t enjoy mutual support, which limited the ability of Compol to both translate Croatian documents and prosecute Croatian extremists (Blaxland 2015, 158).

Up until 1971, the Ustaša had cost the government $29,100 in repairs to the consulates; and the Compol had expended $29,507 in protection (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1972d). After the events of 1972, this number was no doubt higher. Opposition Leader Gough Whitlam made a motion on 19 September 1972 that the government should develop intelligence and police organisations with the specialist knowledge and resources to prevent terrorist activities in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 1972c). On 5 December, the McMahon Government conceded defeat to Whitlam’s Labour Party, leaving this proposal to be undertaken by the incoming government.

The new Attorney General, Lionel Murphy, took a hard-line approach to the Ustaša, and worked to ensure proper resourcing and collaboration between ASIO and Compol. The Ustaša campaign in Australia ended in a slump. There was a half-hearted attempt to paint bomb the Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra in 1978; and in 1979, a Croatian extremist group known as the Lithgow Bombers planned a bombing campaign in Sydney, which never eventuated. In 1979, the Queensland Police compiled a Yugoslav Extremist List, but within five years, the situation was judged to have changed so dramatically that the list was ordered to be destroyed.

The time of the Ustaša in Australia was seemingly over. A change in government and reviews in security processes inhibited the ability for the Ustaša to operate in the open, and few serious attacks were recorded.
after 1973. Retrospectively, it is important to look back and assess what enabled the Ustaša to endure for so long. There were five major factors which facilitated the Ustaša to operate in Australia with such effect. These include political sympathy, ideological alignment, jurisdictional difficulties, community relations with security agencies, and strategic Ustaša targeting decisions.

FACTORS INFLUENCING USTAŠA ENDURANCE

Firstly, there was considerable political sympathy for the Ustaša in Australian circles because of the perceived legitimacy of their cause. The Treaty of Versailles had established the right of national self-determination, which was further defined in international law following the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in 1966, meaning all peoples had the right to political and national self-determination (OHCHR 2017). Ustaša activity was also occurring in the context of decolonisation, where ethnicities around the world were throwing off the colonial yoke and claiming independence. Unwittingly, the legitimacy of a cause was not distinguished from the violent method, resulting in political sympathy, or at least tolerance, for the Ustaša. This was demonstrated by the comments of Hannan and McMahon, who believed the Ustaša were a good bunch with a good cause (NAA M132:330d). The reluctance to admit the presence of the Ustaša in Australia by Attorney-General Greenwood, was perhaps most indicative of this sympathy ("Greenwood again denies existence of Ustasha" 1972). This led to accusations of complicity with the Ustaša.

Tolerance predominantly came from the right wing of Australian politics, spurred by ideological alignment. The Australian Government, under successive prime ministers, was caught in an ideological grapple with communism in the Cold War. The Liberal Party was ideologically aligned against left wing politics, so the right wing Ustaša represented the lesser ideological threat compared to communism. Some ministers of the McMahon Government were sceptical whether the violence was right wing at all, with many preferring to focus on communism (QSA 39:37399k). Others worried that to condemn the Ustaša was to imply that all Croatians were terrorists, thus insulting the broader migrant community. Tolerance led to accusations of complicity, which were not helped by HOP leader, Fabian Lovokovic, once being a member of the Liberal Party (Queensland Government 1972).

Auxiliary to enabling Ustaša endurance was jurisdictional obscurity, which undermined the efforts of law enforcement. A Senate inquiry under
McMahon found that, throughout this period, there was no single person or agency responsible for counterterrorism in Australia. Compol, State Police Special Branches, and ASIO were all investigating the Ustaša, but with inadequate cooperation and intelligence sharing (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1973a). This inadequacy was identified in a Cabinet Decision (1406) in 1972, urging a “radical re-examination” of the role of Compol, and its cooperation with ASIO and the Department of the Attorney-General (NAA A12389f). ASIO had a purely investigative function, mostly targeting communist subversion. Only four officers were resourced to investigate the Ustaša in 1964, although this was later increased (Blaxland 2015, 123). With a change in government in 1973, Attorney-General Murphy proposed new federal laws, security reviews, and the relocation of ASIO to Canberra (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1973a).

Directly impeding investigations were community relations issues. There were few in Australian law enforcement capable of translating Croatian, which added “considerable time” to assessments (QSA 39:37399m). These delays were noted on several occasions in the historical newspapers (QSA 39:37399l&m), impeding investigations and the penetration of the network. Even if the language barrier was overcome, local Yugoslavs were afraid to speak to the police for fear of retribution. To that end, an ASIO Special Report listed the language barrier as an impediment to community relations, followed by a fear of retribution (NAA 12389: A30).

Newspaper articles claimed that the Ustaša employed a “code of fear,” leaving Yugoslavs afraid for their safety (QSA 39:37399t). Special Branch documents in Queensland also demonstrate the complexity of community relations: in Mackay, inspectors described their relationships with the Yugoslav community as good, while in Longreach, inspectors reported the unwillingness of a community member to cooperate (QSA 39:37399u). This can be ascribed to two potential factors: firstly, ASIO noted that offenders nearly always escaped detection, further legitimising community fears for their personal safety; and secondly, Yugoslavs feared deportation if they were found in any way complicit with the Ustaša. Efforts to investigate the Ustaša network were thus impeded.

Finally, the strategic targeting choices of the Ustaša in Australia greatly enabled the networks endurance, coupled with the low casualty rate. The Ustaša were directly responsible for fifteen terrorist attacks from 1963-1973 and were implicated with many more. Most of their attacks
directly targeted the Yugoslav migrant community in Australia, bombing prominent Yugoslav individuals, dances, businesses, and community functions. Their second most frequent target were political symbols of Yugoslavia, such as consulates and embassies. The third most frequent target was religious symbols, such as churches. By focusing their attacks on the Yugoslav community, the Ustaša avoided provoking general outrage and public censure. The violence was considered a Yugoslav migrant problem. It was not until the tourism centre bombings injured sixteen random civilians that decisive political action was taken.

CONCLUSION

The Ustaša and affiliated networks were active in Australia from 1963 until 1973. They were directly responsible for fifteen attacks and linked to many more. The major factors which enabled their campaign to endure was political sympathy and a reluctance to admit their presence; ideological alignment in the Cold War atmosphere; jurisdictional difficulties with no centralised counterterrorism agency; language barriers between migrants and investigators; and, finally, Ustaša strategic targeting against the migrant community, avoided provoking the public. Ustaša terrorism had endured for ten years, and prompted security reviews, recommendations, and improvements which fundamentally altered the security landscape. Attorney-General Murphy declared in 1973: ‘Toleration of terrorism in this country is over’ (Commonwealth of Australia, Senate, 1973a), and to a large extent, history would prove him correct.

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Solar Energy and Battery Development for Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Leading to Increased Proliferation?

Tegg Westbrook§ and Harald Rostvik

ABSTRACT

In recent decades, research into energy production and battery technologies in the space, military and civil industries have taken huge strides. These advances have sparked new ideas and innovations in defence industries and militaries around the world. This article focuses on how technological advances in solar and battery power create opportunities for the research and development of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). It draws on how some technologies help militaries overcome strategic and political obstacles. It focuses on the development of the Zephyr solar UAV, as representative of the technologies that magnify the positive and negative implications of UAV use for military and commercial purposes. The article concludes that as solar and battery technologies get cheaper, this may lead to increased proliferation of UAVs, since the operational cost of solar UAVs is less than their fuel-driven counterparts and offer unique and superior capabilities. While battery energy density has a long way to go match fossil fuel power, if energy density can double, then it would be possible to see electric jet-sized planes in the 2020s. However, solar UAV development may magnify the security, political and judicial dilemmas that already exist with UAV use.

Keywords: solar, battery, hybrid, UAV, zephyr, military

SOLAR ENERGY AND BATTERY PRICE FALLS: AN OVERVIEW

The spacecraft and satellite industry was one of the first major industries seeing the potential to produce electricity from sunshine by solar photovoltaic (PV) means. The industry needed energy to power spacecraft and stations in orbit, with solar being the most practical source.

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Since there are no clouds or similar obscurations in space, the energy supply was predictable and reliable. Solar energy made it possible to avoid transporting heavy fuel from earth, and solar energy catching modules were, even at this time, thin, relatively lightweight, foldable and could be placed on many areas of the spacecraft. Solar energy could be stored in batteries limited in size for short-term use.

Over the years, solar energy products proliferated, eventually leading to a fall in prices. In the early years of space exploration, solar battery power was extremely expensive. The space industries of the major powers and their politicians were consistently criticised for absorbing money away from more pressing matters, such as healthcare. It later became clear that, in spite of the immense space programs expenditures, many positive bi-products came out of the initial explorations. Solar PV was one. During the last half-century, the products have been improved - simultaneously minimising material use, reducing costs and increasing surface area efficiency. Mass production has resulted in falling costs, and with it, the cost of batteries has fallen significantly. Research and development in the private sector of electric vehicle batteries has similarly resulted in improvements, mass production and cost reductions.

Companies like Tesla, Nissan and General Motors now indicate that the approximate cost of their mainly Lithium-Ion battery cells will, in future, fall from below 300 USD per kWh to approximately below $100 in as soon as 2020 (Osmundsen, 2016, para 7). Simultaneously, battery energy density in Wh per litre is forecasted to grow from today’s 200 to slightly below 400 in 2020 (“Electrifying Everything,” 2017). Solar PV market growth has been 30-40 per cent annually, which has led to increased solar proliferation. Solar PV has experienced a 20 per cent price fall each time the global capacity doubled. Additionally, the cost of solar PV systems today is only one percent (1/100th) of the price three decades ago. There are several trends that indicate a steady move away from fossil fuels: Despite the success of Norway’s ‘Pension Fund’ (previously named ‘Oil Fund’), Norway have decided to pull out of oil and coal investments. On a global scale, during 2015, ninety per cent of the new global power production came from solar PV, wind and hydro (“World Energy Outlook,” pp.1-8). Solar and battery technology could, as a result, make fossil fuels obsolete in 25–30 years (Goodall, 2016, p. 6).
SOLAR AND BATTERY USE FOR LAND AND SEA WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Solar power and long-life battery storage offer several benefits for militaries operating on land and at sea. Using solar power at military bases, for example, allows militaries to limit operational costs by reducing the need to transport fuels, thereby reducing the chances of convoys being attacked in conflict zones (Gardner, 2017, para 3). In the field, solar power allows the military to turn off diesel-powered generators to recharge battery-powered equipment, thus reducing noise that can be detected. The U.S. armed forces have supposedly doubled renewable energy power generation between 2011–2015 and have initiated many projects to use renewable energy for domestic U.S. bases (ibid, para 6).

From major conventional weapons to small arms and light weapons and equipment, batteries are versatile for a variety of uses. Batteries can now be made as small as the tip of your finger, allowing a range of uses, including powering tiny spy devices, to as large as Tesla’s 100MW battery project in South Australia, which is intended to be used in large-scale power outage emergencies.

There are some large conventional weapons that rely on high-density batteries to give a military edge. Japan, for example, may be the first country in the world to launch a fleet of Lithium-Ion battery and diesel submarines. It has been argued that using Lithium-Ion allows their submarines to dive much faster than traditional air-independent propulsion (AIP) technologies. Japanese contractors also argue that using Lithium-Ion makes their submarines stealthier (GlobalSecurity.org, n.d.). Hybrid technologies like gas or diesel-electric battleships also save fuel and, crucially, limit the amount of time ships need to stop to refuel at ports or at sea, making them less vulnerable to attacks (Gardner, 2017, para 4). Thus, there are numerous examples of how batteries and hybrid technologies have significantly changed the landscape for military, security and police forces using military installations, light weapons, equipment, and major conventional weapons. What is less understood is the significance of solar power and advances in battery technologies used for aerial vehicles.
POTENTIAL OF SOLAR POWER AND STORAGE: EXAMPLES FROM COMMERCIAL PLANES TO MILITARY UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES

Commercial Developments

There are numerous examples of how the solar PV and battery combination has presented new ideas to produce public transport and aircraft. Likewise, the opportunities for aerial vehicles has demonstrated to be enterprising and innovative. The recent Solar Impulse single piloted RTW flight clearly demonstrated the possibilities offered to the aircraft and military industries (see Solar Impulse Foundation, n.d.). The aircraft industry, represented by Airbus and Siemens, have indicated that short distance routes with hybrid-electric aircraft carrying up to 100 passengers could be possible before 2030. In April 2016 Airbus and Siemens began working on developing hybrid electric flights, with the aim to develop “carbon free” aircraft. The collaboration will cover many types of aircraft and several propulsion systems from 100 kW in small UAVs and unmanned vessels to 20 MW in classical short and medium distance planes. The first step is to develop and fly a hybrid electric plane with less than 20 seats (Godske, 2017, para 17).

Boeing has chosen another path. Instead of participating directly in the development of electric planes, the company has invested in a new start up Zunum Aero together with the low-cost airline JetBlue. Their goal is to develop a hybrid plane that by 2030 will be able to fly 1120 km with 10-50 passengers (Zunum Aero, n.d.). The idea behind the project is to enhance the capacity of smaller airports in the United States by offering short distance flights. Today only 140 of the 13500 U.S. airports provide 97 percent of the passenger traffic. There is hence an enormous potential to travel shorter distances with electric while avoiding the big hubs.

The limitation so far has been the batteries, since solar PV modules are already well developed as stiff modules or thin film that can cover the body and the wings of a plane. Such applications already exist on sailing boats or as bicycle lane surfaces in the Netherlands and in France.
Military Developments: The Opportunities for UAVs

Similar to developments in the commercial sector, Peter Singer, previously senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, stated that military UAVs were a “game-changing technology, akin to gunpowder, the steam engine, the atomic bomb—opening up possibilities that were fiction a generation earlier but also opening up perils that were unknown a generation ago” (Singer and Wright, 2013, p.41). Diesel and electric military, civilian and commercial UAVs can carry various payloads and are adaptable for many military and commercial purposes, such as reconnaissance, convoy protection, law enforcement, bombings, counter-piracy, and delivery. Some are modified to fly at high altitudes, others for low-noise stealth, or for flying at high speeds. UAVs can be as minute as a mosquito to as large as a jumbo jet. They are seen by militaries as strategically convenient and safer than committing humans to tasks such as reconnaissance or offensive operations. Specially modified UAVs can operate undetected in any environment and terrain.

Defence companies are gravitating towards research and development in the UAV market, and by 2020 global militaries are estimated to spend approximately $70 billion on UAVs (Goldman Sachs, n.d.). This is partly because specially modified UAVs currently require only one member of crew to identify and strike multiple targets in one flight. This is a vast leap from WWII bombing squadrons that required hundreds of planes and thousands of aircrews to strike one target with varying degrees of success and with high casualties. Even in modern conflicts such as the First Gulf War, one pilot in a Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk would usually be capable of identifying and striking two targets in one flight (Hansen, 2009, slide 4). States with technical constraints that are unable to manufacture advanced military UAVs, or are unable to acquire the latest systems, are therefore significantly behind in capability and operational know-how.

Due to the availability of relatively small, lightweight and high-density batteries, small electric unmanned vehicles have been widely used by militaries and non-state actors for surveillance and reconnaissance. While armed UAVs are mostly larger fuel-driven machines (due to heavier payloads), the potential of battery power and hybrid technologies, as demonstrated in commercial initiatives such as the Solar Impulse,
combined with designs in lightweight materials, may make hybrid, solar and/or electric-powered armed conflict viable in the future, if expertise is shared. Most countries can acquire high-density batteries, and therefore, if hybrid technologies grow to become the norm, this may lead to a more levelled playing field in terms of capability.

Additionally, cheap and highly persistent fuel and electric UAVs allow continuous communications relay for both commercial and military UAVs, and this constant availability will make it easier for operators to use other UAVs and aircraft anywhere and at any time. It allows more efficient use of other UAVs for other purposes, since one aircraft can survey a wide area. High-endurance UAVs can also significantly reduce costs for other purposes, such as border control and humanitarian aid. Therefore, cheap and highly persistent UAVs could change the military landscape.

While current developments in the commercial sector makes long-haul flights with large payloads possible in the future, how will military solar and electric military UAVs develop? If batteries manage to reach an energy density of 400 Wh per litre, there is of course still a long way towards airline fossil fuels that contain 12,000 Wh per litre. Comparatively, 100 tons of fuel for a Boeing Dreamliner would be equivalent to facilitating a 2,000-ton battery bank (in today's batteries), per aircraft, at an airport. But if battery energy density doubles as expected, 1,000 tons per aircraft would, for example, enable airports and military bases to facilitate more aircraft, and that is not considering other technological milestones after 2020.

Considering that one conventional UAV uses approximately 2,000 tons of fuel per year (Airbus, n.d., para 1), accommodating mega-battery banks may be more practical and cost-effective. As demonstrated in Tesla’s mega-battery project, major installations can be installed in less than 100 days. If the plane’s body is also covered with solar thin film or some solar PV sprayed on the body, the energy storage need would be reduced, since energy is produced while the plane is flying or parked. There is thus huge potential for defence industries to develop lethal solar planes. But at what price?
OPPORTUNITIES AND CONCERNS ABOUT MILITARY AND COMMERCIAL UAVS

The use of military UAVs can favour governments by reducing political costs to launching military intervention. Having service personnel dying in foreign lands and investing large sums of money in conflicts can, as demonstrated by strategic shifts by the U.S and U.K in the Middle East, draw a high degree of public criticism. In the simplest terms, military UAVs can be used for surveillance, for ‘neutralising’ subjects or for destroying infrastructure, without the need to deploy armies or specialist units in foreign territories. This allows governments to operate secretly and remain less accountable considering international laws attributable to (but not limited to) the United Nations Charter, Chapter VII, Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (United Nations, n.d.).

While not being an adequate replacement to ‘boots on the ground’ and other capabilities, military UAVs not only reduce risks and prevent loss of life (for the operators) by replacing pilots, they offer the persistence that any normal human being would not be able to manage (Cole, 2015, para 2). Crews can ‘simply change shifts on the ground while the drone remains in the air’ (ibid). Companies and law enforcement bodies have also explored the development and potential of a range of UAVs to deliver riot control agents, such as tear gas (Crowley, 2015, p, 22, para 2). While there are serious concerns about the use of riot control agents from UAVs with poor accuracy; for military and security actors dealing with riots, for example, it may offer a host of security solutions.

Unsurprisingly, states currently involved in conflicts and with large defence and research budgets are exploring strategic and technical opportunities in military UAVs (Farley, 2015, para 2). The major players in the industry are Israel, the United States, and China, but in terms of acquisition, joint ventures and technical development, other states such as the United Kingdom, France, Iran, and Russia are steadily narrowing the contrasts in capability. It is thought that up to 23 countries can produce UAVs (New America, 2016). How many have acquired advanced UAVs is not known.
The current record of military UAVs is not without controversy. It is often argued by civil society groups that the use of lethal UAVs inclines operators to kill rather than capture particular individuals in combat (see Alston, Morgan-Foster, and Abresch, 2008). It is also widely argued that military UAVs facilitate and legitimise the practice of extrajudicial and arbitrary killings. Furthermore, UAV operators, sometimes stationed thousands of miles away, are detached from the horrors of war due to the video game-like environment from which they operate, potentially making them ‘trigger happy’ (Cole and Wright, 2010, para 8). Current technological developments in endurance, payload and surveillance capabilities, in military and commercial spheres, could also ‘make possible the dramatic expansion of the surveillance state’ (ibid, para 9).

Following consistent and mounting pressure from NGOs and other organisations, the Obama administration released figures (ODNI report) suggesting that between 64 and 116 civilians had been killed through UAVs and other airstrikes targeting terrorists (who were not in “war zones”) between January 2009 and fall 2015 (Dyer, 2016, para 6). This was much less than estimates suggested by independent news organisations and researchers (ibid, para 2). It also did not include deaths resulting from air strikes in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, which are, without doubt, much higher.

Non-military UAVs have received a comparatively favourable press, particularly for example those used for humanitarian purposes or detecting bushfires. DJI, a China-based distributor of UAVs and related equipment, argue that UAVs (military and non-military) have been used to save at least 59 people in 18 potentially life-threatening incidents around the world between 2013 and 2017 (DJI, 2017, para 1). While this is not an entirely objective source, not-for-profit humanitarian bodies such as UNICEF are considering using UAVs to assist their humanitarian efforts (UNICEF, 2017). This stems from a UNICEF initiative to deliver HIV blood samples from a remote area of Malawi for laboratory testing (ibid).

Huge strides have been being made in the commercial/security sectors in the design of high endurance UAVs that could help to bring internet bandwidth and delivery to remote areas of the world. For high-altitude UAVs, examples such as the Boeing Phantom Eye (liquid-nitrogen fueled), AeroVironment’s Global Observer (hydrogen powered), NASA
Pathfinder (solar power) and Facebook Aquila (solar power) demonstrate that there are major commercial interests in the UAV sector. Such technologies have so far demonstrated that low/zero-carbon emitting machines can carry relatively large payloads at very low cost, although some of these projects have been terminated or are on hold.

Thus, there are many opportunities and concerns with regard to how new technologies could be utilised to make war cheaper, less accountable, and more effective through the use of UAVs. The Zephyr UAV is one of example of a major step in breaking the barriers to endurance and payload capacities.

ZEPHYR SOLAR UAV

In 2017 the UK’s Ministry of Defence (MOD) tested its third solar-powered Zephyr UAV (S) for concept demonstration purposes (Chuter, 2016, para 2). Described as high-altitude “eternal planes,” or “daddy long legs,” the Zephyr (S) has broken world records as the longest duration and highest altitude UAV, flying for nearly 630 hours at the edge of space, reaching over 70,000 ft. While its specific function for the UK armed forces has not been clarified, its primary purpose is persistent surveillance and communications relay (ibid, para 7).

The latest model of Airbus Defence and Space’s (ADS) Zephyr 8 (single-tail), while currently under tests, is likely to be used by the UK’s armed forces in the near future. Research and development is also being carried out by the US Army and US Navy as part of of a UK-US joint capability technology demonstrations (JCTD) program (Air Force Technology, n.d., para 3). Born out of information-technology warfare, the Zephyr, while radically different from other UAVs, is part of a broader transformation of warfare that heavily relies on sophisticated, secure, and precise surveillance and communications technologies.

The combination of solar power and unmanned aircraft can be traced back to 1970s (Michel, 2015, para 5), but major milestones have been made with the Zephyr in recent years. Zephyr was initiated by British company QinetiQ in 2003 and has since gone through various prototypes and modifications. Having joined the Airbus High Altitude Pseudo-Satellite (HAPS) programme, it is sometimes known as Airbus Zephyr. Originally launched from a helium balloon (Van der Zwaard and Aalberse,
2017, para 5), the structure of the Zephyr design was later strengthened, and after successful flight tests, launched manually from ground. After improvements in flight times, payload capacities, and after gaining greater understanding of stratospheric flying extremities, the Zephyr project attracted funding from the US Department of Defense, securing its future development (ibid, para 7).

Paul Davey, Zephyr’s Business Development Director, explained that the aircraft flies on solar power, charges its batteries during the day, and discharges its batteries during the night, allowing it to remain aloft the following dawn, and then the cycle is repeated (Fildes, 2007, para 14). The Zephyr has been designed for use in both military and commercial purposes, from improving surveillance and communication in remote areas, to detecting bushfires in Australia (McHale, 2010, para 2). It is argued that since it operates in the stratosphere, it is less affected by weather and air traffic (Martin, 2016, para 6).

It therefore overcomes many limitations experienced with lower-flying machines, and at potentially lower cost; around 10% of the cost of current UAVs, and 1% of the cost of a satellite (McHale, 2010, para 10). Additionally, it is said that replacing one conventional UAV with a Zephyr would save 2,000 tons of fuel each year (Airbus, n.d., para 1). Compared with other manned and unmanned aircraft, it is said to produce virtually no noise and is more difficult to detect on radar (Van der Zwaard and Aalberse, 2017, para 4), and requires less servicing and logistical attention since its operational length is exceptionally higher than many other UAVs (Flatley, 2010, para 10). The Zephyr’s ability to fly at high altitudes for long durations means that it can survey a large area over an extensive period, and therefore identify multiple targets.

Jon Saltmarsh, Zephyr Programme Director said: "By being able to remain over a location for weeks or months at a time, it can usefully deliver a host of practical and more affordable solutions to both civil and military customers" (Flatley, 2010, para 7). Unlike satellite “snapshot per orbit,” armed forces can confine their chosen operations within a particular area up to a diameter of 600 miles, and obtain higher resolution images (McHale, 2010, para 8). On Airbus’s and QinetiQ’s websites, they argue that it could also be used for missile detection, battlespace awareness, signals intercept, and continuous imagery.
Currently, the development of the single-tailed Zephyr S, which carries a payload of 5kg, is being outmatched by the Airbus’s twin-tailed Zephyr T, which could potentially manage up to 20kg (Martin, 2016, para 7). Further developments in ultra-lightweight payloads, such as optical sensors and GPS (Air Force Technology, n.d.), and lightweight body designs and technologies, will make room for other systems.

Table 1. Evolution of Zephyr UAV Capabilities*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Year(s) Tested</th>
<th>Wingspan</th>
<th>Endurance</th>
<th>Max Altitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr UAV</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>12m</td>
<td>6 hours</td>
<td>27,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr 5</td>
<td>2005-2006</td>
<td>15m-16m</td>
<td>18 hours</td>
<td>36,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr 6</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>18m`</td>
<td>54-82 hours</td>
<td>61,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr 7</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>23m</td>
<td>336 hours</td>
<td>70,740 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr (S) 8</td>
<td>2018</td>
<td>25m</td>
<td>630 hours</td>
<td>74,000 ft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zephyr T</td>
<td>2017 - present</td>
<td>33m</td>
<td>TBD</td>
<td>TBD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Information obtained from publicly accessible sources

While there are many factors based on specific needs that go into the development of high-altitude UAVs, there are clear correlations between low flight time and large payloads. While there is currently little to compare with high flight time and payload capacity, the Zephyr 8 is far from potentially being used for offensive military action, such as bombings, as a heavy payload would defeat its primary purpose. While its payload is a major limitation in military contexts, it is said that the current development and testing of the Zephyr T, however, will be able to
accommodate heavier software, such as RADAR (Airbus, n.d., para 1). This model is set to be operational in 2019.

Figure 1: Endurance and payload*

* It is not clear if the 5kg payloads have been achieved. The Zephyr T is expected to exceed the duration and payloads of previous prototypes, with a 20kg payload. Information obtained from publicly accessible sources.

The development of Zephyr demonstrates how unmanned vehicles that rely particularly on solar energy may be a common sight in the foreseeable future. These developments in larger wingspans and lightweight designs begs many serious questions. The most prominent issue is whether the Zephyr would contribute to the proliferation of UAVs by enabling and facilitating their use, particularly in terms of acquiring consistent data feeds for other armed UAVs to utilise.

Another issue is whether current developments in military and commercial solar aerial vehicles means that we may have high endurance, highly stealthy, jet-sized and cheap lethal solar UAVs in the near future? Is this technology going to be essential for all States in the coming future, thereby increasing their proliferation? Additionally, by remaining aloft and out of sight, will the Zephyr contribute the expansion of surveillance by states on their citizens? These questions remain unanswered, but there are many indicators that make this more practical than theoretical.
Considering that the U.K is not believed to be a major innovator of solar PV systems and high-density batteries (at least compared to Germany, China, and the U.S. in solar innovations, and Japan, China, South Korea and the U.S. in battery density), its collaborative work with other European, U.S. companies and national institutions means that many other states are, theoretically, capable of producing highly capable and advanced solar UAV systems. The U.S., on the other hand, have demonstrated that they require little financial or technical assistance in developing advanced UAVs domestically. Corporations in the U.S. have set the bar high in investing in solar and hybrid UAVs which have demonstrated that very large payloads can be carried for long periods of time. These capabilities will not be easily matched by emerging UAV manufacturers in the short term.

However, if solar UAVs prove to be game-changing, it may be necessary for countries to share knowledge to enable capability and interoperability within traditional alliances, particularly within the NATO alliance, Israel, Japan, South Korea, and Australia. This is already seen between the U.S and the U.K (e.g. Zephyr UAV) and Japan (e.g. missile technologies). China - a country that is growing technologically and militarily, with a highly innovative and cheap solar and battery market, and a comparatively liberal national arms export control system - have proven capable of developing systems akin to, and possibly even cheaper than, current hybrid and solar UAVs.

Likewise, such capabilities can be exported to China’s traditional allies, thereby potentially triggering a quantitative and qualitative “race” in high-endurance UAV capability. China's Caihong-T4 (CH-T4), with and wingspan of 40 metres, solar-powered UAV 'designed to stay in the air for months,' is a notable example of its emerging solar UAV capability. Built by the Chinese Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics, the CH-T4 has much of the same qualities of the Zephyr in concept and in appearances (see Lin and Singer, 2017). Russia’s (solar) LA-252, as well as other prototypes, are also comparable models in terms of endurance and intended function.

These developments demonstrate how investment into solar UAVs aligns with a broader trend in solar and battery technological advances, UAV investment, and the need for persistent, sophisticated, secure, and
precise surveillance and communications technologies in modern warfare. Additionally, considering that only a handful of countries have satellites, building a high endurance solar UAV is potentially more cost-effective than funding and developing a satellite and launch capabilities. This means that persistent UAVs are extremely marketable.

CONCLUSION

Alongside technological advances made in solar energy and batteries, the nature of war is changing dramatically to adapt to new security needs and technologies. For militaries, solar energy and battery storage makes it possible to avoid transporting heavy and flammable fuel in warzones. It can make operations cheaper and more practical. Solar and battery technologies are getting progressively cheaper and more area efficient as competition and research expands, and as mass production increases. While there are limitations to using solar power in cold and dark climates and territories in the troposphere, improvements in battery energy density could overcome these limitations, provided that future forecasts are accurate. Other hybrid-electric technologies also provide many opportunities for defence companies.

UAVs have proven to be “game-changing” in certain military contexts. Research and development into UAVs are increasing, since they can, in theory, lower the real political costs to military intervention and reduce casualties for the end-users. The use of military UAVs, however, is highly controversial. Advances in solar and energy storage, in tandem with research and development into lightweight materials, makes the practicalities of solar-fuelled warfare very possible.

‘Disruptive technologies’ or disruptive innovations can also accelerate research and funding into solar energy and batteries. For example, ‘tandem [solar] cells,’ though costly, can double the efficiency of today’s cells by using two-layer cells to double the amount of energy produced. This is currently being tested for small-scale projects. Chinese and Russian developments in solar UAV technology may intensify research and development in many countries. Thus, if energy density can double, it would be possible to see jet-sized planes powered by electric motors in the skies in the next decade. What does this mean for the
potential for solar-powered warfare? For military UAVs, what makes solar different from fuel?

The Zephyr is the best example to address these questions. Uniquely, solar UAVs like the Zephyr increases the time UAVs can spend in the air, therefore potentially increasing military effectiveness by extending operational length and expanding surveillance area. UAVs can recharge in the air and on land. They could potentially venture further and higher in the battlefield, with the persistence that neither humans nor fuel-driven machines can ever manage.

Flying in the stratosphere, they are less detectable and less affected by weather and air traffic, making them more effective for surveillance and therefore deadlier. Considering the earth’s orbit and axis, as well as technological milestones in solar and batteries, solar UAVs may therefore be able to operate anywhere in the world. Solar UAVs like the Zephyr are significantly lower in cost compared to current UAVs and satellites, and, considering current production and procurement trends, and increasing research and development by states like China, proliferation will likely increase. UAVs like the Zephyr and other prototypes developed by US, Russian and Chinese actors may be very appealing to states with limited satellite capability.

On the other hand, using “eternal” UAVs for humanitarian purposes or to monitor natural disasters may radically improve the effectiveness agencies and bodies helping in disaster relief efforts, or controlling forest fires, for example. By being able to accommodate heavier equipment as testing progresses, solar UAVs may have a range of uses.

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Homicide Event Motive: A Situational Perspective

Belinda L. Parker** and Amber C. McKinley

ABSTRACT

The motive for a homicide can be conceptualised from different perspectives, for instance, psychological, legal, investigative, and is often focused on the offender’s reasons for committing the homicide. As criminology often draws on theories from various disciplines, motive’s conceptualisation from study to study and comparison is difficult. This manuscript introduces a new perspective for conceptualising motive, based on the situational approach termed “homicide event motive”. Defined as the fundamental reason for the homicide and drawing on theories such as the Routine Activities Theory, Crime Pattern Theory, and Theory of Closure on Deviant Acts, this conceptualisation shifts the focus from the offender’s personal reasoning to the homicide situation itself and the elements that brought about the event. This manuscript will outline the theoretical foundations of homicide event motive.

Keywords: Homicide Event Motive; homicide; motive; Routine Activities Theory; Crime Pattern Theory; Theory of Closure on Deviant Acts; Situational perspective; Homicide event.

INTRODUCTION

Homicide Event Motive: A Situational Perspective

Husak (2010: 56) noted that “the concept of motive… is unclear and imprecise. Insofar as commentators have sought to analyse the concept of motive, they have defended radically different conceptions.” Although for most people, motive is the “why”, the meaning of the term is ambiguous having been heavily influenced by several disciplines such as psychology, policing, law, and sociology (Hicks & Sales, 2006). Psychological perspectives can be at odds with prosecutorial and investigative approaches (Hicks & Sales, 2006) and represent a lack of theory and practice overlap. With psychology and law espousing fundamentally different conceptualisations of motive, criminology is stranded between the two, evidenced by the various typologies espoused

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by criminologists and offender profilers (e.g. Holmes & Holmes, 2010; Petherick & Sinnamon, 2014; Polk, 1994; Ressler, Burgess, & Douglas, 1996; Turvey, 2012). Problems with varying definitions and conceptualisations are that studies which include motive are unable to be compared due to vast differences in motive classifications, and those focusing solely on the offender are open to criticism regarding the inability to read their mind (Hick & Sales, 2006). Therefore, a conceptualisation of motive is required that will enable interdisciplinary partnerships, connect research and practice, and overcome such hurdles as comparability and subjectivity.

This paper proposes a new conceptualisation of motive based on the situational perspective termed “homicide event motive,” defined as the reason for the occurrence of the homicide. It shifts the focus from the subjective offender motive to the event itself and forms a holistic understanding of the reasons the homicide may have occurred, incorporating situational aspects and victim interaction.

Importantly, this conceptualisation offers a utilitarian way to understand the motive for a homicide when the offender is not explicit in their motives, aids in establishing inferential reasoning in investigations and judicial processes and assists in study comparability. Homicide event motive is of value and relevance to those stakeholders who consider motive critical to the solvability and the increase of clearance rates of homicide, such as police officers and law makers. This paper serves as a theoretical introduction for both researchers and practitioners alike to its concept, its foundations, and introduce the proposed list of homicide event motives.

Defining Motive

Motive appears a somewhat simple construct to describe; it’s concerned with why a person engages in particular behaviours. However, conceptualisations, along with theoretical and practical applications of motive do not always align. Criminology is influenced by the other social science disciplines with theories often the product of interdisciplinary partnerships (Bonta & Andrews, 2017; Bosworth & Hoyle, 2011). Conceptualisations of motive are as diversified as the field itself. For example, Turvey (2012: 312) defined motive as “the emotional, psychological, and material needs that impel and are satisfied by behaviour,” which alludes to motive’s highly complex nature as it suggests that different influences and disparate concepts can all be classified as “motive.”
Use and meaning of the term motive ultimately depends on the user’s theoretical perspective. Psychological theories, for instance, focus heavily on the introspective aspect of what drives behaviour, centring on the “criminal mind” (Burke, 2014). Psychological literature likens motive to human needs that direct behaviour toward an object which satisfies the need (Leontiev, 1978; Maslow, 1943) with criminal motive expressed with terms such as power, anger, control, and masculinity (Groth, 1979; Petherick & Sinnamon, 2014; Polk, 1993, 1994; Turvey, 2012). Psychological theories also explain motive from an evolutionary perspective (see Duntley & Buss; 2011 Eibl-Eibesfeldt; 2009; Raine, 2014), such as the Homicide Adaptation Theory (Duntley & Buss, 2011), which suggests psychological mechanisms have evolved to motivate homicide as one possible response to specific situations.

Likewise, Petherick and Sinnamon’s (2014: 394) pathways perspective of motivation theory explains that people are shaped over their lifetimes and that “any given person is a culmination of various biological and life experiences.” A thorough summation of these combined psychological theories into practical application can be observed within the principles of Bonta and Andrews’ (2017) psychology of criminal conduct (PCC), which is premised on approaches such as behaviourism, social learning, and differential association theories in the prediction and treatment of offenders. Accordingly, criminal behaviour is influenced by personal, interpersonal, and community rewards (PIC-R), and therefore, motive might be considered a culmination of these reward systems.

The legal perspective similarly offers no single definition. The Black’s Law Dictionary defines motive as “something, esp[ecially] wilful desire, that leads one to act” (Garner, 2014: 1,172) and is supported by Wigmore’s (1935L 76) excerpt which states “the feeling which internally urges or pushes a person to do or refrain from doing an act is an emotion, and is of course evidential towards his doing or not doing the act.” This suggests motive is an emotion. Some authors have emphasised the role of an objective and external desire as the cause for the behaviour or act (James, 1986; Okrent, 2012; Salmond, 1924) while other interpretations have introduced the concept of the state of mind in addition to the mind’s desire (Jowitt & Walsh, 1959).

Black’s Law Dictionary definition without Wigmore’s supporting excerpt shifts the emphasis of motive from the cause of a mental state to an entity that causes a person to act. Austin (1995: 99–102) also wrote of motives as being “springs of action,” because “every motive is a wish; and
every wish is a pain which affects a man’s self, and which urges him to seek relief, by obtaining the object wished.” That these definitions transcend more than one legal system and jurisdiction speaks to the current issue of motive and the need for a more concrete definition that is valid in any jurisdiction that homicide is investigated.

One point that is so clearly agreed upon in legal systems (although is debated in the legal literature [Husak, 2010]) is that motive is deemed irrelevant in demonstrating *mens rea* and is not an essential element in proving an accused perpetrator’s guilt (Hall, 1960), a maxim that is embraced in most jurisdictions. Beyond the ethical debate put forth by scholars such as Hall (1960), perhaps another reason for this maxim is that what constitutes motive is not clearly defined (Husak, 2010). It seems then, like the psychological literature, the legal discipline is not as simple either.

Investigators establish motive as part of the theory of the crime (Adcock & Chancellor, 2013). It is used in the assessment of offender identity (ACPO, 2006) and importantly, it provides the context for the homicide, assisting in demonstrating the guilt of an identified perpetrator (Brookman, 2005; Pennington & Hastie, 1992). Labels adopted for motive by police tend to be utilitarian, often describing the circumstances of the homicide, for example *gang-related*, *domestic dispute*, and *money*. In research, they are often called “ostensible motives” (Wolfgang, 1958) as they describe what appears to have happened.

There are two significant issues with using police motives in research; first, most refer to the circumstance of the homicide rather than the motive,¹ and second, they are driven by data rather than theory. It is, therefore, conceivable that every police department, and indeed every police officer may use different labels, making the list infinite and ultimately incomparable. Wallace (1986: 31) raised this concern that researchers uncritically use police motives to form a “valid basis for theoretical speculation,” and yet, police motives have been repeatedly used for research purposes since her warning. Perhaps, due to the ease of access to police motives, the ease with which they are incorporated into a study, and their perceived reliability, they are commonly used in homicide research.

There is clearly a difference in how motive is conceptualised between the different disciplines. There is huge advantage to be gained by pursuing the criminal mind and looking at how an offender’s life history has affected their current behaviours; it is the only way to understand why
humans engage in homicide and to ascertain what might be implemented for its prevention (Petherick & Sinnamon, 2014) and offender treatment and rehabilitation (Bonta & Andrews, 2017). Where this perspective departs from practice, however, is best summed up by Hicks and Sales (2006), who argue that internal or latent variables in a homicide investigation are not as useful as overt behavioural manifestations.

Canter (2000) similarly suggested that although a psychodynamic interpretation of an offender’s motivation may be of interest to the investigator, there is only value to be gained if it will allow inferences to be made that will contribute to their decision making and investigative processes. Terms and concepts such as power and control are not commonplace in the vernacular used by police and do not exist in the motives they record.

Homicide investigators arguably have less practical use for understanding the offender’s behaviour in terms of its physiological basis (Canter, 2000; Hicks & Sales, 2006) than the purported reason for the violent interaction, and, as noted by Newburn, Williamson, and Wright (2007), the motives listed by police reflect those more ostensible or pragmatic reasons based on what they have learned through their experience. It makes the most sense then that investigators treat motive in a manner that clearly outlines the reason why the homicide, as a whole, has occurred.

There is, however, another perspective that can influence the way motive is thought about. Katz (1988: 4) stated,

Whatever the relevance of antecedent events and contemporaneous social conditions, something causally essential happens in the very moments in which a crime is committed. The assailant must sense, then and there, a distinctive constraint or seductive appeal that he did not sense a little while before in a substantially similar place. Although his economic status, peer group relations, Oedipal conflicts, genetic make-up, internalized machismo, history of child abuse, and the like remain the same, he must suddenly become propelled to commit the crime. Thus, the central problem is to understand the emergence of distinctive sensual dynamics.
Simply, there is something in that moment, a culmination of the relationship between the victim and offender and the surrounding situation that spurs the offender to act with homicide.

THE CONCEPT OF MOTIVE—NEW PERSPECTIVES

So, where does this leave homicide motive research? In his discussion of the interviewer and interviewee, Katz (1988: 7) noted that,

Typically, the person [interviewee] will not be able to help us with the analysis because he is taken in by his own efforts to construct the dynamics. If we ask, “Why did you do it?” he is likely to respond with self-justifying rhetoric… If we ask, “How did you do that? And then what did you do?” we are likely to discover some poignant moments. And, because the person constructs this definition of the situation through bodily comprehension, we may catch the conditions of his involvement in exceptional circumstances when it is undermined by an incongruent sensuality.

Therefore, the offender is caught up in their own set of explanations and will usually tell a story that will justify their behaviours to themselves and others or will prove personally beneficial. Shifting the sole focus away from the offender and their personal motives to a holistic review of the event itself is one way to counter these obstacles. This is a similar idea to the distinction made by Turvey (2012) between offender motive and crime-scene motive in that crime-scene motive is fixed to the time in relation to that event and will not change.

This paper proposes that rather than limiting the concept of motive to the offender’s personal reasons for committing the homicide (often called offender motive), motive should instead refer to the reasons the homicide occurred. These conceptualisations sound similar in their descriptions, but they are not the same. Offender motive is a narrow, subjective, and one-dimensional part of the event, belonging solely to an individual with no regard for the other elements that are involved in the situation.

This reflects a dynamic approach to the study of motive, or the search for the origins of behaviour from prior experience (Roeckelein, 2006). The second conceptualisation, on the other hand, is a situational approach, which acknowledges that a homicide does not occur in a social or ecological vacuum and is a descriptive approach as opposed to dynamic, concerning the naming, classifying, and diagnosing of motive (Roeckelein,
2006). It is proposed that this conceptualisation be called and is henceforth referred to as \emph{homicide event motive}.

**The Homicide Situation and Homicide Event Motive**

The “situation” has been widely used within the social sciences to understand behaviour and connect people’s behaviour to the context. The situational perspective, therefore, requires that the researcher considers the broader context of the occurrence of the crime (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004) and the analysis examines the relationship between behaviours and the surrounding conditions (Birbeck & LaFree, 1993)

More recently, Miethe and Regoeczi (2004) described the homicide situation as “the quintessential convergence of offender, victim, and offense characteristics that define the situational context of homicide and that forms the basis for distinguishing homicides \textit{qualitatively}” (Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004: 1). The situational approach, therefore, refers to the context of the crime and is focused on the union and interaction of the people involved and the characteristics of the place of occurrence (for example, location, time, and guardianship).

The focus on the situation is based on the observation that a lot of criminological theories are theories of offender behaviour (Miethe & Meier, 1994). This is certainly understandable given it is their behaviour that requires prevention. Theories of crime that are more general or that focus solely on one element of the crime neglect to account for the influence the specific environment and others involved, have on the situation. For instance, Petherick and Sinnamon’s (2014) pathway perspective of motivation and other needs-based theories (such as Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg’s [1983] Energisation Theory) successfully outline the experiences and psychological needs of an offender as imperative to their current and future motivation, however, fail to consider the influence of the victim in the specific situation.

Similarly, Wolfgang’s (1957) victim-precipitated criminal homicide accounts well for the victim’s role in the proceeding violence and partly dispels connotations regarding the typical victim, however, is focused on only one element of the situation. Alternately, more general and macro-level theories such as those based on evolution (for instance, the Homicide Adaptation Theory by Duntley and Buss [2011]) are well-able to explain why humans engage in homicide, however, are too broad to account for the idiosyncrasies for the motive of each individual case. These theories provide great value in understanding motivation and elements of the
homicide situation but can be disjointed in their common application and explanation.

The situational approach draws on theories such as Routine Activities Theory (Felson & Cohen, 1980), Lofland’s (1969) Theory of Closure on Deviant Acts, and Crime Pattern Theory (Brantingham & Brantingham, 2008) that integrate the idea that lifestyle patterns provide opportunity for crime to occur. They are not offender focused but rather conceive the homicide as an event occurring within a context, not only involving the interaction between the victim and offender, but also the lack of capable guardians, and physical and behavioural dimensions, such as the functional and perceptual properties of the crime (for instance, location, time, guardianship; Davidson, 1989).

Homicide event motive characterises homicide as a social event; the offender believed or perceived something about the victim that influenced them to act, whether it was based on something that happened or not, such as the perception of infidelity versus knowing an affair occurred. Importantly, it is this perception that influenced their action. To not take into consideration the victim’s role and influence is to surely disregard an important part of the homicide’s story, which is inherently linked with the motivation for why the homicide occurred.

Furthering this theoretical basis, Wortley (2001: 63) argued “motivation to commit crime itself may be situationally dependant” and the understanding that the situation can induce behaviour is a useful paradigm with which to examine motive. The environment can escalate an already considered crime or precipitate a crime that was previously considered. Therefore, there must be a motivated offender to interpret the entire situation and perceive something about the victim and surrounding conditions, along with a conducive environment that all influence the decision of whether to commit the act (Lofland, 1969). The offender is, therefore, a major part of the event, but is not the only element (Miethe & Meier, 1994).

Homicide event motive is based on empirical research that has examined the similarities and uniqueness of homicides driven by expressive and instrumental motives within the social context (in other words the holistic combination of victim, offender, and situation; Miethe & Drass, 1999; Miethe & Regoeczi, 2004). Using homicides committed in the U.S from 1976 to 1998, Miethe and Regoeczi (2004) observed that most cases (78%) were distinctly expressive or instrumental in terms of their situational characteristics. For example, it was observed that
expressive homicides were characteristically committed amongst older adults in situations involving intragroup conflicts (in particular, family, intimate partners, and acquaintances) while instrumental homicides were typified by intergroup attacks involving younger males.

Similarly, a set of studies initiated by Salfati and Canter (1999) empirically tested patterns of behaviours at homicide crime scenes to determine whether they are indicative of the expressive and instrumental themes. Their study, which involved 82 British single-offender and single-victim homicides, tested whether behaviours observed at the crime scene can be thematically split into expressive and instrumental themes, or a hybrid of the two. Their model successfully allowed 65% of the cases to be assigned to one of the dominant themes (instrumental or expressive) while a further 35% were considered a hybrid.

A limitation of the situational or opportunity theory of homicide is that it lacks the capability to discover what leads to why behaviours ensue (Birbeck & LaFree, 1993), which, of course speaks to motive. This concern is warranted and paradigms such as the PCC (Bonta & Andrews, 2017) provide a great alternative for understanding the offender motive in terms of both personal and situational elements.

Typically, empirical situational analyses of homicide are a sociological exploration of an area (a country or city, for example) and motive is often a quantitative variable included from the police records. From this perspective, motive as a situational variable is clouded by the issues already raised about police-recorded motives while quantifying an ultimately qualitative construct is problematic. This, however, is where homicide event motive’s strength arises from; by examining the situation, the subjectivity of judgement of the researcher and of the idiosyncratic offender’s motive is sidestepped and the aetiology of the homicide can be understood.

HOMICIDE EVENT MOTIVES AND DEFINITIONS

Homicide event motive is defined the reason for the occurrence of the homicide. Its intention is to provide a pragmatic and utilitarian conceptualisation for police that is based on theoretical underpinnings and a holistic interpretation of the homicide situation. The labels adopted by police (see the Australian National Homicide Monitoring Reports) reflect the ostensible reason for the homicide’s occurrence, such as revenge, jealousy, desertion/termination, domestic argument, alcohol-related argument, and so forth.
The police motives quite clearly outline the context of the homicide, indicating that this is the most useful and practical interpretation to police when investigating homicide. With this in mind, the suggested labels adopted for the homicide event motives are based on those utilised in the U.K.’s *Murder Investigation Manual* (ACPO, 2006). These categories are like the vernacular used by police being suggested for use in homicide investigations, and therefore, have utilitarian value. These motives, however, are not so context-specific and refined to only one motive list that they cannot be applied to other studies. It is far more sensible to use a list that is considered “higher order” than police motives, yet still encompasses and accounts for them. This increases the practical value this conceptualisation has for investigators and maintain that the motives are condensed and limited enough to use in analyses and compare from study to study.²

The original classification from the manual comprised eight motives (*gain, jealousy, revenge, elimination, conviction, sex, thrill, and hate*), however, following a research review, were reduced to seven for the set of homicide event motives. *Sex* as a motive was not included because past literature has suggested that sexually based homicides are “motiveless” (Douglas, Ressler, Burgess, & Hartman, 1986). Homicides motivated by apparent and overt sexual reasons such as conduct a sadistic fantasy have been included under *thrill*. *Elimination*, from the original list has also been changed to *concealment* broadening the definition to include a wider array of situations. Following are the suggested motives and their definitions.

**Gain**

The primary reason for the homicide was to acquire some personal and tangible gain, for example: the victim was killed because they had something the offender wanted, such as money or property. This includes robbery and theft situations, but also other ways in which offenders might gain from the homicide, such as business advantages, personal position, and promotion. Furthermore, a relationship with another person may be gained by eliminating a third party, however, this must be clearly from a position of envy, rather than jealousy. *Gain* should also be conceptualised as the offender gaining by stopping something, such as blackmail or eliminating the need to repay a debt, avoiding divorce and a subsequent settlement, and child support, for example.
Jealousy

Jealousy is defined as “when a person either fears losing or has already lost an important relationship with another person to a rival” (emphasis added; Parrott, 1991: 4). Daly, Wilson, and Weghorst (1982: 12) suggested “jealousy… [is]… a state that is aroused by a perceived threat to a valued relationship or position and motivates behavior aimed at countering the threat. Jealousy is ‘sexual’ if the valued relationship is sexual.” Therefore, jealousy homicides involve the perception of the threat of a loss to another, that is, there is a third person involved in the situation. Either the offender’s lover or their rival may be homicide targets and they may include situations involving, for example, estrangement, termination of a relationship, infidelity, and relationships that involve three people.

Revenge

Homicides that stem from the urge to inflict punishment for a real or perceived wrongdoing. Also included are what are known as “honour killings”, in which a person is killed because they are suspected of being involved in something deemed immoral which has brought disgrace onto their family (Vitoshka, 2010). These vengeful incidents also include intimate partner homicides in which the offender experiences feelings of anger and possessiveness (for instance, following dissolution of the relationship), leading them to kill their partner.

Concealment

When a homicide is committed to conceal another crime’s occurrence. These homicides should be perceived as occurring after the other criminal event. There are two major scenarios; the first are events where offenders are escaping a situation (e.g. following a burglary and fleeing the scene), and the second, eliminating a person who can identify the offender as being involved in a prior crime.

Conviction and Hate

There are two interrelated themes for these homicides. The first are homicides that are committed out of fear or hatred of specific social groups, in particular those from different racial, ethnic, sexual, or religious groups. The second are those that are committed from dedication to a cause, and may include terrorists, group initiation-type behaviours, or the mentally ill acting under the influence of a harmful delusion (for example, hearing voices telling them to commit the homicide).
Thrill
Homicides committed for pleasure and excitement, out of curiosity, to achieve power and control, or to relieve boredom or catharsis.

Love
Homicide committed to remove a person they love from a situation they perceive as being “worse than death”. This includes both altruistic homicides and assisted suicides. For altruistic homicides, the perception for the offender of the situation is that it must be so bad they would rather see the victim die than be alive to experience it (for example, a parent who cannot bear the thought of themselves committing suicide and leaving his or her children in the care of others, also known as an extended suicide). These may occur with or without the consent of the victim. Assisted suicides may include the killing of a terminally ill person with their consent or a person who is in great pain (considered mercy killings).

CONCLUSION
This manuscript introduced the concept of homicide event motive as a new way of understanding and thinking about homicide and the reasons it occurs. Given the complexity that is homicide, this conceptualisation proposes that it is useful to think of motive in terms of a framework that involves not only the sole perspective of the offender, but also the victim and situational elements involved.

It takes a holistic view of the event to understand the way in which the different elements have all influenced and affected the motive for the homicide. By doing so, this conceptualisation overcomes some of the hurdles and criticisms that the motive literature has faced thus far, in particular, the subjectivity of the pure offender motive. It may, therefore, aid in determining the reasons for the homicide’s occurrence when the offender does not disclose their personal motives. Practically speaking, this may also help establish inferential reasoning within a homicide investigation and subsequent judicial processes.

Use of homicide event motive in investigations will enhance the tools already at investigators’ disposal, such as criminal profiling, cultural and diversity specialists, and forensic evidence to enhance the opportunity to solve a homicide. With further research, it would also offer an empirically based line of enquiry for police and argument for lawyers to demonstrate guilt of an accused perpetrator.
This definition can be adopted by many different fields to aid in interdisciplinary partnerships since its focus is not based in one discipline alone. What can result are motive lists that are incompatible and are not comparable to one another, so it is difficult to draw conclusions and inferences from more than one study.

Homicide event motive helps in crossing these barriers between disciplines and offers a conceptualisation that can be utilised by all. Future research would benefit from examining whether the conceptual foundation of homicide event motive is beneficial in explaining other non-lethal violence, such as antisocial behaviour and assault. Finally, to empirically support this theoretical conceptualisation, the situational characteristics that are associated with each motive should be investigated to establish whether there are qualitative differences between them to form empirically based motive typologies.

NOTES

1. Motive refers to the reason the homicide occurred whereas circumstance refers to the elements of the situation (such as location).

2. See Parker (2017) for full in-depth discussion of positive and negative implications of different disciplines’ conceptualisations of motive.

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Edited by Brent E. Turvey
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2013 paperback, 656 pages
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Reviewed by Dr Amber McKinley

The first iteration of this book was originally published in 2009. The text introduced criminal investigators and theorists to the concept of methodically collecting and exploring information pertaining to the victim to better inform investigations. In a traditionally theoretical domain Forensic Victimology distinguishes forensic characteristics as applied to a victim. The second edition of Forensic Victimology offers up-to-date references and case examples, as well as offering readers further applied investigative techniques. It highlights the advantages of forensic victimology to casework and provides best practice standards to effectively assist the Criminal Justice System (CJS).

This second iteration has three new chapters on Emergency Services, False Confessions, and Human Trafficking. The attractive but potentially contentious aspect of this text is Turvey and his co-author’s approach to the study of victimology. It is raw, realistic and highly critical in some instances. For example: few authors in current academia would write about false allegations of sexual assault or a victim’s participation in the crime that sees them harmed.

Brent Turvey is a passionate teacher and forensic specialist based in the United States and even with the international collaborators included within this book, its format and style is fundamentally American. Every chapter begins with a shaded text box of key terms, definitions and a chapter contents list, footnotes and questions at the end of each chapter as a stimulus for revision. The text is relatively expensive (RRP: AU$107)
and quite weighty, however it is filled with current, interesting and relevant case studies that question previous theories and critically analyses material from multiple sources.

Chapters include: false allegations of crime, forensic nursing, school shootings, sexual offenders and their victims, stranger violence, victim lifestyle exposure, victims of stalking, workplace violence and wrongful convictions. Not all this subject matter is entirely relevant to Australia at present (such as: school shootings), however if Australian researchers, students and members of the criminal justice system are encouraged to think globally and more critically, then the value of these topics gain relevance.

This text is easy to read and offers students and investigators alike case examples to further describe the theories and application of this relatively new field to the CJS. The case examples offer interest, reality and the nuances of the human condition, to what could be a dry text. The addition of dramatic stories, photographs, and recent cases examples demonstrate theory and the practical application of law is also presented. As an example of this format choice, at least half of the 20-page preface involves cases. This text would be much shorter without the cases, photos and current formatting however, it would also be harder to read, less accessible to new students and perhaps not as appealing to those new to this field of study.

The text starts by defining victimology and presenting concepts in relation to realistic victimology, it introduces terms such as “victimity” and offers examples and context to these phrases. The bulk of the text aims to guide investigators to get to the truth, no matter what that looks like. The contributors to this text come from policing, military, psychology and forensics backgrounds so sections on ‘Creating a Timeline: The Last 24 Hours’ are actually written by people who use the technique in the workplace and who are also aware of the positive and negative aspects of the work practice. This book should be of interest to students of forensic science programs, legal studies programs, criminology programs, victim studies programs, and those currently employed within the legal community, or working within the criminal justice system.

When one reviews the list of contributors to this cutting-edge text they appear to collectively support recognition of forensics as an independent discipline standing strong beside criminology, sociology and behavioural sciences, due to its intrinsic value to all the domains and more specifically to police investigations. There is a danger that practitioners
within the CJS may steer away from this text due to the argument being constantly interrupted. A suggestion for further iterations of this text would be to publish two different types of books; one for interested, but unqualified people and university students gaining qualifications and another for investigators or practitioners. *Forensic Victimology* will be of interest to law enforcement and students alike due to its easy to read text, fundamental applied nature and its move away from traditional models and stereotypes.

**ABOUT THE REVIEWER**

**Dr Amber McKinley** (BLibSt, MCJ, PhD), is a lecturer with the Charles Sturt University, Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security (Law), and her current research interests are in relation to serial homicide in Australia (1900–2016), theoretical, applied and forensic victimology, factors influencing homicide clearance rates in Australia, and a longitudinal study of the effect of demographic, temporal and geological factors on the solvability of adult homicide in Australia.

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