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Weapon System Selection in Police Use-of-Force Training: Value to Skill Transfer Categorisation Matrix

Mario S. Staller, Oliver Bertram and Swen Körner*

ABSTRACT

The development of transferable skills that help officers in preventing and dealing with armed and unarmed confrontations is crucial to police use-of-force (PUOF) training. Based on the concept of representative learning designs guided by an ecological dynamics perspective to learning, we argue, that skill acquisition is predicated on continuous information-based interaction between the learner and the performance environment. This nonlinear pedagogical approach to PUOF practice requires PUOF coaches to underpin their operational practice with a clear understanding of the interactional relationship between the informational variables and the goal-directed behavior. As such, a sound knowledge of the functional properties of used weapon systems is essential, in order to efficiently locate their use within the context of PUOF learning environments. The paper proposes a categorisation matrix to weapon systems that are used in PUOF training settings according to their functional properties and their opportunities for learning. On a practical level the matrix enables PUOF coaches to make decisions about the use of different training systems based on their functional properties. On an organisational level the matrix helps law enforcement agencies to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio, when investing in new training systems.

Keywords: Police use-of-force training, skill acquisition, weapon systems, representative learning design, ecological dynamics, nonlinear pedagogy

INTRODUCTION

Police officers are regularly tasked with the resolution of conflicts (Amendola, 1996; Anderson, Litzenberger, and Plecas, 2002; Anshel, 2000). As organs of the executive branch of government the use of proportionate use-of-force is a legitimate part of their role (Amendola, 1996; Terrill, Paoline, and Manning, 2003). However, conflict resolution and achieving compliance is not limited to the use-of-force, as can be seen by the value of communication and negotiation skills in these contexts (Vecchi, Van Hasselt, and Romano, 2005;  

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Zaiser and Staller, 2015). The police occupation involves coping with a broad range of situations. How these situations develop and unfold cannot be foreseen. On the one hand, even routine deployments can result in life threatening situations for the officer (e.g. terror attack while on patrol). On the other hand, high-risk deployments can turn out to be non-threatening once the police officer arrives at the scene (e.g. martial arts class practicing in the park). Additionally, the types of threats posed to police officers can vary from verbal abuse to deadly assaults. Even unarmed encounters pose a serious risk of injury to the police officer and the other party involved (Bochenek, 2014; 2011; Ellrich, Baier, and Pfeiffer, 2011; Jager, Klatt, and Bliesener, 2013; Smith and Alpert, 2000).

Police use-of-force (PUOF) training is geared towards officers developing transferable skills that help in preventing and dealing with armed and unarmed confrontations in different social contexts and fields (Armstrong, Clare, and Plecas, 2014; Staller and Zaiser, 2015). PUOF coaches are often tasked to design learning environments and training activities that optimally foster the transfer of learned skills from the training to the real-world context (Staller and Zaiser, 2015). However, recent investigations of performance of police officers have shown (Jager et al., 2013; Renden, Nieuwenhuys, Savelsbergh, and Oudejans, 2015), that skills developed in police use-of-force learning environments do not necessarily transfer to the environment where these skills are needed.

Publications in the context of pedagogical practice of police use-of-force learning environments regularly recommend: 1) designing the training as realistic as possible (Armstrong et al., 2014; Hoff, 2012; Jager et al., 2013; Renden et al., 2015; Wollert, Driskell, and Quali, 2011); 2) refining the taught skills (Renden et al., 2015; Renden, Savelsbergh, and Oudejans, 2016); and 3) to provide more training (Jager et al., 2013; Renden et al., 2015). Even though there is practical value within this body of research, it seems that these recommendations are based on pedagogical practices that advocate a traditional reproductive style to coaching; that is, questionable with regards to optimal skill development in PUOF settings (Staller and Zaiser, 2015). Such practices are characterised by conventional teaching and learning sequences, consisting of three consecutive phases of practice: 1) introduction to the technical/tactical skill with detailed explanations of the key features of the skill; 2) repetitive attempts of the learner to reproduce the movement patterns, that have been prescribed by the coach and that are considered to be optimal; and 3) an application phase,
where the skills should be applied in the criterion context (Chow, Davids, Button, and Renshaw, 2016; Moy, Renshaw, and Davids, 2015). Recommendations to optimise the effectiveness of training, which is based on this traditional reproductive approach, consequently include increasing the amount of training time and to review, revise and specify the taught patterns (Jager et al., 2013; Renden et al., 2015).

Based on the drawbacks of such an approach in police use-of-force training and the evidence emerging from sports training programs that advocate a nonlinear pedagogy (Araújo, Davids, and Hristovski, 2006; Chow et al., 2016; Chow, Davids, Hristovski, Araújo, and Passos, 2011; Davids, 2000; Handford, Davids, Bennett, and Button, 1997), we recently argued to shift the emphasis in PUOF (and civilian self-defense) training to representative learning designs based on a nonlinear pedagogy (for further explanations see Staller and Bertram, 2016; Staller, Zaiser, and Körner, 2016b; Staller, Zaiser, Körner, and Abraham, 2016c).

This approach is underpinned by an ecological dynamics perspective to learning, advocating that skill acquisition is predicated on continuous information-based interaction between the learner and the performance environment (Davids, Renshaw, Pinder, Araújo, and Vilar, 2012). The police use-of-force coach is understood as a designer of the learning environment, that enables the learning officer to experience the interacting constraints of the performance environment in a managed way (Davids, 2015; Davids et al., 2012; Hristovski, Araújo, Balagué Serre, Button, and Passos, 2014). The interactive process between the police officer and the environment leads to the coupling of key information sources to goal-directed movements as each individual adapts to changes in the performance context.

This nonlinear pedagogical approach to police use-of-force practice requires coaches to underpin their operational practice with a clear understanding of the interactional relationship between the informational variables and the goal-directed behaviour. As such, a sound understanding of the functional properties of used training systems is essential, in order to efficiently locate their use within the context of PUOF learning environments.

It was posited that a categorisation matrix to weapon systems that are used in police use-of-force training settings according to their functional properties and their opportunities for learning in training settings. The matrix enables the
police use-of-force coach to make informed decisions about the use of different training systems based on the functional properties and may help law enforcement agencies to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio, when investing in new training systems. For that purpose, weapon systems are first categorised before outlining pedagogical aspects that should be considered by PUOF coaches.

WEAPON SYSTEMS IN PUOF TRAINING SETTINGS

In police use of weapons learning environments, a variety of weapons systems are used to train for violent real-world confrontations. Used weapon systems have to accommodate for representativeness in the learning design while simultaneously ensuring health and safety of those involved (Staller et al., 2016b; Staller et al., 2016c). Since representative learning design implies that these environments need to be predicated on key information sources that are found in the specific performance context (Pinder, Renshaw, Headrick, and Davids, 2014), the categorisation of weapon systems has to account for informational variables and goal-directed behaviours that could emerge through the use of a specific weapon system in a training setting.

An interactional relationship (between informational variables and goal-directed behaviour) in police use of weapons training settings is mainly influenced by the projectile or emission out of the barrel from the weapon system, and the target of that emission with its dynamical properties. Regarding the emission out of the barrel, weapons can be differentiated between four categories. First, weapons can emit potentially lethal projectiles like conventional ammunition, potentially lethal training ammunition, or unhardened structure target ammunition (Murray, 2004).

Second, non-lethal training weapons use projectiles that exit the barrel with a reduced velocity that is great enough to enable shots over a certain distance, but is small enough to not penetrate the skin of users. Common non-lethal training systems include Simunition FX weapons, Airsoft, and Paintball. The third category consists of laser-based systems like the SAAB Small Arms Transmitter, Lasertag systems, Stress Vest, or the Beamhit Interactive Dry Fire System. These systems involve a sender unit (weapon) and a receiver unit that is mounted on the potential target (e.g. vest, head gear). Since no projectiles are emitted, there is no experience of pain, if a participant is hit by a laser-based weapon system (although the Stress Vest can be used with electric shock to induce pain). Finally, there are inert weapons that are non-functional by design,
meaning they are not able to emit any projectiles during the training session. Examples include ASP RedGuns, rubber guns, but also real weapons that are temporarily rendered non-functional (e.g. by blocking the barrel via a safety stick, unloading the weapon).

The target, that is the potential receiver of the weapon's projectile or emission, can be either non-human or human. Non-human targets can be stationary, like paper targets, or non-stationary, making target practice more difficult. Human targets can be fellow trainees or the trainers who act in scripted or non-scripted parts-like in a stage play. In scripted target behavior actors role play events in a predefined way to generate a range of realistic situations that the trainee has to solve. Non-scripted practice involves situations that are only bound by a set of general rules. Paintball and laser-tag matches are prototypical activities involving non-scripted behaviors of participants.

These two broadly described categories of weapon systems (emission/projectile and target of emission/projectile) regularly define the boundaries under which the weapon system can be used with regards to representativeness and participants’ health and safety. For instance, it is not ethically permissible to use live-fire against a fellow training partner who is acting in a non-scripted training scenario.

PEDAGOGICAL ASPECTS OF DIFFERENT WEAPON SYSTEMS

Besides the functional properties of different weapons systems, police use of weapons coaches have to account for various pedagogical aspects in order to design effective and efficient practice programs and activities. In general, learning environments are designed to accelerate skill development through various features that have to be carefully considered in order to enhance effectiveness and efficiency of training programs. Key features include: 1) representative learning design (Broadbent, Causer, Williams, and Ford, 2015; Pinder, Davids, Renshaw, and Araújo, 2011b; Staller and Bertram, 2016); 2) repetitive practice via active learner engagement (Issenberg, McGaghie, Petrusa, Gordon, and Scalese, 2005; Okuda et al., 2009); and 3) intra-experience, direct feedback (Okuda et al., 2009).
Representative Learning Design

With regards to optimal skill transfer, learning environments in combat settings should accommodate principles of representative learning design (Staller and Zaiser, 2015). As such, a task should allow the learner to be exposed to and act upon the same constraints as in the performance environment. Furthermore, the learner has to be allowed to execute a response that is the same as in the performance environment (Pinder, Davids, Renshaw, and Araújo, 2011a).

The use of different weapon systems allows coaches to be able to design many realistic task that representative real-world scenarios employing the learning method known as perception-action coupling. While interaction with realistic environmental variables is important to achieving performance, weapon systems that allow for continuous, dynamic interaction between the learner and the target enable more representative learning than weapon systems that consist of a stimulus-response reaction, like non-human targets (including video screens).

Repetitive Practice and Active Learner Engagement

It has been acknowledged that practice is essential to skill development (Coutinho, Mesquita, Davids, Fonseca, and Cote, 2016; Ericsson and Towne, 2010). Research has repeatedly shown a relationship between the number of hours of practice and level of achievement (Baker, Cote, and Deakin, 2005; Berry, Abernethy, MacMahon, and Farrow, 2009; Coutinho et al., 2016). However, the quality of practice activities that are undertaken has been shown to be a far more important indicator of expertise development than the time spent in practice (Coutinho et al., 2016; Davids, 2000; Hambrick et al., 2014).

Practice activities that provide high amounts of perceptual-motor coupling under high levels of variability and constraints (e.g. unstructured training activities with more experienced peers) have shown to be important in skill development (Hornig, Aust, and Güllich, 2016; Memmert, Baker, and Bertsch, 2010; Roca, Ford, McRobert, and Williams, 2013). It is worth noting, that practice time does not equal the scheduled time for a training session. Providing learning environments that foster the active engagement of the learner with skill-developing practice activities is a key challenge for coaches (Chow et al., 2016; Dyson, Griffin, and Hastie, 2004; Sinelnikov and Hastie, 2010). This involves providing the opportunities for repetitive practice and engagement in learning
activities, and creating the motivational climate to let learner actively engage in practice activities.

In the context of police use of weapons training, opportunities for practice are likely to be restricted by institutional regulations (How many officers are allowed to simultaneously shoot on the range), availability and characteristics of training gear/weapon systems (how many laser-based systems are available for a class of recruits), management of the specific practice session (how many learners can simultaneously work with soft-air guns), and prevalence of injuries of learners (are learners injured because of practice activities). Regarding the motivational climate, the PUOF coach has to be aware that activities involving possible experiences of pain (Staller and Abraham, 2016; Staller, Abraham, Poolton, and Körner, 2016a) pose an additional challenge in creating learning environments that support sustainable motivation.

**Intra-Experience Feedback**

Mistakes are essential for learning, since they provide the opportunity to revise previous actions and adapt performance (Piggott, 2008). This implies, that learning activities provide immediate and direct feedback to the learner. If a goal-directed behaviour is executed (e.g. a shot to a part of a target, the effective blocking technique, etc.), the learner needs (at some point) to know, if his/her behaviour achieved the goal (e.g. hit the target, defended the punch, and so on). With regard to the issue of pain in training settings (and the possible negative effects on motivation), it becomes a key challenge for police use of weapons instructors to separate their feedback from pain in the learning setting.

While a laser-based system provides feedback if the learner has been hit by an aggressor, it does not involve pain. Non-lethal training weapons provide the experience of pain, which depends on the system used, the distance between learner and target, and the mass/velocity of the projectile. Since the possible experience of pain does alter goal-directed behavior of the learner (Nieuwenhuys and Oudejans, 2010; Renden et al., 2014), it is an important aspect in the design of (effectively) representative tasks. However, there seems to be motivational drawbacks of pain experience in training settings (Staller et al., 2016a).

**CATEGORISATION MATRIX**

Law enforcement agencies and police use of weapons coaches are regularly challenged in making decision about in what training weapon systems to invest...
in, and what practice activities to provide. Such decisions involve various considerations on different levels (e.g. financial, pedagogical, etc.). Since transfer of learning is a key element when designing a learning environment (Staller and Zaiser, 2015), different weapon systems should be rated according to their opportunities in using them for activities that promote the skill development of transferable skills.

Table 1 displays a weapons systems categorisation matrix for the functional properties of weapons systems as well as their value in different learning environments. The matrix was developed by distilling the arguments and other factors expressed in the subject literature, then these results were cross-checked for validity by three police use-of-force coaches who assessed the findings independently. Once agreement was reached, the findings were consolidated in data contained in table 1.

The matrix contains the different weapon systems and the possibilities of using them in training settings (horizontal). Each category of use (e.g. use of laser-based weapons systems on non-stationary, non-human targets) is rated across a variety of different aspects that have been identified as being relevant in providing an optimal learning environment. This involves the level of representativeness with regards to perception-action coupling and the differentiation between feedback and pain. Further, each category is rated in relation to the risk of injury in training and the opportunities for repetitive practice, and learner engagement.

Based on the consideration about the pedagogical aspects of PUOF training, it is assumed that training efficiency is high, if: 1) the level of representativeness is high; 2) the practice activity provides intra-experience feedback regarding the effectiveness against the target and the effectiveness of the defensive/evading behavior; 3) risk of injuries are low or not existing; and 4) opportunities for repetitive practice and active learner engagement are high. With regard to deadly force encounters training over short distances, the matrix indicates that non-lethal training systems and laser-based systems engaging human targets provide an optimal learning experience.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emission / Projectile</td>
<td>Emission of Projectiles with Potential Lethal Impact</td>
<td>Emission of Projectiles with Non-Lethal Impact</td>
<td>Emission of Laser</td>
<td>No Emission Possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stationary Target</td>
<td>Stationary Target</td>
<td>Non-Stationary Target</td>
<td>Stationary Target</td>
<td>Non-Stationary Target</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Scripted Target Behavior</td>
<td>Non-Scripted Target Behavior</td>
<td>Non-Scripted Target Behavior</td>
<td>Non-Scripted Target Behavior</td>
<td>Non-Scripted Target Behavior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example of Training Activities</td>
<td>Use of Conventional Ammunition on Stationary Targets</td>
<td>Use of Conventional Ammunition on Moving Targets</td>
<td>Use of Non-Lethal Training Aid on Stationary Targets</td>
<td>Use of Non-Lethal Training Aid on Moving Targets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Representativeness (Perception-Action Coupling)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback (If learner was effective on target)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback (If learner was effective in defense)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Pain (of the target)</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Experienced Pain (If learner was not effective)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of Injuries (of the target)</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk of Injuries (If learner was not effective)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opportunities for Repetitive Practice / Active Learner Engagement</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Non-Existent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
It is worth noting, that it is only considered deadly force encounters on short distances for these categories. Moreover, it needs to be emphasised that specific ratings cannot be generalised because practice environments can limit or otherwise alter learning outcomes. For example, the rating for opportunities for repetitive practice/active learner engagement in table 1 are based on the premise that the number of training systems needed are available in that setting. Limitations in these numbers will limit the opportunities. Likewise, if there is a difference if the shooting range (live-fire weapon on stationary, non-human targets) provides the possibility to actively engage all learners simultaneously or not.

CONCLUSION

To design an effective and efficient police use-of-force learning environment, it has been argued that trainers need to develop such programs based on sound pedagogical considerations. To this end, a categorisation matrix was developed to enable PUOF coaches to rate different weapon systems according to their functional properties and their ability to promote skills transfer. The practical aspect of this is that the matrix enables PUOF coaches to make decisions about the use of different training systems; and from an organisational point of view, the matrix can assist law enforcement agencies to evaluate the cost-benefit ratio when investing in new training systems.

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Baseline Knowledge of Islam and Muslims: 
A Study of Australian Government Crisis Communication Officials

Kate O’Donnell,† Jacqui Ewart and Clair Alston-Knox

ABSTRACT

This study examined the level of knowledge Australian crisis communications officials had about Islam and Muslims. It did so at a time when the Commonwealth Government has warned in the current national security environment that a terrorist attack could be experienced at any time, and where the most serious threat emanated from those holding what the government described as a “deviant” view of Islam. The study identified that Media Liaison Officers (n=72) have low levels of knowledge about this religious faith, and that they were aware of their lack of understanding. These findings raise policy concerns about the extent to which Media Liaison Officers can differentiate between Islam and deviant interpretations of the faith. With the pivotal role that Media Liaison Officers play in crisis communication—including briefing and educating journalists when a terrorist event occurs—these findings present crisis managers with several challenges; including recruitment, training, and ongoing professional development.

Keywords: Crisis communication, terrorism, violent extremism, Islam, Media Liaison Officers, Australia

INTRODUCTION

A ustralia’s contemporary security and emergency policy frameworks are centred on the all-hazards approach; but moreover, this doctrinal approach emphasises resilience (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d). Nevertheless, human-induced disasters—such as acts of terrorism—pose unique challenges for political leaders and crisis communication practitioners, not the least of which is dealing with the public’s heightened perceptions of risk, fear, uncertainty, panic, and their search for answers (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2012; Commonwealth of Australia 2015d; Griffin-Padgett and Allison 2010; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006).

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These challenges arise because the roles of different levels of governments in crisis communications before, during and after disasters (e.g. terrorism) are “fundamentally different” than for more familiar crises and disasters (e.g. natural disasters) (Kapucu and Van Wart 2006: 280). Training and education of crisis communication officials, understanding and taking account of contextual factors, and effective engagement with the political leaders, and news media, are all critical success factors for effective crisis communications (Boin, Cadar, and Donnelley 2016; Commonwealth of Australia 2015e; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006; Palttala, Boano, Lund, and Vos 2012; Seeger 2006).

In the contemporary Australian security context, “…a terrorist attack is likely any time” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b: iii). The principal terrorist threat facing Australia has been identified as individuals or groups that promote violent extremism, specifically those with “…a deviant interpretation of Islam” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015a: 2). Therefore, the ability of government officials responsible for crisis communications will be to differentiate Islam from its deviant interpretations.

The role crisis communication plays in disasters by government agencies has been the subject of scholarly inquiry for decades (Cheng 2013; Griffin-Padgett and Allison 2010). While studies have identified that communication is central to the four key phases of crisis management (prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery), less well documented are the so-called best-practice approaches for crises and disasters (Cheng 2013; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006). Moreover, those studies examining best-practice for political actors when communicating with the public, tend to focus on natural disasters (Ewart and McLean 2015a, 2015b; Ewart, McLean, and Ames 2015, 2016).

LITERATURE AND CONTEXT

The four-phase cycle of crisis management encompassing prevention, preparedness, response and recovery has been well documented by researchers (Boin, et al. 2016). Central to effective crisis management across all four phases is accurate and timely communication with various publics (Boin et al. 2016). Yet, crisis communication raises an important dichotomy; that between the push pressures to lead and inform various publics with accurate and timely information, and the pull pressures to be guarded, to over-reassure and to deny blame (Venette 2006: 230). Finding this balance for governments and political leaders can be fraught with uncertainty, and various publics (including the news
media) can be unforgiving if the right balance is not found (Cheng 2013; Ewart and McLean 2015a; Ingham 2014; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006; Palttala et al. 2012).

In crises, the news media is an active rather than a passive actor providing an important conduit between responders and various publics (Palttala et al. 2012). The news media shapes public opinions and influences the actions of both the public and political leaders (Anthony and Sellnow 2011; Cheng 2013; Ewart and McLean 2015a; Palttala et al. 2012; Seeger 2006). The public and the news media can be harsh critics (Ewart and McLean 2015a; Kapucu and Van Wart 2006).

Best-practice crisis communications strategies continue to evolve, adapting to different scenarios, risks and threats, responder roles and expectations (Covello 2003; Griffin-Padgett and Allison 2010; Heath 2006; Seeger 2006; Venette 2006). Research focused specifically on the roles of political actors as responders identifies that while crises are inherently political events, at times politicians struggle to find the balance between the push pressures on them to act as leaders and the pull pressures on them to simultaneously step-back allowing operational managers to lead (McLean and Ewart 2015a, 2015b). Research has also found that in times of crises, political actors “…are both a help and hindrance in the provision of information to the public” (McLean and Ewart 2015b: 512).

In the immediate crisis response phase, political actors “walk a tightrope” when attempting to balance the potential political mileage from showing strong leadership from being “on the scene” with the needs of first responders to focus on preserving life and protecting property (Ewart et al. 2016). Pre-event planning including pre-messaging is critical, yet for human-induced crises and disasters, pre-event planning and the roles of governments remain under researched (Boin et al. 2016; Covello 2003; Griffin-Padgett and Allison 2010; Palttala et al. 2012; Seeger 2006). As Heath (2006: 245) points out, in the preparedness phase of a crisis “…creating teams, fact-finding protocols, messaging, and delivery are vital.” The resultant crisis narratives are built on “pre-crisis conditions” including other contextual narratives (Heath 2006: 247).

Australia routinely experiences natural disasters, including flooding, tropical cyclones, and bushfires, with average annual insured losses estimated at A$1 billion (Commonwealth of Australia 2011; Crompton and McAneney...
Australian interests are also not immune from acts of international and domestic terrorism. Since the early 1970s spurred on by the massacre of athletes and officials at the Munich Olympic Games in 1972, Australia’s counter-terrorism efforts have been driven by international as well as domestic events, and the subsequent changes to the threats that emerged since (Finnane 2013, 2015; Wright-Neville 2006). At least twelve acts of terrorism have occurred on Australian soil since 1970 (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2016). The Australian government has reported that since 2001, policing and intelligence agencies have also disrupted at least four major terrorist plots, and in the past decade alone, more than 110 Australians have been killed overseas in terrorist events (Australian Government 2016a).

Over time the threats facing Australia have included those emanating from Armenian terrorism, violence by right-wing racist groups, and violence directed against Jewish and Islamic populations in Australia (Commonwealth of Australia 1984: 17; 1990: 49; 2001: 4; 2002: 17). These shifting security threats would indicate that the requisite knowledge held by officials with responsibilities for responding to acts of acts of terrorism should also shift. Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Level at the time of this writing was set at probable (Australian Government 2016b). This means “…that individuals or groups have developed both the intent and capability to conduct a terrorist attack in Australia” (Australian Government 2016b).

The principal terrorist threat facing Australian interests now has been identified by Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) as individuals or groups that promote violent extremism, specifically those with “…a deviant interpretation of Islam” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015a: 2). Of the twenty organisations currently proscribed under Australia’s Criminal Code as terrorist organisations, nineteen are groups that claim to act in the name of Islam (Australian Government 2016c). It is noteworthy that Australians are largely ignorant of Islam, with 70% of a random stratified sample acknowledging they know little to nothing about the faith and its adherents (Withheld, 2016).

Australian governments, police and officials have specific, yet complementary, roles to play in preparing for and responding to a range of natural and human-induced crises and disasters including acts of terrorism (Commonwealth of Australia 2011, 2012, 2015b, 2015e). This includes complementary roles in crisis communications as they relate to acts of terrorism (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e). Official guidance for Media Liaison
Officers in the context of an act of terrorism includes advice about “...the judicious and prudent use of language” (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e: 18). This advice extends to the potential intersection between terrorism and religious, national, and cultural communities (including Islam) (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e: 20). Strawson (2008: 9) identifies governments have sought to differentiate the Islamic faith from the acts of violent extremism committed by a small proportion of its adherents. The distinction between terrorism and Islam is crucial (Strawson 2008: 9). This is a highly-nuanced scholarship and policy area reliant on an understanding of Islam, its history, variants, and differences in its political goals and relationships with the West (Strawson 2008).

It is posited that this situation infers that government officials whose roles it is to brief political and policy elites as well as liaise with the media and inform various publics during a crisis should have a higher level of knowledge about Islam and its deviant interpretations than that of the general Australian population. To test this hypothesis, this study examined the knowledge held by crisis communications officials about the Islamic faith.

METHOD
In May 2016, at the request of the Australia–New Zealand Counter-Terrorism Committee’s Public Information Sub-Committee, two of the authors designed and conducted along with a Muslim trainer, two ninety-minute workshops for officials involved in public messaging during times of crises. The focus of the sessions, which were conducted in two Australian capital cities, was multi-faceted: to brief participants about a broader project at the time being co-led by one of the authors focused on encouraging more informed reporting of Islam and Muslims by the Australian news media; to discuss key information about Islam and its religious practices (discussed below); and to begin to assess the information needs of participants who operate in counterterrorism policy.

At the beginning of each workshop, participants (a convenience sample of n=73) were invited to (but were not required to) complete an ethical clearance form and a questionnaire. The questionnaire asked participants about their levels of education and work-related experiences, and asked twelve targeted questions.

To enable comparisons to be made to the Australian population, the first two questions were modelled on questions asked by Roy Morgan Research in their June 2003, *Attitudes Towards Islam Survey* (Dunn, 2004), and replicated in a recent study (Withheld, 2016). Participants were asked to describe their
knowledge of Islam and its followers using a four-point scale—1) I don’t know anything about Islam and its followers; 2) I know a little about Islam and its followers; 3) I know a reasonable amount about Islam and its followers; 4) and, I know a lot about Islam and its followers. Participants were then asked to nominate whether they were Muslims themselves, and how many Muslims they knew.

To test participants’ knowledge of basic facts about Islam, eight of the remaining ten multiple-choice questions replicated those about Islam and its religious practices administered in one stage of the broader project. The two remaining multiple-choice questions were tailored at another objective of this study, that was, to identify levels of knowledge about media practitioners’ roles in reporting of acts of terrorism. These results are excluded from this paper. After each workshop, a questionnaire using the same ten multiple-choice questions was administered. Not all participants answered all questions, and this is reflected in the data.

During the workshops, the correct or incorrect answers to the questions were not identified. However, the part of the workshop that focused on Islam and Muslims, which was delivered by a Muslim trainer, was designed to cover the material in the questionnaires. It included a discussion about Islam as an Abrahamic religion, monotheism, the prophets of Islam, the five pillars of Islam, the branches of Islam, an explanation of key terms (including jihad, halal, and sharia, as well as terms relevant to veiling, such as hijab and niqab), and cultural practices and sensitivities.

STATISTICAL ANALYSIS

The pre-workshop test asked participants to rank their knowledge of Islam and Muslims using a four-point scale (table 1). There were 72 responses to this question. The study found that approximately 78% of participants considered they knew little to nothing about Islam and Muslims; approximately 22% considered they knew a reasonable amount; whereas, no respondent considered they know a lot (note: results have been rounded to one decimal place for clarity).

These data were analysed using linear regression under a Bayesian framework, with vague conjugate priors (Kass and Wasserman 1996). To test the participants’ knowledge, both pre-workshop and post-workshop scores were modelled using linear regression to exam the effects of:
1 session attended;
2 if participants had been journalists in the past;
3 if participants had been involved in reporting on, or responding to, a
terror event in the past;
4 participants’ level of education (trichotomised as: no tertiary education;
undergraduate; and postgraduate);
5 participants’ self-reported knowledge (nothing; a little; a reasonable
amount; and a lot); and
6 the number of Muslims participants knew (converted to a log scale for
analysis).

Table 1: Participants’ self-ranked knowledge of Islam and Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Participants’ Self-Ranked Knowledge of Islam and Muslims</th>
<th>Participants (n=72)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I don’t know anything about Islam and its followers</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know a little bit about Islam and its followers</td>
<td>69.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know a reasonable amount about Islam and its followers</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I know a lot about Islam and its followers</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Initially, it was determined that neither participants’ involvement in reporting or
responding to past terror events or the participants’ level of education were
significant. These results however, may not reflect the effect of these factors in
the wider community. For instance, there were only four participants who
indicated they had reported on a terror event when they were journalists (three of
whom attended the same workshop). As a result, it was not possible for the
study to comment on the significance of this factor on pre-workshop knowledge.

In terms of education levels, the bulk of our participants had an
undergraduate degree (n=51) as their highest level of education, with eight
participants having a higher degree, and five having no tertiary qualifications.
As a result, the possible effects of levels of education may be masked by the
The coefficients from the resulting linear model (including only significant terms) are summarised in table 2.

Table 2: Estimated coefficients for linear regression of effects on re-workshop test results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effect</th>
<th>Mean (SD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>1.53 (0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course (location 2)</td>
<td>0.67 (0.47)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Previous work as journalist</td>
<td>0.85 (0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reported Knowledge: A little</td>
<td>1.18 (0.80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Reported Knowledge: A reasonable amount</td>
<td>2.13 (0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Muslims known (log scale)</td>
<td>0.15 (0.12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is worth noting that the aim of the analysis is to describe differences between workshop participants and their baseline knowledge of Islam. In this context, linear regression is a modelling process used to detect factors that vary between baseline knowledge, rather than constructing a model to predict the baseline knowledge of other people who are not part of our sample (see Scmueli 2010 for further discussion). As this analysis was focussed on explaining differences, significance was determined using the posterior distributions of the parameter estimates based on the Monte Carlo Markov Chain simulations. If zero (0) was included in the 95% credible intervals, signifying the plausible range of parameter values, the result was deemed non-significant.

DISCUSSION

The results of the pre-workshop test revealed that scores were impacted by the course location, with the overall mean in one capital city, location being 0.67 points lower than the overall mean in the other capital city location (table 2). Additionally, significant terms imply that pre-workshop test scores increase for current journalists (0.85), in line with self-reported knowledge (an additional 1.18 when reporting knowing a little, and an additional 2.13 for participants who reported knowing a lot).

Participants who reported knowing more Muslim people also achieved higher mean scores in the baseline knowledge test (shown in table 2 on a log
scale). Overall, the mean pre-test score was 1.53 (out of 8) and is displayed in table 2. This result would correspond to a participant at location 1, who was not a former journalist reporting that they knew nothing about Islam and knew no Muslims.

The results of the pre-workshop analysis (table 2) are shown graphically in figure 1, which provides model estimates for a participant reporting knowing no Muslims. Solid lines are modelled test means for location 1, dashed lines for location 2. Self-reported knowledge is none, a little and a reasonable amount. These estimates are for participants who report knowing no Muslims. Mean scores increase with the number of Muslims known to participants.

![Figure 1: Posterior distributions of mean scores of pre-workshop test analysis.](image)

Although the study would expect all test scores to be either stable or improve after the workshops because the same test was administered, the study has similarly analysed the post-workshop test scores to determine if these knowledge gaps between the various sub-groups were still evident. While the estimated posterior means were shown to be similar in direction for course, education, self-reported knowledge and journalist role, they were no longer significant at the 5% level. Education and journalist roles were marginally significant (p<0.1), and as such, they are not ruled out of requiring further research. Interesting, while education level has become a marginal effect influencing post-workshop scores, self-reported knowledge, which was significant at pre-workshop is no longer a significant variable, marginal, or otherwise.
The number of Muslims that the participants knew was significant at the 5% level, with the estimated effect on test mean being shown in figure 2. It shows the average rising from slightly fewer than 6 (for those who reported knowing no Muslims) to around 7.5 for participants who knew a larger number of Muslims (around 30). These results are likely to indicate that exposure to Muslims in everyday life is an important part to understanding Islam and Muslims.

In the regression analysis, the number of Muslims known to the participant was examined as a linear function of test score. In reality, the study expected some type of step function or threshold. For example, knowing fewer than 5 Muslims may result in a similar test score, and there may be some number over which knowledge may not increase greatly (or at all). However, as this study had a limited sampling frame, it used linear regression to show that having Muslim friends and acquaintances increases baseline knowledge.

Figure 2: Estimated test mean post-training relationship with number of Muslims known to the participant (on log scale, note +0.1 due to zero’s in data). Solid line is posterior mean and dashed lines represent 95% credible interval.

The results of this study show that in the threat situation that existed at the time of writing, not only do Media Liaison Officers have low levels of knowledge of even basic facts about Islam and Muslims, they are aware of this knowledge gap. This lack of understanding can be improved by participating in a relatively short workshop. This study has also highlighted that despite their
roles, Media Liaison Officers consider they know less about Islam and Muslims than do a random stratified sample of the Australian population (Withheld 2016).

Of note is that the participants’ baseline knowledge of Islam and Muslims is impacted by relevant experiences in the field either in reporting on acts of terror or involvement in responding to them. While further research is needed to identify precise points, this study has done the initial identification of key non-demographic factors that influence baseline knowledge of the Islamic religion and those who practice it—workplace exposure to terror-related events (as either an advisor or journalist), and the number of Muslims people know. Media Liaison Officers’ knowledge of reporting stories about Islam and Muslims remains, yet, untested.

This study highlights important short-term lessons and contextual considerations for policymakers. Media Liaison Officers play pivotal roles in public messaging when there are changes to Australia’s terrorism threat level, and in both preparing for, responding to and recovering from acts of terrorism (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e). This includes building relationships with other agencies, industry, and the news media (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e). It assumes requisite levels of contextual knowledge and established relationships. Nevertheless, in their examination of the shifting relationships between counterterrorism agencies and the news media in Australia, O’Donnell and McLean (2015) pointed-out that since the late-1970s, mutual distrust and suspicion has never been far from the surface.

At the core of this distrust is the dichotomy between journalists’ need to report the news and governments’ need to contain certain elements of the news as it relates to counterterrorism efforts (O’Donnell and McLean 2015). Yet, despite this longstanding misgiving, suspicion and at times competing professional goals, in times of a suspected or confirmed act of terrorism Media Liaison Officers are expected to play a key role in liaising with and briefing the news media (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e: 14), and by extension, communicating with various publics.

Official guidance identifies such interactions are necessarily limited, drawing short of revealing information that could compromise either security or the integrity of any subsequent criminal investigations (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e). Adding a layer of complexity, Media Liaison Officers are encouraged to view journalists as active rather than passive actors who are
highly influential in how incidents play-out (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e: 14). This presupposes that as part of their liaison and briefing roles, Media Liaison Officers can and should play a role in educating the news media.

Against the backdrop is Australia’s history of Islamophobia and the problematic nature of how the Australian news media reports stories about Islam and Muslims. It includes negative stereotyping, the portrayal of Muslims as backward and Islam as an anathema to Western values, and the conflation of Islam with terrorism (Akbarzadeh and Smith 2005: 7; Aly 2007; Anderson 2015; Dunn 2001; Manning 2003, 2004; Rane, Ewart, and Martinkus 2014). Tahiri and Grossman (2013: 7) pointed-out that for parts of the Australian community, the Islamic faith and terrorism have been inextricably linked.

Through negative stereotyping, sensationalism and distortion, the news media have played a key role in this (Tahiri and Grossman 2013: 11). Media practitioners’ lack of knowledge about Islam and it adherents is a contributing factor to inaccurate reporting (Smiles Persinger 2010). The findings of this study highlight that despite their pivotal and influential roles, this sample of Media Liaison Officers are not currently well placed to contribute to redressing this in the event of a terror event with actual or potential links to deviant interpretations of Islam.

CONCLUSION

This paper reports on the findings of a study that sampled a selection of Australian government officials (n=73) who were involved in crisis communications; people whose roles, or potential roles, would be to engage with political and policy elites as well as liaise with the media and inform various publics in the event of a terrorist attack. Participants’ knowledge of Islam and Muslims was assessed. This was done by identifying and comparing participants’ self-ranked knowledge of Islam and Muslims with their actual knowledge about basic facts about the religion. This was done using a multiple-choice questionnaire.

The study then re-tested the participants’ knowledge using the same questionnaire, but after they attended a ninety-minute workshop that was aimed at boosting the participants’ knowledge of Islam and its adherents. The study stemmed from a broader research project that focused on encouraging more accurate reporting of Islam and Muslims by the Australian news media.
The study found that approximately 78% of participants considered that they knew little to nothing about Islam and Muslims; 22% considered they knew a reasonable amount; but none considered they knew a lot. The study also found that participants’ perceptions of their knowledge of Islam was a reasonable indicator of their actual knowledge. Further, while additional research is needed, there were statistically significant shifts in participants’ knowledge of Islam by the end of the workshop.

The study also found that participants who had either worked as journalists in the past or who have had a role in responding to a terror event had a higher baseline knowledge of Islam and Muslims than their other counterparts. While the highest level of tertiary education gained was not associated with baseline knowledge, the number of Muslims participants report knowing was an important factor.

The findings of this study have important implications for governments, the news media and Australian Muslim communities. This is because current government policy incorporates a focus on briefing political leaders, various publics and the news media as well as public messaging in the event of an act of terrorism (Commonwealth of Australia 2015e). In the context of the current threat environment, policy assumes officials’ levels of knowledge are sufficient to understand, and can differentiate between highly nuanced religious and cultural concepts, and key terms in times of intense pressure. However, this study shows that this sample of officials involved in crisis communication have knowledge deficits, of which they are aware.

These findings are useful because along with more formal education programs, Media Liaison Officers may be able to play a role in educating their colleagues prior to a crisis occurring through discussions and other workplace based activities. Our analysis shows that the participants’ perceptions of their knowledge of Islam and Muslims are a good indicator of their actual knowledge. For policymakers looking for ways to address knowledge gaps across the broader Media Liaison Officers cohort, Media Liaison Officers’ self-assessment of their knowledge will be a valuable indicator.

While training is one possible approach to addressing the issues raised in this study, the question of how practitioners’ baseline levels of knowledge about the Islamic faith can be boosted to facilitate detailed and contextually relevant multi-modal-communications with the news media, Australian publics and
Australian Muslim communities requires further research. Such research is vital because the types of knowledge gaps identified in this study have the potential to impact on the efficacy and quality of these practitioners’ public communication activities.

Poor communication, which may result from a lack of knowledge, poses significant threats to social cohesion and has the potential to cause social isolation amongst vulnerable groups and that may ultimately feed into the desires of prescribed terrorist groups like Islamic State to further their own causes. Further research that may assist in improving the outcomes of communication with various publics at times of crisis could focus on gaining deeper understandings of the relationships between journalists and crisis communicators and how their interactions might be improved. It would also be instructive to know more about how public communication about the types of events discussed in this article impact on Australia’s Muslim communities.

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REFERENCES


- o O o -
Military Police Operational Harmonisation: The “Golden Hour” of Stability Deployments

Gary L. Jones‡

ABSTRACT

When the threat level of foreign stability operations increases, military police units can make an effective contribution, especially when conducted with the Australian Federal Police. It is argued that, if Australian military police can apply police harmonisation techniques and improve their ability to conduct civilian-like policing duties, then their role in future rule-of-law operations are likely to be more effective.

Keywords: military police, stability operations, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, rule-of-law operations

INTRODUCTION

There is a generally accepted view that as military forces move from combat operations to stability operations there is a transition period known as the Golden Hour of security (Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, 2005). This period is seen as being critical for laying the foundation for the development of foreign nation's ability to govern. The Golden Hour, also known as the Deployment/Enforcement Gap (Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, 1998), can be defined as the immediate aftermath of combat operations. Nonetheless, this period can vary depending on the political situation in-country; from several weeks to several months.

This paper argues that in high-threat, non-permissive, and time-sensitive environments where Australian military forces may be deployed, Australian military police units should be called on to provide situational awareness reports to the civilian policing authorities during the lead-up to stability operations. This is because military police operate with combat units from the time of first deployment. But, for such a strategy to succeed, a culture of interoperability, operationalised though a joint cell structure is likely to be needed. This relationship would provide the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and its partner, the International Deployment Group (IDG), with intelligence during this transition period. Finally, it is argued that to ensure the success of this strategy,

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Australian military police will need to develop policing skills that are capable of civilian support, but also provide policing tactics to secure the host nation's population, including working with civilian police forces (CIVPOL) during this transition.

BACKGROUND

Australian Military Police have been deployed with the Australian Army in wars and peacekeeping operations since the end of the Second World War. These deployments include all Australian Defence Force (ADF) Service Police—from the British Commonwealth Occupation Forces, Korea, Vietnam and numerous peacekeeping operations, such as Cambodia, Somalia and East Timor, where law enforcement of civilian and military persons was a primary task (Buckingham, 2014), through to conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, and border protection operations, where Military Police have provided close personal protection, detention and internment operations, and policing of civilian and military personnel on military establishments. Overall, the role of the Australian Military Police is to provide:

1. manouevre and mobility support (mobility support; manoeuvre support; route reconnaissance and monitoring; military road network regulation and enforcement);

2. internment and detention (classify captured personnel; handle captured personnel; manage internment and detention facilities and repatriation and release of captured personnel);

3. law enforcement (support morale and discipline; enforce military and civil law; law and order restoration; liaison with other policing and civilian agencies); and

4. security (area security; logistic support security; point of entry/departure security; physical security). (Military Police Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 2008)

While the role military police play in a traditional context is to ensure manouevre and mobility support, and internment and detention operations, it is through the application of policing and security duties that the end-state is achieved. Australian Military Police conduct operations according to a system of priority levels; from offensive operations, to defensive operations, to stability operations, and finally, to enabling operations. The priority of operational support depends
on the type of operation. For instance, in the case of offensive operations, resources would normally be focused on manoeuvre and mobility support, and internment and detention operations. However, in stability operations, law enforcement may be the primary task. Military police use a centralised command and control (C²) structure that permits a rapid change in operational focus based on priority (Military Police Tactics, Techniques and Procedures, 2008). But this structure lacks the interoperability needed for effective transition to civilian handover.

RATIONALE

Australian Military Police are in the unique position to be able to work across a range of military operations in both high-threat, conventional operations, and low-threat peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (Force 2020, 2002). Rule-of-law, in some form, will always be a core tenet of these operations, and the Australian Defence Force has a policy of using a Whole of Australian Government (WoAG) approach to military operations to ensure this outcome (Force 2020, 2002); that includes working with the Australian Federal Police (Joint Operations for the 21st Century, 2007). Part of this policy is for policing agencies to work toward a common goal that will result in security and stability.

Australian Federal Police officers have worked alongside the Australian Defence Force personnel on several occasions. Take, for example, East Timor and the Solomon Islands deployments where these organisations operated under the United Nations' chapter VII powers (being the ability of the UN Security Council to act in respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression from, and to nation states) (Greener and FisSh, 2015), and under the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) agreement (Greener, 2009). During these types of operations, the Australian Federal Police's International Deployment Group expanded its functional areas. This included institutional capacity building, training and mentoring programs, as well as the development of a more robust crisis response capability and post-conflict rule-of-law development programs (Dhalstrom, 2007).

Military police units assume some of the law enforcement related roles and responsibilities because they are deemed combat survivable, and this ability allows military police greater freedom of movement within high-threat environments that exist during initial stages of engagement. Nonetheless, what is lacking is some of the higher-level policing skills, such as problem-oriented
policing and community policing experience that the Australian Federal Policing have. But, apart from this shortcoming, the ability to operate in a combat zone emerges as an asset during the Golden Hour. International expectations are that policing and rule-of-law enforcement will be a high-priority for stability operations, yet in an asymmetric, high-threat environment, there are times where the civilian police cannot move around the area of operation because the security situation is unstable, or at other times not in position to implement their mission mandate without a large police presence. This is because these Australian Federal Police are not trained to operate as a combat unit, nor is it their role.

**PROPOSED DOCTRINAL POSITION**

It is criminological truism that law is the prerequisite for social order; so, if peace is the common goal, then the introduction of law and order should not be delayed (Hills, 2009). Therefore, it is posited that during an operation's Golden Hour military police should be used to bridge the gap.

If it is accepted that the Australian Military Police, with its combination of general policing skills and its experience in operating in combat zones, is what sets it apart from the civilian police forces, then the transition to civil order could be achieved quickly via the use of an AFP–Military Police Interagency Co-operation Cell. Operating a joint cell structure to the military police C2 and the AFP's reporting lines would also ensure that when the security situation is stable, civilian policing responsibilities are handed-over to the Australian Federal Police. (Szayna, Eaton and Richardson, 2007).

**NEED FOR INTEROPERABILITY**

**Tactical Level Criminal Intelligence During the Golden Hour**

Criminal intelligence is an important element of being able to make the transition during the Golden Hour. Military intelligence is the product of information about the theater's terrain, weather, activities, infrastructure, as well as the opposition force's order-of-battle and intentions (Intelligence Doctrine, 2008), whereas criminal intelligence informs commanders about the nature, extent, and effect of criminal threats. Criminal intelligence provides insights into the criminal activities and criminal personalities involved in a theatre of operations. While the Australian Military Police has a dedicated Service Police Intelligence Office, this Office is a non-deployable unit, and as such, nearly all of the field intelligence services within the Australian Defence Force have been provided by
a single service intelligence organisation. This is because the Australian Military Police has not made criminal intelligence collection an operational priority, and what criminal intelligence that is collected, is directed to military intelligence.

This shortcoming will need to be addressed; it will require military police units to improve their data collection and analysis in order to align itself with their civilian counterparts. This is because criminal intelligence is a key aspect in shortening the length of time Golden Hour operations persist. It does this by providing commanders with greater understanding of their area of operations.

Although related, criminal intelligence differs from military intelligence in several ways; principally, the rules and regulations for conducting military intelligence activities can only be conducted outside of Australia. Criminal intelligence activities are conducted within Australia by duly authorised agencies. However, the collections of criminal information by a military unit and shared with civilian police forces during a foreign stability operation could step over the demarcation line separating military and Australian civilian intelligence activities.

It would be fair to say that there has always been a level of mistrust of the military undertaking policing activities and some of the issues have a logical argument, especially the historic misuse of the military through internal security in some Latin American and African countries. Indeed, Western militaries have been reluctant to take on policing activities, which stems, in part, from the Weinberger-Powell doctrine the United States implemented (Record, 2007: 82), where the basic use of the military was to fight and win a war “quickly and decisively, with a clear exit strategy.” But a strict interpretation of this doctrine is incompatible with stability operations.

As civil conflicts unfold, and geo-political influences bear more and more on nation states, issues such as the emergency of transnational crime groups during stability operations, requires a re-think. Nevertheless, an intelligence sharing arrangement for overseas stability operations could be drafted, as will be discussed.

**Civilian Police and Military Police Co-Operation**

While civilian and military police interaction have been a somewhat taboo subject about an integrated structure, the security situation in some theatres
requires a re-think of this position. The current mindset is reflected by Greener and Fish (2013), who state that:

Although members of the military often suggested they were capable of performing a number of policing tasks, our research made it clear that there was among military as well as police personnel a level of discomfort about this possibility. … Despite this unease, however, all military personnel said they were comfortable working with … and an increased willingness to work in support of police objectives.

While the blurring of policing between civil and military lines is not enviable, it is no doubt necessary at times when dealing with high-threat security situations and finite resources. Greener and Fish (2013) do identify that while some military units are the “least-worst” options for effecting policing at the tactical level, it is arguable that this option could become an “enforced-necessity.” Enforced, because the Australian Federal Police is not able to deal with high-legality, asymmetric threats, and hence is reliant on the Australian Military Police to perform this role. Necessary, because the Golden Hour is time-critical; an effective transition could be hindered by the security situation, or ultimately, result in failure if crime and internal instability are not brought under control quickly.

IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS

Precedent

There are examples where military police have been the lead-agency or assist CIVPOL elements during the Golden Hour. Such cases usually involve situations were forces are still engaged in combat, but a policing presence is required;¹ an active insurgency is on-going; or where criminal activities involving armed offenders are prevalent. At the beginning of the 1999 intervention in Kosovo, the Feldjager (German Military Police), commenced community policing, taking witness statements and conducting field investigations into allegations of war crimes (Brocades Zaalberg, 2006). Again, that year, with the outbreak of violence in East Timor, Australian and Coalition military police took a lead policing role as the International Force East Timor (INTERFET) moved from combat patrolling to constabulary tasks. Policing and law-and-order patrols commenced for Australian and Coalition military police in-theatre as well as providing support to CIVPOL in war crimes investigations (Greener and Fish, 2015). Later in 2009, in Afghanistan the German Feldjager
assisted their CIVPOL counterparts by collaborating in general police training. The Feldjager also trained Afghanistan National Police personnel in combat skills; such as weapons handling and shooting techniques, unarmed combat, first-aid training, conducting vehicle searches, and or high-risk security duties (Friesendorf and Krempel, 2011).

**Interagency Co-Operation Cell**

To implement the transition from military to civilian control during the Golden Hour requires some form of joint command and control that is not featured in existing structures. A simple, yet functional, model for C² that immediately presents itself, is to use an Interagency Co-operation Cell. Without such a command and control arrangement, a disjointed application of policing practices and procedures could inadvertently evolve, resulting in a less stable situation. By way of example, take the case of the 2003 American-led intervention in Iraq—Operation Iraqi Freedom.

During Operation Iraqi Freedom, American military police were assumed to be experts in policing. However, this did not prove to be the case during the transition period. This was discovered when US military police received the mission to develop host nation police; since that time, reports suggest that the American military police struggled because of a lack of understanding of the role of civilian police, police management at the [operational] level, and the expertise to design a long-term, coherent plan for development and reform (Dillon, 2013). As a result, several civilian contractors were employed as a way to help resolve the problem.

**A Lesson Learned**

The American experience in Iraq is an important lesson to be learned; that is, Australian Military Police should understand policing practices beyond the military application so that their effectiveness increases in joint civilian operations. If they lack these skills, then, like the lesson learned by the US in Iraq, they may find themselves replaced by other personnel, either civilian, or perhaps, other coalition military police. This skills gap should be a rallying point for Australian Military Police to commence teaching modern policing practices as part of its training curriculum.
Civilian Police Deployment

Experience has shown that when civilian police elements are deployed, it is a slow process. And, if they are to be deployed into a high-threat environment, they cannot be stationed in conflict locations where the need is great. The reasons are varied, but include practical as well as political issues. By way of example, the security threat they face is the most obvious practical issue, and government's reluctance to commit police because of the financial costs reflects a political dimension (US Department of State and Defence, 2006). These issues are exacerbated by frequent personnel rotations that can exhaust the supply of fresh police (Hansen, 2002). Ironically, this is compounded by the popularity of these interventions from institutions such as the UN.

Development of an Interoperable Doctrine

How might an interoperability doctrine be developed? As with many operational agreements, an officer-level working party could be established to draft a number of documents that could be discussed at higher echelons; eventually, being signed-off at Ministerial or Cabinet level. These documents would logically include a memorandum of understanding between Australian Military Police and the Australian Federal Police; the doctrine itself, which would lay-out the principles, polices, and operational procedures of working as a joint force, as well as incorporating an ethics statement to guide operational personnel at all levels of command; and finally, a set of capability statements, a list equipment requirements, and a training curriculum that ideally includes pre-deployment exercises.

In drafting these documents, it needs to be made clear that joint operations would be restricted to overseas rule-of-law operations. In no way should the doctrine suggest the integration of military police and civilian police services within Australia, or the paramilitary development of any of Australia's state police forces or the Federal Police. The doctrine need only concern itself with developing units of the Australian Military Police and Australian Federal Police to operate as a unified tactical force in stability operations (Eaton, 2009).

CONCLUSION

Soldiers were once expected to be warriors, now they are expected to also assist in nation building. They must be prepared to help re-establish institutions, which includes assisting re-build local police forces. They must be able to facilitate
local governance through the rule-of-law. To do this it requires coordination and cooperation with many international agencies, intergovernmental organisations, and host-nation authorities (Galvan, 2012).

This paper puts forward the argument that in the transition from combat operations to stability operations, planners would benefit by acknowledging the role of military police could play if its police mandate was underscored as much as it military moniker. It is through military police's policing role and its ability to assist in force projection on the battlefield that could provide an advantage over the current doctrine of separating military actions from civilian policing.

There is no doubt the future of stability operations is one that will be fraught with danger. There is little doubt that policing will always be a key component in ensuring the rule-of-law is re-established. As soldiers and civilian police evolve to take on these new responsibilities, so does the Australian Military Police. To ensure that Australia's military police are ready for that challenge, the doctrinal ground-work needs to begin.

ENDNOTE

1. That is to say, three-block warfare, a concept by Marine General Krulak that at certain points in time, within a three-block radius in urban environments, the military could potentially be providing humanitarian assistance, holding two warring tribes apart (peacekeeping operations) and be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle (Collins, 2004).

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and are not intended to reflect the views of the Australian Defence Force, the Commonwealth or New South Wales governments, or any of their agencies.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

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- o O o -
Humanitarian Intelligence: A Practitioner’s Guide to Crisis Analysis and Design

by Andrej Zwitter
Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, Maryland
2016, hardcover, 232 pages
ISBN–9781442249486

Reviewed by Henry Prunckun

Casting my mind back to some of my early readings in the field of intelligence, I recall that the subject literature was dominated by texts that addressed issues involving national security and foreign policy. This international subject focus was reflected in the way intelligence was portrayed in fiction; take for instance works by authors like Ian Fleming, John La Carre, Robert Ludlum, Frederick Forsyth, Ken Follett, Len Deighton, Martin Cruz Smith, and Tom Clancy.

The non-fiction literature was influenced by authors such as Allen Dulles (The Craft of Intelligence, 1963) and Professor Harry Howe Ransom’s, The Intelligence Establishment (1970). There were, of course, dissenting views about intelligence from a cadre of authors such as Snepp, Marks and Marchetti, Wise and Ross, and Agee. But there were also more balanced treatments of intelligence and what it entailed by writers like Copland, Deakin, and Rosezke. This foreign policy dominance in the literature continued through to about the mid- to late-1980s when two things appeared to take place: an organisation by the name of the International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts formed and launched a scholarly journal, and the publication of a rush of books on business intelligence—which has also been called corporate intelligence, competitor intelligence, and in some circles, the less complementary term, industrial espionage.

With the events that unfolded after the al-Qaeda attacks in 2001, intelligence work, and the literature surrounding it, took a turn. It acknowledged what, to some extent, existed before—there is an overlap and interrelationship between foreign policy intelligence, law enforcement intelligence, and business intelligence. That is to say, problems that affect national security can include
unfriendly actors who are the targets of law enforcement; and business that are the targets of hostile actors are of interest to national security and law enforcement agencies.

This weaving of intelligence interests and targets has grown since the 1980s to include the private intelligence firms, and now the non-government sector. Non-government organisations (NGOs) operate in an area that straddles foreign relations, national law enforcement, and the business sector. These agencies are often characterised by the humanitarian work they do. In this regard, it is interesting that acknowledgement of this missing sector of intelligence work has been overlooked for so long. However, Zwitter’s *Humanitarian Intelligence* is nothing short of ground-breaking. With the publication of this book practitioners and intelligence scholars can finally incorporate this type of intelligence work into the larger tapestry of intelligence research and analysis.

As the book’s subtitle so aptly describes the text’s focus—*A Practitioner’s Guide to Crisis Analysis and Project Planning*—this book fills the void in how intelligence can be applied to helping NGOs deal with “…criminals, militants, extremists, diseases, and other natural…” hazards (p.1). The book is presented in four Parts—1) Contextualizing Humanitarian Intelligence; 2) Form Data to Context; 3) Actors and Interactions; and 4) From Trends to Operational Plans.

These Parts comprise a number of chapters that logically take the reader from what underpins intelligence research, to how these methods can be applied in practice. Zwitter has provided illustrations of how intelligence can be deployed in the field through examples; allowing students to visualise exactly how intelligence can be applied to the types of issues their NGOs face. In my view, this is an important aspect of the book, because experience shows that discussing intelligence with NGOs is not easy. There is a reluctance for NGOs to associate with agencies that are involved in security, law enforcement, or secret intelligence; yet paradoxically, NGOs need their advice and counsel to plan and deliver their humanitarian services. So, this book is a welcome addition to the literature on intelligence, and hopefully will bridge the gap of reluctance that NGOs have felt about embracing the need to engage in intelligence research and analysis.

**ABOUT THE REVIEWER**

**Dr Henry Prunckun** is a research methodologist who specialises in the study of transnational crime.
Considering what it sets out to achieve, placing opportunity at the centre of white-collar crime discussions, Benson and Simpson’s second edition of *Understanding White-Collar Crime* hits its target.

The book begins with an introduction to white-collar crime and the white-collar criminal using a comparison of the offender-based versus offense-based approaches to defining white-collar crime. The reader is then introduced to both the Yale studies on white-collar crime by Wheeler et al., (1988), and the Frost and Rhodes study from the same period in what is a deliberate effort to guide the reader to the conclusion that without opportunity, crime will not occur. In Part II, we are offered Sutherland’s (1983) differential association theory, Hirschi’s (1969) control theory, Merton’s (1938) anomie theory, rational choice theory (Becker, 1962), and finally, an integrated theory as proposed by Braithwaite (1989).

Setting Braithwaite’s integrated approach aside for the moment, two of the remaining four major theoretical explanations are those that you would expect to see here, however the work of Murphy and Robinson (2008) on the *Maximiser* is an obvious area where thinking around anomie/strain theory has evolved and should, one suspects, be considered for inclusion. Moreover, the presence of control theory, while not common nor “widely accepted as an explanation for white-collar crime” (Yeager, 2010: 245), usefully introduces the work of Lasley (1988) as a way of situating control theory in the domain of white-collar crime studies.

In Part III the authors provide a focused, yet limited (in scope) exploration of some crime types traditionally associated with white-collar crime including health care, mortgage, securities, markets financial crimes as well as a few
corporate violence crimes including environmental, workplace and manufacturing offences. In Part IV the authors then set out to differentiate between a symbolic construction, and a sociodemographic approach to account for why some turn to crime while others with the same opportunities and access do not. Lastly, in Part V the authors introduce control and prevention of financial crime via a combination of legal and extra-legal controls before looking towards opportunities for the future research and study in white-collar crime.

In his review of Benson and Simpson’s first edition White-Collar Crime: An Opportunity Perspective, Yeager (2010) questioned the lack of critical consideration of the influence of the political economy in that version, and called it out on the series editor’s assumption that Benson and Simpson made the claim of an original link between opportunity and the study of white-collar crime, “[i]n point in fact, analysing opportunity structures in regard to crimes of the bourgeoisie, the well-to-do, or corporations for that matter, has been a well-established perspective.” Instead, I would suggest that what Benson and Simpson sought to achieve was to bring together a range of disparate lines of thinking into a largely coherent picture of the role opportunity plays in white-collar crime and the academic discourse surrounding it. Have they succeeded? In short, “yes,” but it could contain more while still achieving its intended outcomes.

As to who this text is the most useful for, Yeager (2010) recommended it as a suitable undergraduate text “to be juxapositioned alongside more critical and theoretical material.” Where this text has also found a following is in postgraduate studies for students from professional backgrounds not previously schooled in criminological or sociological thinking as a foundation level academic text that sets out the basic concepts associated with a what works study of white-collar crime. In this book, Benson and Simpson have—in a very succinct manner—conveyed the importance of opportunity to those seeking to understand both the crime and the criminal.

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

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