Contents

Historical Research Article
Camouflage and Its Impact on Australia in WWII: An Art Historian’s Perspective
Ann Elias 1

Critical Essays
The Changing Landscape of Competitive Intelligence: Two Critical Issues Investigated
John J. McGonagle and Michael Misner-Elias 13

Prolegomena to Intelligence Studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Maid Pajević 25

Book Reviews
How to Undertake Surveillance and Reconnaissance: From a Civilian and Military Perspective
Patrick F. Walsh 38

My Year Inside Radical Islam
Susan Robinson 41

Licensing
All material published in Salus Journal is published under a Creative Commons License. Under this licence readers are free to copy and distribute the essays, articles, and reviews under the following conditions: 1) you give attribution to the author(s); 2) the essays, articles, and reviews are not used for commercial purposes without written permission of the author(s); 3) that you do not alter, transform, or build upon the essays, articles, or reviews; and 4) further distribution is based on the “share-alike” principle.
CAMOUFLAGE AND ITS IMPACT ON AUSTRALIA IN WWII: AN ART HISTORIAN’S PERSPECTIVE

Ann Elias*

Abstract

The impact of modern camouflage on Australian military practices and on the public imagination intensified during the Second World War. A new organisation was created to support national security through concealment and deception. Its core members were civilians and included a zoologist who specialised in animal camouflage as well as a group of Australia’s leading artists who specialised in optical tricks and visual illusions. While concealment and deception remain central to contemporary approaches to national security (i.e. part of a counterintelligence strategy), the history outlined here draws attention to ethical conflicts and conceptual struggles in relation to camouflage and warfare that were important in WWII, but may seem quaint today.

Keywords: Camouflage, WWII, art, counterintelligence, deception, visual illusions, science, animals, manliness

INTRODUCTION

It is no good pitting rugged western manly virtues against an enemy who is not impressed by them and who combats them, wisely enough, with the cunning of a jungle beast uninhibited by any considerations of military deportment and concerned only with the most effect method of destroying his opponent (Editorial, 1942).

“We must become more jungle minded,” wrote the Editor of the Brisbane Telegraph in the article quoted above. It was 1942 and a concerted effort was underway to train Australian soldiers to become “jungle minded” in the New Guinea area. For Professor William John Dakin (1883–1950), the Technical Director of Camouflage for Australia and the SW Pacific, the answer to the New Guinea problem lay in training soldiers to become camouflage conscious. Like the author of the newspaper column he also believed that Australian soldiers were too

* Corresponding author: ann.elias@sydney.edu.au

Salus Journal Issue 4, Number 1, 2016
inhibited in mind and body for jungle fighting. When writing camouflage manuals for troops his instructions were to blend with the background, think deceptively and change the position of the body to horizontal postures such as crouching and crawling. To jungle soldiers he wrote: “learn to crawl properly. You should be flat on the ground!” (Dakin, 1947a: Appendix K–N, 32)

Dakin was a zoologist, and his approach to deception in human warfare was based on the study of animals that creep, crawl, and slide on their stomachs, stay close to the ground, and freeze still by instinct (Dakin, 1918: 272). He hoped that Australian soldiers in Papua and New Guinea would rediscover animal-like instincts arguing these had been lost over time due to civilising processes. By identifying with wild animals he was convinced that Allied militaries would gain superiority in the fight to win the War.

Today, this history seems quaint: military personnel and counter-intelligence agencies regard as normal business and as a cornerstone of practice the dynamics of concealment and deception even though the appearances of animals is no longer their starting point. In a digitally networked age of surveillance and counter-surveillance, global systems of code have transformed the logic of those earlier modernist perceptual constructions of camouflage. As Ross Gibson has shown about camouflage in the twenty-first century: “more than just a trick to the eye, most camouflage operates as an event, as a series of actions applied to objects and intensities occurring in space and time” (Gibson, 2015: 201).

It is also strange to think there was ever a time when soldiers had to be convinced of the advantages of camouflage for warfare. But as this paper shows hiding, subterfuge, and disguise as a way of thinking and as a paradigm of behaviour was, at the time of WWII, still in the process of becoming second nature to military business despite the decisive advances made to the formal integration of camouflage into military operations in the First World War. Addressed here is a very particular history for national security when the old practice of camouflage was based in the idea of tricking the eye, and when it seemed logical to look for help outside military organisations to one special group of citizens who excelled at visual illusions—the artist community of bohemians and radicals who had made perception in the visual field their speciality.

This paper is also about the exchanges of artists, military tacticians and biological scientists in the push to resolve the issues surrounding jungle camouflage in the New Guinea area in the Second World War. The aim is to show how the necessity for camouflage presented a challenge to conventional warfare
and disturbed long-held ideas of manliness in combat and military deportment. Points about the impact of WWII camouflage on motivating military change will be illustrated through the discussions they evoked in the Australian popular press where the topic of deception was enthusiastically aired during the war. Three main matters emerged in the press: the importance of concealment and deception for national security; the oddity of Australia’s leading artists (under supervision of a zoologist) advising the military on camouflage and also basing their ideas on animals; the challenge that wartime practices of subterfuge presented to social values in peace-time, especially honesty.

NATIONAL SECURITY AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMITTEE

*Modern art* is how camouflage was described to Australians through the press in 1942—one that has “that subtle capacity for defacing an object or for suggesting an object that is not there” (Weston, 1942). Camouflage warfare was a game of hide-and-seek where things went unseen in plain view, or seemed present when actually absent.

Camouflage captured the imagination of the public to such an extent that hardly a day went by without some news of concealment schemes by allies and enemies, or updates on new efforts to formalise camouflage training and fieldwork in Australia for the Army, Air Force, and Navy. A new emphasis on aerial warfare and the need to respond to aerial optics and surveillance had driven the need to increase camouflage consciousness. But when Darwin was bombed in 1942, the question of how to hide bodies, things and operations from the aerial view made camouflage defence a priority for Australia, even though planning had begun earlier in 1939.

The first public announcement was July 1941. Under National Security regulations the Federal Government established a Central Camouflage Committee chaired by William Dakin within the Department of Home Security. Every action to conceal or disguise military or civilian sites would have to go through Dakin’s committee to ensure:

> That any camouflage schemes bore a proper relation to their surroundings, the nature of buildings nearby, and conditions peculiar to Australian light and background. The committee would include civilians with special qualifications. (“Camouflage Plan,” 1941)

When it came to light that the Defence Central Camouflage Committee included scientists and artists researching concealment and deception by studying animals,
the story of camouflage became more intriguing. Seemingly new to camouflage warfare from the Australian public’s perspective in 1941—but in fact a continuum from WWI—was the secondment of artists to work alongside military organisations, and the model of animals including emus, kangaroos and insects for schemes and designs (“Nature’s Aid,” 1941).

The First World War integrated theories of concealment and deception from biology based in Charles Darwin’s and Alfred Russel Wallace’s observations of mimicry as an adaptation in insects that enable them to hide from predators. Their ideas influenced every subsequent scientist of military camouflage in the First and Second World Wars including Abbott Thayer, Hugh Cott, Edward Poulton, William Pycraft, and William Dakin.

ARTISTS AND ANIMALS

The First World War was also the first war to deploy artists to camouflage duties. The aesthetics and principles of concealment and deception in WWI were recognised as the modern development of an ancient art. But what changed in WWI were the establishment of specific camouflage units and the collaboration in the design of wartime camouflage by institutions dedicated to science and art as well as war. Lucien-Victor Guirand de Scevola (1871–1950), an artist, was the founder of the first French camouflage division, and liked to remind people that just prior to WWI camouflage was a term for criminals hiding from the police (Kahn, 1984: 148–149).

Camouflage was furtive, shady, and cunning. He saw this as its strength for modern soldiering, but traditional soldiers often disagreed thinking instead that the new camouflage strategies were a sign of cowardice for achieving “purely protective concealment” (Reit, 1978: 65). An interesting case from that period is Theodore Roosevelt who, according to Alexander Nemerov, considered camouflage as “a form of effeminate cowardice, a mere defensive strategy [that] all but announced an unmanly desire to hide instead of fight” (Nemerov, 1997: 79).

Despite strong views challenging the value of camouflage to war, each military country participating in WWI used artists to apply disruptive patterning and other methods of deception and concealment, to military objects. The ships of WWI are now the most celebrated camouflage experiments of that time. They were based on observations of nature including the effect of stripes on zebra, and also on the abstract experiments of modernists. At the onset of war most art practitioners were dedicated to art for art’s sake and the self-sufficiency of beauty.
in art. But when war descended they were given the utilitarian task of applying to military objects, including ships, the painter’s strategy of altering perception through pattern and colour. The idea, as Roy Behrens explains in relation to soldiers in French artillery teams wearing cagoules (shapeless hooded robes), was to deform anything worth protecting by hiding recognisable elements of form:

By applying broken colour to artillery, the camouflleurs’ intention was to make their positions harder to spot (by subverting the continuity of the cannon’s shape through high difference disruption). At the same time, by wearing dingy hooded robes, their goal was to prevent themselves from standing out (by merging visually with the ground through high similarity blending, or background matching). (Behrens, 2015: 2)

So the idea of utilising artists for wartime camouflage, and looking at animals as models, was not new in 1941. Two artists who excelled in their work for the Department of Home Security and worked closely in Sydney with the Army at George’s Heights as well as with the Air Force at Bankstown and the Navy at Garden Island were Frank Hinder (1906–1992) and Max Dupain (1911–1992). Although Dupain would later call himself a ‘pacifist’ he also acknowledged that it was simply expected that artists would get behind the war effort to defend democracy and protect national borders from Japanese invasion: ‘even in remote Australia the war was in everybody’s life’ (Dupain, 1986: 14–15).

In 1941 Dupain and Hinder helped Dakin write an important book, The Art of Camouflage, which was republished in 1942 as a handbook for the Australian military. They experimented wearing different colours and patterns to find optimal ways to make soldiers inconspicuous. They counter-shaded their bodies the way they had observed in fish and birds: dark on top, light underneath so that gradations of light and shade assist the illusion of the animal’s effacement as a solid object. Like animals they utilised disruptive patterning to help their forms blend into backgrounds.

From Dakin’s point of view, it was vital to educate soldiers that camouflage was not a sign of passivity or cowardice. Yet he was highly conscious that by working for a department called Home Security the role of camouflage could be misconstrued as not only passive but also decorative and feminine rather than part of the science of war:

The title “Home Security” may be regarded as a somewhat misleading expression. It tends, perhaps, to emphasise a passive attitude. Whatever the name may indicate, those in control of Camouflage realise very clearly that
its closest association is, and must be, with the perfection of a fighting
machine, as it always has been (Dakin, 1947b: Appendix O, 3).

William Dakin was a provocative character and turned the valuable work of his
artist team into controversy by encouraging the Minister of Home Security, Hubert
Lazzarini, to argue the case to the Prime Minister, John Curtin, that camouflage in
WWII was not a matter for military experts – it was “a matter for science and
scientific experts together with architects and artists” (Lazzarini, 1942). Consequently, *The Art of Camouflage* defined camouflage as “art (with a scientific
basis)” applied to armies in the field (Dakin, 1941: 3).

Dakin’s insistence that civilians knew more about camouflage than the
Services led to the Australian Army deciding to go its separate way from the
Department of Home Security. The Minister for the Army preferred the Army
itself to control camouflage research and operations (F.M Forde, 1942). Despite
losing control of Army initiatives, Dakin and the team of camouflage artists
continued to have influence, particularly within the Air Force, and especially
through programs and publications on camouflage for troops involved with tropical
fighting. Between 1943 and 1945 at least eight artists in the Department of Home
Security were stationed for up to six months in Papua and New Guinea, including
at the Department’s headquarters for camouflage on Goodenough Island (Welch,
1943). Artists Max Dupain and Robert Emerson Curtis were both sent to
Goodenough—their mission was to educate the troops to be more camouflage
conscious and jungle-minded.

Victor Corlett was also among the eight deployed in the tropics. He noted
that Allied personnel cleared large areas of jungle and kunai grass with bulldozers
making it impossible to hide ground activity from aerial view. At Nadzab and
Kiriwina the RAAF did not observe “blackout” at night leaving them visible to
nightly enemy aerial reconnaissance. Soldiers made military objects conspicuous
with poorly designed static camouflage. Moreover, he observed that too few
soldiers were aware of how to adapt their bodily conduct and behaviour in
rainforests (Corlett, 1943: 10).

To communicate the theory and practice of concealment and deception to
Australian troops in the SW Pacific, the Department of Home Security printed
a selection of manuals. It was in *Camouflage Bulletin 7* that Dakin explained
the concept of instinct, and specifically, the instinct of “wild” animals to hide.
He argued that animals in a state of nature are driven by the kinds of survival
instincts also needed by soldiers in the field. The type of animal Dakin wanted
Australian troops to emulate was one driven to:

Choose dark corners as hiding places, during the day. Above all, they have learned through thousands of years of the struggle for existence that being seen is not merely a matter of colour but far more often a matter of injudicious movement and bad choice of resting place. The correctly coloured animals of the jungle have an instinct which automatically causes them to resort to the correct background and to remain immobile whilst they wish to be hidden. The soldier has to learn both these things (Dakin 1947c: Appendix O, 7).

War justified rediscovering methods of survival practiced by animals, and “animal cunning” was held up as an important model of correct behaviour. What was admired most was the way creatures with sharp instincts utilise space, colour and light to make themselves invisible and it was Dakin’s aim to equip soldiers with a similar intuition for making their bodies “disappear.” A camouflage manual printed for Australian soldiers in the New Guinea jungle explained about “The Ten Big Sins of the Hunter and the Hunted”: one deadly sin was the inability to hide due to “being a conspicuous colour or shape (or both)”, and alternatively “being a misfit in the background pattern” (Dakin 1947: Appendix K–N, 3).

Traditional Western approaches were proving useless for tropical warfare, and disastrous in the face of a smarter Japanese enemy. The author of the Brisbane newspaper column quoted at the start of this article put it this way:

To conventionalised Western military minds, the Japanese methods of covering themselves with mud, painting themselves green, letting off firecrackers to create a diversion and employing every conceivable trick might have seemed puerile. The fact remains however that these ruses have been terribly effective and must not only be followed, but surpassed (Editorial, 1942).

Discard inflexible “Continental” approaches to warfare, argued the writer, and find adaptable, Australian solutions. Because Dakin thought of war as a logical but temporary return to the animal origins of civilised man he encouraged in soldiers the discovery of a primitive masculinity, and “the beast within” (Mitman, 1997: 262). A series of camouflage posters urged soldiers to behave like tigers in the wild lying hidden in long grass before springing towards prey. Far from serving the weak, camouflage as practiced by predatory animals was a model of virility and offensive action; which is why Frank Hinder liked to remind the troops that “the tiger conceals to attack!” (Hinder, c1943). But he sensed that all too often members of the military found it unnatural to mimic the behaviours of
animals. Weren’t humans superior to animals? Wasn’t it unmanly to hide and somehow demeaning to the human race, even in war?

Victor Corlett, for example, noticed that traditionalists in the Australian Air Force in the New Guinea area preferred to wear khaki—which showed up vividly against the dark vegetation of the SW Pacific—rather than the new uniforms, which were green. Neither could he convince troops to wear Skin Tone Commando Cream to make their skin black and prevent those pale European faces shining under the stars at night. A women’s cosmetic manufacturer had concocted the cream for the Department of Home Security; it was designed especially for the tropics. Being aware one’s physical colour and shape, as well as sound and smell in tropical rainforests was common sense but “will the Services ever realise that?” complained Corlett (1943: 10).

CHALLENGE TO SOCIAL VALUES BASED ON HONESTY IN PEACETIME

For tropical fighting Dakin and the camouflage artists argued that shadowy behaviours were laudable along with primitive and instinctual actions, the opposite of behaviours encouraged in Australian society in peacetime. A conceptual inversion happened when citizens wrote about the ethics of camouflage in war compared to the ethics of concealment and deception in everyday life. Dakin himself made a clear separation.

In civilian life he admired and respected men who were mobile and active and moved quickly through life, and who were also conspicuous and stood out in relation to other men. But in war the converse was true; the men he admired were the ones most likely to beat other men by hiding in silence, becoming invisible, and freezing still, actions, he said, that are “practised beautifully by many kinds of crabs” (Dakin, 1953: 74).

What a different world-view, what a different ethos surrounded war and society in the first decades of the twentieth century in terms of decorum, ethics, and behaviour. In Britain in the Second World War when artists were also seconded to work in camouflage, Roland Penrose (1900–1984), who was well known at the time as a surrealist and associate of Pablo Picasso but also an expert on camouflage for national security, found it difficult to make the concept of camouflage palatable and ethical for the older generation.

His views and ideas on camouflage were reported in Australia in 1942 in a newspaper article where he described camouflage as “a young word and a
fledgling science” and argued its application to warfare in WWI had been crudely attempted (Penrose, 1942: 3–4). The shift, he argued, to more sophisticated camouflage practices was the outcome of “camouflage discipline” in WWII. By this he meant a set of rules about behaviour in wartime to counteract the enemy’s aerial cameras and surveillance, and a new code for behaviour that placed greater emphasis on the practice of hiding.

But it was the concept of hiding that was the root cause of the difficulty he experienced in conveying the importance of camouflage to older soldiers. Penrose had prepared a camouflage manual for the Home Guard in Britain and in it he was forced to address what he recognised as the “problem” for traditionalists. He conceded that for the older citizen who believes in conventional warfare the concept of hiding might not only seem revolutionary but for him “the idea of hiding from your enemy and the use of deception may possibly be repulsive. He may feel that it is not brave and not cricket.” (Penrose, 1941: 4).

During the interwar years, citizens reflected on the implications of camouflage. They contemplated the ethics of living in a society that also encouraged the values of concealment and deception. Some tried to discourage the public from what was seen as the dishonest practice of camouflage. One Australian newspaper reported how:

Camouflage is the trick of making a thing look like something else … The honest person never tries to camouflage. He does not pretend to be something that he is not. Don’t camouflage. The trick is easily spotted, and it is always a sign that there is something wrong somewhere. Be yourself. Be the best yourself that you possibly can, and you’ll never need camouflage (“Camouflage,” 1936).

Therefore, when the Second World War descended, a level of existential anxiety about humanity’s increasing stealth and deception added a sobering note to the excitement surrounding innovations in the field of camouflage. When whole armies and towns could be concealed from view, and with daily proof that the surfaces of appearances of objects, individuals and events could not be trusted, a more cautious voice crept into public discourse extolling the virtues of openness and honesty. By the Second World War the word “camouflage” had become as much a cautionary social metaphor as it had a military and biological term.
CONCLUSION

As WWII continued into its sixth year, camouflage’s image evolved into a sign of humanity’s increasing intelligence. But the amazing camouflage deceptions of WWII were good reason, writes Hillel Schwartz, for people to ask: “where, then are our own skills at disguise, decoy and deception leading us?” (Schwartz 1996: contents, n.p). What warfare and national security has retained from camouflage in the twentieth century is the strategy of hiding and revealing. But the deliberate confusions created by camouflage in the Second World War, which were primarily based on objects and bodies in real space, are now, as today’s newspapers keep reinforcing, superseded by the subterfuges at play with information technologies and virtual space and what was described by Jacques Richardson at the beginning of this millennium as “ruse, imposture and disinformation of virtually infinite possibilities” (Richardson, 2002: 196).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT


ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Ann Elias is Associate Professor in art theory at Sydney College of the Arts, University of Sydney. Her research interests include: camouflage as a military, social and aesthetic phenomenon; flowers and their cultural history; and coral reef imagery of the underwater realm. Her books include, Camouflage Australia: Art, Nature, Science and War (University of Sydney Press, 2011), Useless Beauty: Flowers and Australian Art (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), and Camouflage Cultures: Beyond the Art of Disappearance, edited by Ann Elias, Ross Harley and Nicholas Tsoutas (Sydney University Press, 2015).

REFERENCES


Camouflage. (1936, October 16). Albury Banner and Wodonga Express, p. 35.


Dakin, W.J. (1953). *Australian Seashores: A guide for the beach-lover, the naturalist, the shore fisherman, and the student*. Sydney, Australia: Angus and Robertson.


Editorial. (1942, September 15). We must become more jungle minded. *The Telegraph*, p. 3


Nature’s Aid in Army Camouflage, (1941, September 1), *The Sun*, p. 5.


THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE: TWO CRITICAL ISSUES INVESTIGATED

John J. McGonagle† and Michael Misner-Elias

Abstract
Competitive intelligence is evolving. Why? It is the evolving needs of businesses and not the method or technology supporting the gathering and analysis of information that force this continuing evolution. Two changes in competitive intelligence are investigated in this paper: 1) the failure of the competitive intelligence system because of reliance on an outdated understanding of the intelligence cycle and the associated concepts of key intelligence topics (KITs) and key intelligence questions (KIQs); and 2) the growth in the production of competitive intelligence by those who actually use it—the do-it-yourselfers, or DIYers.

Keywords: competitive intelligence cycle, Key intelligence topics, key intelligence questions, KIT, KIQ, do-it-yourselfers, DIYers

BACKGROUND
Competitive intelligence (CI) traces its intellectual origins to Harvard Professor Michael E. Porter’s 1980 work, Competitive Strategy: Techniques for Analyzing Industries and Competitors. (Porter, 1980) There, he described how to create a “competitor analysis system,” (Porter, 1980: 368–82) which linked the concept of CI to the development of corporate strategy. Competitive intelligence traces much of its operational origins to retired US government intelligence community officials who, at about the same time, helped transfer the concept of governmental intelligence to business (McGonagle, 2007). For example, Motorola was early recognised as the home of one of the first full-time modern competitive intelligence units:

[Jan Herring1] “Although I started my intelligence career in 1963, I became a private sector competitive intelligence professional in 1983 when I joined Motorola. [Robert Galvin, then CEO of Motorola2] wanted a business intelligence program very much like the ones he had observed in government….My approach was [to apply]

† Corresponding author: jjm@helicongroup.com

Salus Journal

Issue 4, Number 1, 2016
government principles, theory, and practices using my own professional skill.” (Symposium, 1997: 8–9, emphasis added)


Since that time, competitive intelligence has been adopted by numerous private organisations, both businesses and non-profits, has been offered in universities, some at graduate-level, has been nurtured by numerous professional organisations, including the Strategic and Competitive Intelligence Professionals (SCIP, formerly the Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals) and the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE), and closely studied by research groups including the APQC (formerly the American Productivity and Quality Center).4

Today, competitive intelligence, at least formally, still retains elements of its government intelligence origins, first among them the importance of the CI cycle, as well as the implicit given that competitive intelligence is a product to be transmitted from an analyst to an end-user, rather than a process to be incorporated into management wherever it can help.

ISSUE UNDER INVESTIGATION

This essay notes two critical changes in competitive intelligence that are the result of its independent development since the 1980s, and by its expansion from, arguably, a predominantly strategic research method to one that now supports operational and even tactical decision-making. The two issues that will be investigated in this paper are: 1) the failure of the system of reliance on an outdated understanding of the intelligence cycle and the related key intelligence topics (KITs) and key intelligence questions (KIQs); and 2) the growth in the production of competitive intelligence by those who actually use it—the do-it-yourselfers, or DIYers.

CONTEXT OF THE COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

Competitive intelligence is traditionally viewed as following a cycle,5 derived from the strategic intelligence cycle described in government intelligence operations literature.6 That cycle traditionally starts with the determination of need by the end-user/requester, followed by the research of others, then an analysis, and finally communication of the finished intelligence to the requester.
(who then decides whether or not to use it). At some point, there is feedback from the requester to the analyst.

![Diagram of the Competitive Intelligence Cycle]

**Figure 1**—The Competitive Intelligence Cycle (McGonagle and Vella, 2003: 8) As can be seen, it is very much a process separating the intelligence requester from the intelligence provider. In practice, competitive intelligence professionals and academics in the field extended this cycle beyond strategic CI to tactical and operational CI. They also adapted it, recognizing that feedback was necessary from every step in the CI cycle to every other step in the cycle. That means for competitive intelligence professionals, the classic CI cycle is already more of a theoretical description than an operational guide.7

One of the operational methods that accompanied the transfer of the strategic government intelligence cycle to CI was the National Intelligence Topics process. In CI, it was recast as Key Intelligence Topics (KITs), a critical step in managing the determination of requester strategic needs and their communication to analysts. Over time, the use of KITs has spread to tactical and operational competitive intelligence:

It is the problems with KITs that is the subject of the next section. And, in the following section, we will discuss how, at least in the case of the individual DIYers, the CI cycle no longer exists. Instead, it is, at best, an approximation of the thought processes that an individual goes through.

**KEY INTELLIGENCE TOPICS**

**Frustrations with the Current Paradigm**

When the concept of a strategic intelligence cycle, Key Intelligence Topics (KITs) and Key Intelligence Questions (KIQs)8 were first brought to corporations by former state intelligence practitioners, they would have had no idea of how divisive or misapplied these concepts would later become. The intelligence cycle as it is seen in CI today (figure 1) has always presented a number of difficulties, even in the venues for which it was developed. Top among these issues is the
failure of the feedback mechanism to function all the way back to the request’s initiator, in CI terms, the needs step.

The initiation of the competitive intelligence process develops when an end-user requires an answer to a competitive question or needs intelligence in order to make the best decision. As noted above, feedback is supposed to occur in every step of the process, all the way back to the end-user. The necessity of feedback is two-fold; first, it should help to eliminate cognitive biases of the requester and, second, it should provide a means by which the collectors and analysts confirm that the information and intelligence they derive is in accord with the requirements, both implicit and explicit, in the original request. In practice, that is not the case. It is our experience that if any feedback is actually started, it rarely gets a “sanity check” from the end user by those tasked as collectors and analysts. This is most true when the need is a strategic one and the requester is a director, vice president or member of the C-suite, but is also the case with tactical or even operational competitive intelligence. Experience shows that in most cases, the decision on using CI, and the reason the intelligence is needed, is made at a distance from the planners, collectors, or analysts. KITs and their related KIQs are developed during the initiation and planning stages of the traditional CI cycle. Examples of traditional KITs include:

- “What production process will the competition use in their new plant?
- “How is competition likely to respond to our new product?
- “How will the government change the regulatory regime we now operate under?
- “Determine the competitive position of our new technology; and
- “What strategic alliances are our competitors seeking? Why?” (Herring, 2005).

It could be argued that any discussion involving a KIT provokes the question, “Why is it called a topic if we are asking questions.” To this, the only reply is that the topic was phrased in this way due to historical precedent. In other words, it became a question from inertia, possibly due to the unwillingness of the requester to engage in the feedback necessary to carefully articulate their needs in order to identify topics and then to generate the related KIQs.

Actually, the KITs were to be only strategic in focus (Herring, 2005), so inertia has already changed the process (without saying so) by eliminating...
feedback and removing the iterative process of generating KIQs from KITs through interaction with the end-users. In addition, it was being applied to non-strategic topics, thus stretching it well beyond its original scope. Eventually, this has resulted in lost faith in the competitive intelligence cycle’s KITs and KIQs as the starting points for generating sound intelligence. Other weaknesses that developed from flaws in the CI system include:

- information-loss between second and third-parties in the collection of intelligence;
- analysts’ selection of inappropriate techniques and methods based on the requested information; and
- the failure of feedback (in the event any occurs) on the disseminated intelligence (its reception and utilisation by the requester) to get back to the analysts or collectors.

With respect to the first of these, the lack of direct contact with the end-user/requester results, more often than not, in either too much information or too little useful information being developed. The purpose of collection is, ideally, neither random nor exhaustive, but focused on garnering the best information to respond to requester’s needs. Analysis, too, suffers from a failure to fully understand the requester’s need: Is the appropriate method a ratio analyses for gaining financial insights or a Porter’s Four Corners to understand a competitor’s management’s motivations; or is a BCG Matrix or SPACE Matrix more appropriate?

More simply, the tasking is now too far from the collection and analysis. And such a system fails to address emerging circumstances found by data collectors that may radically alter the equation.12

DIYers

One of the forces that helped develop competitive intelligence was its link to corporate strategy first developed in the seminal strategy book by Professor Michael Porter (Porter, 1980) together with his two follow-ons (Porter, 1985 and Porter, 1990). In Porter’s vision of a competitive strategy achieving a competitive advantage, competitive intelligence is the link that enables a firm to develop its competitive strategy, which, when executed will produce a competitive advantage for it.
But, over time, competitive intelligence spread its mantle. CI professionals began providing intelligence not only on competitors’ strategies, but on their tactics; not just on macro-level issues like long-term investments, but on micro-level issues, like pricing and product positioning. Regardless of the targets, it has been the goal of the CI professional to provide intelligence that the end-user will, well, use. As the end-user is not the same as the intelligence analyst and collector, CI historically ran into a fundamental disconnect. That is, while CI, very good CI, can be provided to the decision-maker, there is nothing requiring the end-user, the decision-maker, to use it to make a decision.

However, there were situations where such disconnects were avoided. That was done by having the end-user be a part of the process of developing the raw data and finished analysis. For example, technology teams in a wide variety of industries began to develop and use access to data on pending research and development. The goal was to help develop an understanding of where their competitors were, are, and will go. Technology-oriented intelligence grew out of this environment. It still enjoys the creativity, cross-fertilization, and intellectual stimulation that having competitive intelligence professionals work directly with the decision-makers generates.

Over the past 30 years, most CI has been provided by individual internal (and external) CI analysts to another person or another unit within a business, that is, their end-user (requester). Within the last ten years, an alternative has developed whereby the individual manager develops competitive intelligence for his or her own use, whether or not there is a dedicated internal full-time CI function available. For these people, CI is now an additional management approach just as automatic personnel, undertaking strategic planning, coping with Six Sigma, doing budgeting, etc.

Why? Because, as we have noted, traditional competitive intelligence, including the CI Cycle and KITs, is premised on a reactive, two-part relationship—that is, a CI professional responding to what an end-user identifies as a need, often with the help of the CI professional. But, by being a DIYer, a manager or business leader can turn CI from being reactive to being proactive, by eliminating the KITs, the conferencing, and the feedback. As the decision-maker, the DIYer now gets what CI he or she needs, when it is needed, and then can use it almost seamlessly.

In addition, as end-user (requester), collector, and analyst are the same, there is no longer any danger of the fundamental disconnect rendering a competitive
intelligence assignment pointless. The fundamental disconnect is when the end-user of CI does not incorporate the intelligence provided by the analyst into his/her decision-making.

CHANGING THE PARADIGM

There are, essentially, two functions for CI today. The first is to answer questions and provide intelligence for decisions. The second is to provide early warning of potential threats or early identification of developing opportunities. While these basic needs are unlikely to change, the way in which the needs are expressed and collected are either in flux or still following an outmoded paradigm that no longer, even if it could previously, provides the best information from which to derive intelligence.

There is a need for a new paradigm in competitive intelligence which will provide the best intelligence to those requiring answers in support of their needs. In essence, there is nothing particularly wrong or incorrect in the intelligence cycle as it currently exists—with the critical exception of assuming regular communication (including, but not limited to, feedback at all stages) between the necessary competence groups (requester, collector, and analyst), which does not always exist.

The role of the competitive intelligence professional is to assist in clearly defining the objectives, help identify the places and modes of collection, propose the best analytical techniques to develop the information, and determine the best methods of dissemination. The CI professional facilitates the ongoing communication between the competent groups. But how does the profession accomplish this given the flaws in the way we look at the production of CI as well as in the way in which it is now conducted?

The most difficult part of this process is explaining to leadership the benefit of a strong process for developing intelligence. As with the KIT/KIQ system, this begins with a clear definition of those factors where CI is most needed by the organization—call it the Critical Intelligence Requirement (CIR). This may be either a question or a decision that needs to be made, stated in clear, direct terms.

Ideally, this will be developed in consultation with the competitive intelligence team, the requester/end-user, and others in leadership to ensure that the output is need-to-know, not merely (the pointless and resource wasting) nice-to-know. The team approach also works by minimizing the biases that creep into the CIR and point, tacitly, to an expected answer.
If the KIT is replaced with the CIR, they then become a method for identifying and dealing with a strategic topic. And the KIQs can, in essence, then serve the tactical and operational end-users while remaining responsive to the KITs in light of the CIR. From this we can develop the collection strategy based on the format of an outline where the topic is the highest level of the outline (the Roman Numeral) and KIQs the next level down (the Roman capitals).

The topics/questions under the CIR then drive the collection strategy. For example, a CIR may be that “[As a chocolate manufacturer] we want to enter the high-end ice cream market.” Topics to be explored to enlighten the CIR may be competition, of course, but since we are discussing competitive intelligence, not merely competitor intelligence, we must go further. Additional topics to assist in developing the intelligence necessary for this decision might also include: synergies, consumer trends, market saturation, intellectual property, regulatory environment, fleet and logistics, distribution channels, suppliers, pricing, and so on. Now, under each of these topics we can develop the questions from which we hope to derive answers to better understand the topic directly responsive to the CIR.

DIYers

DIY CI is real, it is here and is it growing. One of the authors has already conducted numerous public and private courses for managers and business leaders who have added competitive intelligence to their personal methodological approaches.

Still not sure of this? Here is a partial list of non-CI trade and professional groups have held training, conference, or chapter presentations on CI for their (non-CI professional) members:

- Aligning Medical Affairs & Services for Success Conference;
- American Chemical Society;
- American Society for Industrial Security;
- ARMA International;
- Association of Independent Information Professionals;
- Association of Strategic Planning;
- Business Threat Awareness Council;
- Construction Market Research Council;
- Defense Industry Initiative;
Professional Pricing Society;
Society of Manufacturing Executives; and
Special Libraries Association.

In addition, there is growing evidence that businesses are indirectly bringing some competitive intelligence into functions such as market research, customer insights, and even risk management.\textsuperscript{13} We do not mean to say that classic CI is destined to be replaced by DIY CI:

- What this means is that the methods and techniques that enable individual managers and leaders to produce their own CI for their consumption are out there, and have been honed by decades of work by academics and CI professionals. But, today's DIYers cannot just adopt them – of necessity, the DIYers must adapt to them.

- It also likely means a change in how internal CI units will function. Perhaps it will allow/force them to focus largely or exclusively on supporting early warning projects and strategy and move away from supporting tactical and operational activities.

- As for the future of external competitive intelligence firms, it is possible that their focus may shift more heavily to strategy/very large project/early warning support, more training of DIYers, and to becoming a resource for research that internal CI units and DIYers can/should not do, such as elicitation interviews of sensitive targets (your own employees, competitors, etc.).

CONCLUSION

Competitive intelligence is evolving. It is not the method or technology supporting the gathering and analysis of information that force this development, though they play their part. Rather, it is the evolving needs of businesses, both large and small, competing in the Internet Age to sell both commodities and differentiated products. Now, perhaps more than ever, a sound process for obtaining solid competitive intelligence is imperative. For large companies, this means developing a workable, formalised process. For the DIYer, the methods and techniques necessary to support the needs of their business or corporate function whether strategically, operationally or tactically. Good-enough competitive intelligence is already being practiced, but great competitive intelligence is on the horizon.
ENDNOTES

1. Jan Herring was former director of intelligence at Motorola, and before that a career intelligence officer at the CIA. See also, Fisher (2014).

2. Galvin had served on the US President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

3. For more on this, see Kahaner (1996: 1519) and Kraft and Lyke-Ho-Gland (2014).

4. See, for example, Sawka (2008: 4).

5. See, for example, Clark (2008: 10), Nolan (1999: 7) et seq., and Kahaner (1996: 43) et seq. This reflects the significant influence of former government intelligence analysts who have joined private companies as competitive intelligence analysts.

6. For more detailed critiques of the competitive intelligence cycle, see Wheaton (2014) and McGonagle (2007: 7186).

7. For more detail on the concept of KITs, see Herring (1999: 414).

8. “KIQs are used both to analyze the KIT and determine the types of intelligence operations that are required to develop understanding and insights regarding the critical elements of a KIT issue.” (Herring, 2013)

9. A more detailed discussion on cognitive biases in the intelligence process can be found in Huer (1999).

10. Jan Herring, reviewing the use of KITs, noted that, “Developing key intelligence topics is not a simple ‘question and answer’ process. [A] KIT is … seldom satisfied by a simple ‘answer.’ It usually requires some planned mix of collection and analysis, often combining various analysis techniques in addition to both primary and secondary collection operations. (Herring, 2013)

11. According to Herring (1999: 6–8) there were only supposed to be three types of KITs—strategic decision, early warning and key players.

12. For a preview of treating competitive intelligence as a process, see McGonagle and Vella (1996).

13. A search on LinkedIn (1 December, 2015) found over 150 individuals whose official titles combined competitive intelligence and market research or customer insights. On the relationship between competitive intelligence and risk management, see Gilad (2003).
REFERENCES


Galvin, Robert W. “Competitive Intelligence at Motorola”, in *Competitive Intelligence Review*, 8:1, pp. 3 et seq. (1997).


*Salus Journal* Issue 4, Number 1, 2016


ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**John J. McGonagle** is Managing Partner of The Helicon Group, a global competitive intelligence consulting and research firm. He has received both the Meritorious and Fellows awards from Strategic & Competitive Intelligence Professionals. He is the most prolific author on CI, blogging from DIY-CI.com.

**Michael Misner-Elias** is Global Business and Competitive Intelligence Lead for SABIC Specialties, a leader in innovative solutions for the plastics and chemicals industries. With more than 25 years as an intelligence professional and consultant in disciplines as varied as architecture, financial services, and chemicals, he provides expertise in developing competitive intelligence programs, and training in collection and analysis.

- o O o -
Abstract

This paper discusses the development of the academic field of inquiry known as intelligence studies. After noting the historical and global context, the paper observes at the development of intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It argues that for intelligence studies discipline to make advancements like those seen in other academic disciplines, it needs to adhere to the scientific method of inquiry, which is, after all, the hallmark of scholarly inquires.

Keywords: Intelligence, intelligence studies, intelligence training, education, occupational training, Bosnia and Herzegovina

INTRODUCTION

The field of intelligence studies is not an inanimate, or abiogenic, activity. Contrary, it is argued that it is a living, biogenic, set of processes. As such, intelligence studies is not just the study of facts or historical events. Yes, it is the accumulation of information—a body of knowledge—but it is also the analysis of those data in order to gain insight.

As a discipline, intelligence studies is based on empirical research, not speculation. This is because intelligence studies is based on research methodologies that come from academia (Pajević, 2013). Just as sociology grew from historical and psychological inquiry, intelligence studies has grown from its ability to use a range of academic methodologies.

This paper discusses the development of the academic field of inquiry known as intelligence studies. After noting the historical and global context, the paper observes at the development of intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It argues that for intelligence studies discipline to make advancements like those seen in other academic disciplines, it needs to adhere to
the scientific method of inquiry, which is, after all, the hallmark of scholarly inquiries.

WHAT IS INTELLIGENCE STUDIES?

A definition of intelligence studies was developed by the Chairman of the Committee for Education practitioners at the International Association for Intelligence Education (IAFIE):

Intelligence Studies is studying the theory and practice of application of information collected by open and covert methods, for the purpose of strategic planning, criminal investigations, and implementation of policy by the government, law enforcement agencies and the business sector (Cristescu, 2011: 6).

Intelligence studies can cover a wide range of disciplines that provide training in various occupation types, including those who work for national security, law enforcement, the business sector, as well as private firms. In the case of the latter, intelligence studies is important to think-tank organisations because these organisations use intelligence research to assist lobbying policy makers. State/provincial and local governments also have needs for certain types of professionals who have the knowledge and skills in intelligence studies. But essentially, the main function of intelligence studies is train and/or educate analysts so they can provide insight for governments, law enforcement, and commercial decision-makers. Therefore, intelligence studies plays a key role in providing, in broad terms, some level of certainty (which could also be interpreted as security). (Hughbank, and Githens, 2010).

Although intelligence studies is a scientific field of inquiry within the social sciences, it could be viewed as having its own branches and sub-branches, and disciplines and sub-disciplines. But in the main, intelligence studies is a science of security challenges, threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. The relationship between intelligence studies and other sciences is exemplified by its multidisciplinary approach.

Intelligence studies can be argued to be an academic discipline that sits in an organised teaching profession but draws on history, political science (e.g. government, political systems, international relations), legal sciences (e.g. the theory of state and law), sociology, anthropology, criminology, management sciences, and economics. New disciplines have joined the ranks of these more traditional subjects of scholarship, such as foreign affairs, public administration,
criminal justice, criminalistics, urban geography, military studies, library studies, as well as cultural and ethical studies.

Intelligence studies has been an academic discipline for more than half a century. Today, intelligence studies is an independent field of inquiry. In general, intelligence studies has a defined locus (security, threats, risks and vulnerabilities), as well as a focus (prediction and active problem solving). Intelligence studies as a discipline abides by the three principles that form the convention of the scientific method: objectivity, reliability and universality.

Figure 1—Intelligence Studies as an Academic Discipline

INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Within some academic circles there exists a debate as to whether intelligence studies is science or whether it is an occupational skill, or a combination (Pajević, 2013). But like practitioners in any academic discipline, intelligence studies should not be categorised as either. It is posited that it is both—a science and a practice-based skill. If a parallel were drawn to, say, archaeology, one can see that the two disciplines share a similarity—theory and practice. By way of example, society’s decision-makers looking to address security threats, risks and vulnerabilities, such as industrial spies, terrorists, smugglers, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber hackers, call on analysts who are not only schooled in the theory of these issues, but also have the practical skills that are provided by intelligence studies.
Integration of various academic disciplines, theoretical approaches and research orientations feature largely in the discourse of intelligence studies. However, it is still difficult to identify specific or significant findings that are the result of the integration of these elements. Wikströmand and Sampson (2006) have argued that there are four types of integration: theory (e.g. a theory about intelligence failures); methods (e.g. qualitative and quantitative); the level of analysis (e.g. tactical, operational and strategic); and discipline (e.g. history, international relations, security studies etc.).

Studying intelligence practice can be conducted from two approaches. Firstly, by the external study of intelligence work (in all its manifestations) by unofficial access original documents. The second approach is through internal study where academics are afforded access to agency documentation (Warner, 2007). Examples of reliable data sources for intelligence studies scholars include: official and operational files, archived dossiers, trial court materials, official correspondence that are usually protected (e.g. cable traffic), agency databases, personal interviews, private files, personal diaries, and e-mails. There are also many reliable secondary documents too, such as the outputs of inquires (e.g. the so-called Church Committee), leaked documents (e.g. WikiLeaks files), news reports, memoirs of the intelligence professionals, oral-historical interviews (e.g. memoirs of former-CIA directors and station chiefs (e.g. Devlin, 2007).

TRADITIONAL AND CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO INTELLIGENCE STUDIES

Traditionally, intelligence studies supported practitioners who worked in the operational areas of national security or foreign policy. This can be seen as following the historical development of intelligence work that, in general, grew from military and foreign policy application (Herman, 2006). Today, it also encompasses law enforcement, business intelligence and private sector applications.

Moving from what could have been seen as occupational training (e.g. training of military intelligence officers) to include university-level education appears to have had the effect of reducing the possibility of compromising the intelligence and security services with regard to certain issues, especially when it comes to public confidence. (Luce, 2013).

But in order to provide education, rather than occupational training, the intelligence community has turned to academia—university professors are the intelligence communities “nursery.” Academia has the potential to contribute to
the appropriate use of methodologies used in intelligence analysis that are crucial to the understanding of security, economic, political, and technological issues that are at the centre of intelligence research projects. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the relationship between the academic community and the intelligence community (Duraković, 2011). By establishing such a relationship, it not only demystifies the secrecy surrounding intelligence work (e.g. through the publication of scholarly texts, professional seminars and discussion forums), it also builds confidence in the integrity of the research being conducted. Having a strong academic grounding, the conclusions of intelligence research potentially hold more sway with decision-makers because of the academic rigor in collecting and analysing data have been applied. These types of results can be observed in the way reports produced by independent think-tanks are well received.

GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES: THE MACRO VIEW

Intelligence studies represents a rapidly growing field of scholarly inquiry. This dynamism is not only evident by the expanding body of literature, but also by the number of university departments, study centres, specialised degrees, conferences, and professional associations. Intelligence is taught at some of the most prestigious universities around the world (e.g. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and the United States). Special institutes and degree courses were established with the aim to prepare students for entry-level positions for intelligence and security careers—to name a few; the Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies at the University of Mississippi, Mercyhurst College’s Institute for Intelligence Studies (Pennsylvania), Macquarie University (Sydney), Charles Sturt University’s Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security (Sydney), Massey University (New Zealand), and Brunel University (London).

It is similar in the United Kingdom—there are centres in Brunel, Buckingham, Aberystwyth and at the University of Salford. In Australia there are master’s degrees in intelligence offered by Charles Sturt University and the Macquarie University. Intelligence studies, it has been said, suffered the qualification of science with the missing dimension (Andrew and Dirks, 1984; Moran and Murphy, 2013: 1–3) for a long period of time.

In the 1970s academic attention, at an international level, turned its focus to the subject of intelligence, and this attention bore the fruit of a new academic discipline called intelligence studies. What could be considered as the watershed years of intelligence were 1974 and 1975 because of the large number of
publications that were published in those years (Beer, 2006). Certainly, it can be said that during the last three decades, the broad topic of intelligence and specifically, intelligence studies, saw an increase in related publications, or rather to say in hyper-production. This suggests that intelligence studies has been accepted as a separate, respectable academic discipline.

But until the 1990s, scholars spoke about the history of intelligence, not the wider contribution the field was making to scholarship. During this period, former intelligence practitioners dominated the literature, which points to the unique activity intelligence work is.

Intelligence studies consists of four academic groups that make it more of a multidisciplinary field of inquiry rather than one that is interdisciplinary. These groups of scholars include: historians, political scientists, practitioners-researchers, journalists and freelance writers. Generally, historians tend to be the most prominent in this community (Fry and Miles, 1993).

Although, writers were mainly from the United States, significant contributions to the intelligence studies have been made by other countries, among others, by the Britain (see, Gill and Phythian, 2012), Canada, Australia (see, Prunckun, 2013, 2015; Walsh, 2011), France (see, Denécé and Arboit, 2010), Spain (see, Matey, 2010), Germany (see, Wolfgang, 2004), Holland (see, De Graaff, 2014), Austria (see, Beer, Gemes, Mindler and Muigg, n.d.), Turkey (see, Beşe, 2013; Berksoy, 2013), South Africa (see, Duvenage, 2013), and others.

Stuart Farson (1989) suggested a division of studying the intelligence topics to the different national schools of thought. He accentuated in particular the American school of thought, which has a rich tradition. This school of thought emphasises the conceptual issues and organisational efficiency. The British school is primarily historical. Many countries are building so-called hybrid intelligence studies which are a combination of historical and conceptual approach (Farson, 1989).

In Sherman Kent’s article The Need for Intelligence Literature (1955) he said, "In most respects the intelligence calling has come of age." Kent considered that the intelligence activity has become a profession and explained what kind of literature is needed for this type of profession and literature that deserves to be the basis of intelligence studies (Kent, 1955: 1).

Dorand (1960) recommended that colleges and universities organise the basic study on the phenomenon of intelligence, which would be the basis for
policy planning, guide for the operations, exploring the game by the rules of intelligence, and teaching principles and information processing in order to get final intelligence products for decision-makers. Such a course of study should develop broad principles applicable to all areas. Intelligence studies programs and courses continue to grow in the United States, together with the demand for qualified faculties in the service of these activities which also continues to grow (Jonathan, 2013).

To illustrate this point, in some countries with advanced economies, civil, military and government institutions offer a wide range of courses in intelligence issues (e.g. data collection, analytical techniques, research writing, counterintelligence activities, fraud, and ethics, to mention a few), and many of these are able to studied by distance education (e.g. online and/or correspondence). These mode of study offers students the ability to undertake continuing education while in-service or while deployed overseas.

DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA—MICRO CASE STUDY

Bosnia and Herzegovina's intelligence studies can be viewed through the ex-Yugoslav school of thought, which has left a deep impression on the current state of studies. Intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina has evolved from an interdisciplinary many diverse fields of inquiry. Bosnian writers have given a strong contribution of this academic discipline, which has only in the last few decades taken a sizable momentum.

In Bosnian literature, the figure of spies and presenting Bosnia and Herzegovina in the world, can be found in many writers, for instance, Ivo Andrić, Meša Selimović, Derviš Sušić, Dževad Karahasan, Nenad Veličković, as well as others. Also, popular cinema has made a large contribution to the development of intelligence studies with the achievements of authors such as Hajrudin Krvavac (e.g. his cinematic productions: Valter Defends Sarajevo, Bridge, and Saboteurs), Zulfikar Zuko Džumur and Mirza Idrizović (Hodoljublje), Ademir Kenović (Perfect Circle), Danis Tanović (No Man's Land), Jasmila Žbanic (Grbavica), Bata Čengić (Silent Gunpowder). These writers have made a mosaic, novelistic and philosophical basis for the development of intelligence studies in Bosnian. A further catalyst to the development of intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina came from the publication of the translations of monographs by authors from both the West and East, with special attention to the publication of law enforcement intelligence topics.
The formalisation of intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina originates from the formation of the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Sarajevo. In 1970, the Secondary Police School in Sarajevo was founded and the process of providing education for young people wanting a career in crime sciences. This is aimed at students studying at high school level. Degree level courses were still not developed (FKN Sarajevo, 2004). At the same time, intelligence officers from Bosnia and Herzegovina were sent to the intelligence courses in Belgrade and Skopje because there was a lack of intelligence academies and colleges.

In 1993, at the Law Faculty of the University of Sarajevo, the basics on criminology were also introduced. In addition, the Faculty of Criminal Justice at the same university was founded. Moreover, the formation of the Faculty for Security and High School of Internal Affairs in Banja Luka were created, and in combination, these developed an academic environment that encouraged further development of intelligence studies.

An important contribution to the education and training of personnel in the various security agencies of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the creation of nation’s Police Academy, which is based in Sarajevo, as well as the creation of the Police Academy in Banja Luka. The Agency for Education and Professional Training (AEPTM), situated within the Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina was established in 2009. It is also important to note the establishment of some private higher education institutions, such as Logos Center College in Mostar, the Faculty of Safety and Protection in Banja Luka, the University Sinergija Bijeljina, the College CEPS Centre for Business Studies in Kiseljak, and the Faculty of Criminal Justice and Security, University Interlogos in Kiseljak. With these advances, the problem of police training and education has been resolved at the state level.

**IMPROVING OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA**

The concept of intelligence is not a new phenomenon, but the academic intelligence studies is. In recent decades the growth of academic intelligence studies has experienced an expansion, and in recent years has been growing along with increasing public awareness of intelligence.

Improving intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina as an academic discipline requires reinforcement of the best practice that exists in the academic community, which includes the identification, acquisition, storage, creation, and
dissemination of new knowledge. More effective implementation of these practices would have the potential to strengthen the links between intelligence studies as an academic discipline with the security environment this type of work involves (e.g. dissemination of scholarship, public understanding and better management practices).

It has been argued that scholars need to access the creation of new knowledge, rather than repeat the old ideas—the "old wine in new bottles" (Marrin, 2014: 4). Creating the new knowledge can be implemented through the following steps: 1) to document what is known; 2) evaluate gaps or holes; 3) work to fill these gaps in knowledge; 4) dissemination of knowledge to those who need or want it; and 5) institutionalisation of these efforts (Marrin, 2014: 10).

In this regard, Gregory Moore (2008) has identified several issues to be taken into account when promoting intelligence studies as an academic discipline. These polemic questions could be argued as important considerations to improving intelligence studies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

- Does intelligence education require the emersion of a new academic discipline (e.g. such as intelligence studies) or can intelligence education be absorbed within the existing curricula?
- Do students—undergraduate through to graduate—have the academic grounding to allow them to understand intelligence theory, and more specifically, if not, how should these curricula structures to accommodate these learnings?
- Would intelligence studies be best positioned as a subset of the existing discipline or would it be better as an independent discipline?
- What attributes need to be established before intelligence studies could be formally acknowledged as an academic discipline? Would it mean establishing its own body of literature, intelligence theories, the gathering of peer-acknowledged academics who are respected for their work in intelligence studies?
- How does the academic teaching community align itself with the requirements of the intelligence community who require certain skills and knowledge?
- Which class of scholar would benefit the most from obtaining a formal qualification in intelligence studies: analysts, researchers, future political consultants, or public officials? And should the curriculum be tailored to offer different streams for this different students?
• And finally, who is qualified to teach an intelligence-based curriculum and where will this cadre of lecturers come from?

ENDNOTE

1. The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies (The Canadian Association for Security and Intelligence Studies—CASIS—was established in 1985) is a non-partisan volunteer organisation with the aim of organising the debate in Canada on security and intelligence matters. Its aims are to encourage and promote intelligence and security studies; promotion of courses at Canadian universities and colleges in these areas; and supporting projects in the intelligence and security studies in the interest of higher education, science and public information.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr Maid Pajevic earned his MA and PhD in the Faculty of Criminalistics at the University of Sarajevo. Between 2000 and 2010 he was employed in operational as well as managerial positions in the intelligence-security system of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 2011 he held the position of certified instructor with the United Nations Police (UNPOL). Since 2012 he has held the position of Head of Department for the Agency for Education and Professional Training, Ministry of Security, Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is also employed at the College Logos Center Mostar as a lecturing professor and the Head of Department of Security Studies. He is the author of Contemporary Theories of Intelligence (College Logos Center Mostar, 2013).

REFERENCES


- o O o -
How to Undertake Surveillance and Reconnaissance: From a Civilian and Military Perspective

by Henry Prunckun
Pen & Sword Military, South Yorkshire, UK
2015, 147 pages

Reviewed by Dr Patrick F Walsh

Dr Prunckun is a seasoned intelligence studies scholar and former intelligence officer who has written on a range of related topics. In this recent release, he has presented students with an important primer on how to undertake surveillance and reconnaissance. Baring a few dated military field manuals on the topic, his current treatment covers this topic greater depth.

This interesting book comprises ten chapters that set-out what surveillance and reconnaissance are, and what there are not. It steps those readers who are new to the subject matter from beginning to end, and in the process showing how to put the theory of reconnaissance into practice, (particularly reconnaissance tradecraft). Moreover, it discusses how to counter the reconnaissance efforts of adversaries. This is an aspect of tradecraft I haven’t seen in print before.

In defining reconnaissance, Prunckun rightly points out the crossover that exists between it and the broader interests of intelligence collection, but he argues that the focus of reconnaissance is firmly fixed on what might be seen as the tactical aspects of intelligence, leaving the operational and strategic aspects to those whose practice is intelligence. That is, Prunckun argues that reconnaissance is making observation that inform the action-in-chief. It can be part of the intelligence cycle, but it can be an independent activity.

Chapter three provides the reader with a clear articulation of what Prunckun terms the seven tenets of reconnaissance, which include, amongst other things: the aims of the recon mission; central coordination; communication; reliability; and deception (pp. 23–24). There is also a good survey of the various uses of reconnaissance (e.g. air, amphibious, armed, civil, and radar).
Many of the examples Prunckun presents in the book have a military application, though the author recognises the broader need for these skills by such occupations as private investigators, bodyguards, bailiffs, and security guards. Indeed, he makes this point clearly in the introduction, but I would add that his ‘how-to’ book is also relevant to, sadly, ordinary citizens who now have a need to gain greater situational awareness in places like subways, school campuses, and other public places due to the rise in home-grown terrorism, which is becoming a feature of modernity.

Chapter 5 (surveillance) shows the relationship between reconnaissance, surveillance and intelligence collection, though I would argue that the growing proactive application of intelligence collection post-9/11 (particularly covert searches) makes the relationship between these three activities more dynamic and overlapping than the author suggests.

Chapter 8 (counter-reconnaissance) holds has some timely lessons for our security and law enforcement services as they attempt to increase awareness of terrorist operational planning and counter-jihadist surveillance activities in a way that secures vulnerable sites yet reassures the public about their safety.

There is a final chapter on ethics that rounds-out the book by reminding the reader of the ethical dilemmas posed by surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence, which is always a complex issue. Prunckun stresses that there is no simplistic method to ameliorate ethical dilemmas because much depends on the methods of surveillance, the context in which they are used, and who is being targeted. Though, legislation and oversight can help manage such ethical issues to some extent.

In summary, this book provides a solid introduction to the subject of reconnaissance. There are extensive endnotes that contain interesting source citations, subject related facts, photographs, illustrations, and references to further readings. Each chapter contains a review of key concepts as well as few study questions and learning activities that will assist students build their knowledge of the craft and improve their field practice.
ABOUT THE REVIEWER

Dr Patrick F Walsh is Associate Professor of Intelligence and Security Studies at the Australian Graduate School of Policing and Security, Charles Sturt University, Sydney. Associate Professor Walsh is a former government intelligence officer who has written numerous articles and chapters on a range of intelligence reform issues that span the Five-Eyes intelligence community. His recent study into intelligence—*Intelligence and Intelligence Analysis*—was published by Routledge (2011). He is also the discipline head for the intelligence studies program at Charles Sturt University.

- o O o -
**My Year Inside Radical Islam**

by Daveed Garenstein-Ross  
2007, hardcover, 304 pages  
ISBN-978-1585425518

Reviewed by Dr Susan Robinson

The book, *My Year Inside Radical Islam*, is written as an autobiographical memoir by the author, Daveed Garenstein-Ross, and examines his experience as he struggles to find spiritual fulfilment and social connection in America in the period just prior to 9/11. Throughout his life, the author was greatly influenced by his liberal, non-orthodox Jewish parents to question and try out different religions, but their seeming inability to be committed to one doctrinal belief system frustrated and disappointed him.

One thing his parents did give him though was a love of intellectual inquiry and he also loved the freedoms he enjoyed under the American Constitution. Garenstein-Ross valued most highly, the freedom of speech, the freedom to question, and the freedom of religious expression. As a result, he was an accomplished debater at college.

His exploration of religion began relatively early in his life. He was introduced to Christianity by a high school friend, but once they commenced college he found his friend’s increasing fundamentalism concerning as it coincided with what he felt was a growing tendency toward narrow mindedness. He was also put off by the constant pressure he felt from this friend and his friend’s fiancée to convert to Christianity. When he looked into Christianity he was troubled by what he saw as an ambiguity in relation to the trinity and the concept of Jesus as being a man and also God.

The author felt frustrated that people such as his friend and his parents were unwilling to help him explore these questions. Interestingly, he states that in retrospect, he considers this early experience with Christianity as a milestone on his path toward radical Islam. The other milestones that he saw as influential on this journey were two life threatening health events in his late teens and early twenties that prompted him to think more seriously about mortality and the
theological issues of life. It was at this time in his life that he was introduced to Sufism which he describes as an uncommon, but moderate form of Islam.

Garenstein-Ross was impressed by the simplicity and open mindedness of this faith and it was through the lens of Sufism that the author became attracted to Islam. He found it reassuring that Muslims were clear about what they believed and there was no apparent ambiguity in their beliefs. At the same time there appeared to be a respect and acceptance of other religions.

It was during his first visit to a mosque that he became aware of the intolerance within Islam. He heard a sermon on the deficiencies of other religions with a particular emphasis on the Christian belief in Jesus as being the Son of God, and for the first time he felt uncomfortable. Due to his earlier frustrations over the apparent ambiguity of the Christian religion he justified the sermon when it attacked Christianity but his discomfort grew when Judaism and the concept of ‘the chosen people’ was called into question. Despite his unease, he was able to throw off these unsettling rumblings mainly because the sense of brotherhood and the acceptance he experienced in the mosque was so overwhelming.

He decided to become a Muslim in Venice while away on a study trip. When he returned to the United States, Garenstein-Ross and his friend attended a local Muslim meeting that was held in a private home. It was a more formal meeting than he had been to previously and he noted that the women were banished to another room. He had begun dating a Christian woman and found the views of this group toward women and courtship to be oppressive, but he was unable to express this within the group.

The author also discovered that the moderate Muslims he had previously associated with were hated by this group. Almost immediately, the group offered him a job with a branch of the organisation known as the al-Haramein Islamic Foundation and he began to spend all his time there. The Foundation was a Muslim charity but was constantly accused of fund raising for al-Qaeda.

During the course of his employment, Garenstein-Ross was exposed to many more extreme views held by the organisation, including a ban on music which he loved, and a strong disapproval of his relationship with his Christian girlfriend; whom he also loved. The camaraderie and male bonding was so strong that he overcame these disappointments to embrace the more radical views being espoused in the group. There was a strong internal culture in the organisation that forbade questioning and helped to keep him within the group. If there was any sense that he was waning in his allegiance to the radical ideology being espoused,
he was “talked to” by senior members of the group in order to get him back on track.

Throughout this time, he was aware that his relationship was disapproved of and he tried to get his girlfriend to convert to Islam. When this failed and he was unable to talk about his concerns, he became more and more disillusioned with the religion. Although he was unaware of it, he had also come to the attention of the Federal Bureau of Investigation while he was working for this group. After twelve months with the group, his belief in Islam waned and he left the job and became a lawyer. It was while he was practising law that the FBI finally raided the offices of the al-Haramein and he became an informant for the FBI.

This is a book that shows how the author was drawn into the religion of Islam and how he was influenced gradually to become radicalised, despite being aware that the thoughts and views he expressed were frequently at odds with his inner feelings and beliefs. It was only when he recognised how unhappy he had become with Islam that he began to question the spiritual road he had taken and sought to leave a religion that expressly declared that execution was the punishment for leaving it.

The author succeeded in leaving Islam however and converted to Christianity, eventually becoming an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. By addressing the topic of radicalisation in an autobiography with a conversational tone, the author has provided ordinary people the opportunity to understand how the Islamic radicalisation of western young men can occur.

ABOUT THE REVIEWER

Dr Susan Robinson is a criminologist, lecturer and researcher with the Charles Sturt University, Graduate School of Policing and Security. She has extensive experience working as a practitioner and manager in the public service in South Australia, the Australian Capital Territory, and the United Kingdom in the areas of child protection, juvenile justice and adult corrections. She holds a PhD in sociology (criminology) from Flinders University, South Australia and an Honours Degree in Social Work.
Call for Papers

*Salus Journal* is a peer-reviewed open access journal for the publication on law enforcement and security issues as well as research findings and discussion papers regarding emergency management and public safety. *Salus Journal* seeks to contribute to practice by inspiring discussion through an interdisciplinary approach.

The journal invites submissions of articles of between 3,000 and 5,000 words for double-blind peer-review that:

- focus on issues that have an impact on criminal justice, law enforcement, national security, or emergency management;
- engage with contemporary topical practice issues; or
- add to the understanding of complex management conundrums.

Submissions can use either qualitative or quantitative approaches, including studies that employ the use of exploratory or holistic approaches. The journal also accepts discussion papers, critical essays, and analytical papers as long as a clear position is stated and the argument is grounded in sound practice, or the subject literature.

*Salus Journal* is indexed in RMIT Publishing’s *Informit* and the *Directory of Open Access Journals* (DOAJ).

RMIT Publishing is an aggregator of research information for students, lecturers, and researchers. Its *Informit* databases delivers content to scholars through its online search facility. *DOAJ* is an online directory that indexes and provides access to quality open access, peer-reviewed journals.

By publishing in *Salus Journal* you can be assured that your paper will receive the circulation it deserves.

**Book Reviews**

*Salus Journal* also accepts book reviews of around 750 words. Reviews should go beyond the descriptive account of the book’s contents. Reviews that discuss the implications of the book’s message for practice or policy are sought for inclusion in future editions. Books can be either newly published or vintage editions where the book’s thesis can be applied to a current situation or in an emerging context.

**Submission Process**

Visit the journal’s submissions page to see a copy of the author guidelines and a summary of the refereeing process:

www.salusjournal.com/submissions