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Research Article

PROMOTIONAL AND NON-Stereotypical Policing Roles: Are Women Opting Out?
Susan Robinson*

There is an appearance that women are uninterested in applying for positions in specialist areas of policing such as tactical operations, traffic and highway patrol, and counterterrorism. It cannot be assumed however that the low numbers of women is indicative of a lack of interest or will to be involved in these areas as there may be unidentified structural impediments preventing them from gaining access to these jobs. This paper critically discusses the issues relevant to women’s involvement in specialist policing roles and what can be done by police leaders to encourage greater employment of women in specialist policing roles.

Key Words: policing, police women, specialist policing, gender, police leadership

INTRODUCTION

Policing has been a traditionally male dominated profession and for many years women have been under represented and marginalised. While the overall representation of women in paid employment averages around 46% in most western countries, the level of female representation in policing still does not come anywhere near that figure (Prenzler & Fleming, 2011; Rabe-Hemp, 2007; Westmarland, 2001; Prokos & Padavic, 2002). This picture is slowly evolving as can be seen in the changing statistics for women’s employment in policing. In the United Kingdom in 1998, police women made up only 16% of the total sworn police constable population (Westmarland, 2001). This grew to 27.3% in 2013 (Home Office, 2013).

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In Australia, the number of women represented in sworn police positions grew by a similar amount during this same period. In 1996, 13.5% of Australian police officers were women (Wilkinson & Froyland, 1996; Boni, 2005) but by 2006, this number had increased to 23% (Prenzler & Fleming, 2011; Irving, 2009). Studies show that men and women join the police force for similar reasons (Christie, 1996; Brown, 1998) but where men take advantage of opportunities to move into promotional and specialist roles women do not.

In 2013 in the United Kingdom, women in senior ranks across England and Wales still only accounted for 18% of the total police workforce compared with 29.7% of women at the constable level (Home Office, 2013). This paper examines gender representation in promotional and specialist roles in policing and the reasons why women appear to be opting out of these roles. The role of police leadership in encouraging greater female representation in promotional and specialist areas will also be critically discussed.

MOTIVATIONS FOR JOINING THE POLICE FORCE

Before embarking on a discussion of gender choices in promotional and specialist roles, it is worthwhile to firstly consider whether there are any identifiable gender differences in motivations for joining the police force. In a study conducted by Christie (1996) involving new recruits in the Queensland Police Service in the early 1990s, no significant difference was found in the reasons given by both men and women for joining the police force. This study found that helping people, job security, a desire to fight crime and a lack of other job opportunities were the dominant reasons given for becoming a police officer. A study of New York police officers, conducted by Ermer (1978) found that job security, career prospects and relatively high salaries were the main motivating factors for both men and women in making the decision to join the police force. This finding is well supported by other research (White, 2007, Wimshurst, 1995). In the Ermer study, high salary was rated particularly highly by female officers.

It is evident that police recruits in contemporary society are commonly listing economic benefits, job security, career prospects and excitement of the job as the main motivating factors for joining the police (Wells & Alt, 2005) and in reference to these factors, there appears to be commonality between the motivations of men and women (White, 2007, Brown & Heidensohn, 2000).
EXPERIENCE OF GENDER IN POLICING

It has been reported that four in ten police women in England and Wales have considered quitting the police force due to lack of opportunities for flexible working conditions and a belief held by women that the police force is unresponsive to women’s needs in regard to pregnancy and maternity leave (Helm, 2012). In addition to this, police women constantly need to prove themselves capable of doing the job in order to gain acceptance into the group and are often marginalised and criticised because of their gender (Rabe-Hemp, 2007).

Dick and Cassell (2004) present an alternative view that policewomen are often their own worst enemy because they consent to dominant and oppressive male constructions of police work and they therefore do not oppose nor seek to change the work practices that marginalise them. Such a view does not take into account the extreme difficulty for policewomen, who are in the minority, to challenge the dominant male culture and to try to introduce change to traditional police practices from a position of relative powerlessness. It must however be taken into account that singling women out for “special” treatment may in fact expose them to greater marginalisation and possibly even hostility and resentment from male colleagues and police unions (Finnane, 2002).

Furthermore, an inherent tension exists for policewomen when trying to establish an identity as a police officer within the police force. Those women who exhibit traditionally feminine behaviours are said to be more readily accepted as a woman by the police group but traditionally masculine behaviours are linked with greater acceptance as a police officer (Prokos & Padavic, 2002). Women who try to retain their feminine identity risk losing the professional confidence of their colleagues but are likely to be socially accepted “as a woman” by the work group.

Women who adopt more masculine behaviours may gain greater acceptance in their work role but risk losing social acceptance in the work group. So much has changed for women in policing but the prevailing police culture remains overtly masculine in nature and as a result women experience difficulties on many levels when trying to fit in (Rabe-Hemp, 2007). To begin with, police women are found in much lower numbers than their male counterparts and are therefore often isolated and viewed with suspicion. In the past police women were resented for “taking a position away from a man” who
(allegedly) could do the job better (Silvestri, 2003). Arguably, while women are more accepted in general policing roles this resentment is still apparent in terms of women’s movement into specialist and promotional policing roles (Rabe-Hemp, 2007).

Since policing fosters a culture of hegemonic masculinities it also serves to marginalise femininities and instead encourages subordinated, feminised, masculinity in women (Rabe-Hemp, 2007; Silvestri, 2003). The police culture tends to encourage and celebrate the stereotypical, masculine values of:

- Aggressive, physical activity;
- Competitiveness;
- Preoccupation with imagery of conflict;
- Exaggerated heterosexual orientations;
- Misogynistic and paternalistic attitudes towards women;
- Rigid in-groups with exclusionary sanctions towards out-groups; and
- Strongly assertive of loyalty and affinity in the in-groups (Silvestri, 2003, p.26).

Such strong and idealised social norms can marginalise some police men as much as they do women. Just as there is heterogeneity in femininities, it is misdirected to assume that masculinities in policing are homogenous when in fact multiple varieties of masculinity are represented. This is not just a reference to homosexual and transgender males, but also to men who do not fit the gendered stereotype of the typical “macho cop.” It is from within this androcentric culture that policies and procedures are developed, including selection criteria and recruitment requirements for specialist and promotional positions.

**Organisational Impediments and Enablers**

Police organisations worldwide are experiencing disparity in respect to gender representation in specialist and promotional police roles (Prenzler & Fleming, 2010; Home Office, 2010). According to Australian research conducted by Irving (2009) women are over represented in community policing and administrative roles and under represented in specialist areas such as major crime, highway patrol, tactictical response, drug squad and water police. Although the overall gender breakdown in the Irving research cohort was 80%
male: 20% female, the percentage of men in these areas averaged 90–97% which greatly exceeded this already disparate gender ratio.

It is possible that masculinised selection criteria for specialist and promotional policing roles may be discouraging for some women and may in fact directly or indirectly discriminate against women. For example, selection processes that emphasise physical strength and agility may block women from entry into policing even though some of the physical tests applied to the selection of new recruits are not reflective of the ability needed to do the job (Lonsway et al, 2002). The Fitzgerald Inquiry in Queensland in the 1990s found that while the service was attracting 25% of applicants that were women, only 5–12% of these applicants were getting through the selection process (Wimshurst, 1995). The Inquiry found that “informal” processes had operated to thwart these women from entering the service. Discriminatory selection processes that target men and exclude women, have been identified as hindering women’s entry into policing for a number of years (Scarborough & Collins, 2002).

It is also possible that systemic processes (such as recruitment requirements) and informal processes (such as the role of informal networks) are also working to hold women back from entering specialist and promotional roles once in the police force (Rabe-Hemp, 2007). This contention is supported by a United Kingdom study which found that only 26% of police women had been promoted to ranks above constable after 10 years of service whereas 50% of police men had achieved this (Dick & Metcalfe, 2007).

In addition to the apparent difficulties involved when applying for specialist and promotional roles, police women also face greater challenges than men when appointed to these roles (Rabe-Hemp, 2007). In particular is the social isolation of being potentially the sole woman in a unit of men and the cultural isolation of being ostracised by peers. This marginalises women from the informal networks within policing that are essential to career advancement (Rabe-Hemp, 2007).

It is argued that women have long been prevented from getting the experience they need to successfully apply for promotion because they are inequitably deployed to working in stereotypical areas of policing such as victims, domestic disputes and juveniles (Silvestri, 2003; Gold, 1999; Holdaway & Parker, 1998). It is also possible that due to caring responsibilities that impinge at strategic points in their career, women are not taking advantage of
training opportunities that are necessary to prepare them for promotion because such opportunities often involve spending time away from their family (Boni, Adams & Circelli, 2001).

To justify the low numbers of women in senior and specialist policing roles, the argument has been used by male police that women are physically unsuitable for police work (Dodge, Valcore & Klinger, 2010; Silvestri, 2003). Almost as a means of proving this, women are required to demonstrate excessive displays of strength, physical endurance and stamina that have little bearing on the job they are required to do. These requirements continue to exist despite the fact that studies have shown that physical strength is not predictive of police effectiveness (Lonsway et al, 2003). Furthermore, as police move up the hierarchy and into specialist roles, with the exception of some specific roles such as tactical response, these physical requirements have even less applicability to the job at hand. Nevertheless, excessive physical requirements are imposed in most areas of policing, despite such assessments being heavily biased against women (Dodge et al, 2010; Silvestri, 2003).

ARE WOMEN OPTING OUT?
The low numbers of women in senior positions and non stereotypical specialist roles in policing continues to be a problem (Dodge et al, 2010; Irving, 2009) and it is evident that more information is needed to determine why this is the case. Much of the research and discussion to date has centered around the organisational impediments. An explanation that has not been considered is whether in fact the over-riding reason women are not represented in these areas is because they do not want to be in these roles.

Not suprisingly, this assumption is not supported by research into police career aspirations and gender such as an Australian study undertaken by Wimshurst (1995) which found no significant difference in the career aspirations of male and female recruits towards promotion and specialist policing roles. So, it appears that women want these roles as much as men do but may still be choosing not to pursue them. The question is why?

There is no doubt that the masculinised police culture makes the assimilation and acceptance of women in policing difficult to achieve but change is slowly occurring, in general duties policing at least. Despite this improvement there continues to be cultural barriers and organisational systems that serve to either prevent or deter women from entering senior policing positions and
specialist roles (Dodge et al, 2010). Miller (2012) articulates how the culture and requirements of some specialist areas might put women off from applying even while appearing to encourage them:

> It takes a very strong personality to be a lone woman in a male world when you have male supervisors, male colleagues and the type of work it is—very dependent on strength, the ability to be tactically sound, think on your feet (Miller, 2012, p.1).

Women may be discouraged from applying for positions in areas that appear to be hyper masculinised or which have excessively restrictive entry requirements. Studies show that police women generally believe they have to constantly prove themselves and they believe they must be twice as good as men to gain the same level of recognition and acceptance (White, 1996). When faced with having to prove themselves at an even higher level, women are often put off, perceiving the process to be too difficult for them to achieve and the culture too unwelcoming (Dodge et al, 2010). If women therefore choose not to apply for these positions can it be said that they are voluntarily opting out or is it that the organisational processes and sub cultures are impeding their entry?

In addition to these considerations, women still remain the primary caregivers within the family and this poses serious practical impediments to women being able to take on additional responsibilities at work. The way in which work is organised can support or impede women when it comes to career progression and involvement in specialist roles (Wilkinson & Froyland, 1996) and policing is slow to adapt to the changing social landscape in this regard. The attrition of women from the police force tends to occur in the child bearing age groups and is being attributed to lack of access to flexible working conditions that would support their family responsibilities (Charlesworth & Robertson, 2011).

**CONCLUSION**

This study has analysed some of the factors that are involved in the under representation of women in non-stereotypical specialist roles such as tactical response and major crime units. One of the factors discussed was the potential role played by the masculinised hegemonic subculture to discourage and actively prevent women from entering them. Some suggest that the subculture within specialist units could serve an important function in increasing the unit’s cohesiveness and should therefore not be disturbed (Febbraro & McCann, 2003).
However, in refuting this conception, Dodge et al (2010) use SWAT teams as an example to argue that the hyper-masculinised sub-culture is unnecessary in respect to the cohesion and/or effectiveness of these teams. In fact, they argue that studies into gender and the military have shown that the inclusion of women does not adversely affect unit cohesion or camaraderie. Febrarro & McCann (2003) also point to the military as an example to show that the inclusion of women does not adversely affect unit cohesion, camaraderie or unit effectiveness. This cannot therefore be used as an excuse not to include women in specialist policing areas.

Are women opting out of specialist and promotional policing roles? It appears that the answer to this is not a straight forward yes/no response. Women may be choosing not to apply for these positions and may be excluding themselves from opportunities that would give them a competitive advantage when applying for these positions but it is essential to look behind these decisions. From studies undertaken, it is apparent that the reasons behind these choices reveal that what appears to be an exercise of free will is in fact a response to formal and informal processes that operate to impede and discourage women.

Women are not opting out, but rather, are being pragmatic. Just as policing organisations globally have tackled the assimilation of women into generalist policing roles, so too do they need to focus on the acceptance of women in specialist and promotional positions. Gender equity in specialist and promotional policing roles will occur when the exclusionary culture of these internal specialist units change.

In order to address the under-representation of women in promotional and specialist police positions a strategic effort is required on the part of police executive that involves several different approaches that can work separately or be combined. These strategies include, but are not restricted to:

- Internal policies that encourage the involvement of women in specialist policing roles;
- Mentoring programs aimed at encouraging and supporting police women in leadership;
- Reviewing recruitment procedures and selection requirements to remove items that may bias women, especially where these items are not directly linked to the job (e.g. lifting 35kg weights over a 6ft high fence without
bending the knees as is the case in the dog squad of a police force in Australia);

- Active recruitment and marketing programs such as recruiting young women from high school could raise the numbers of women in policing to a “critical mass” that brings about the needed changes;

- Educating both male and female police at middle management levels, about gender bias and how women can be unintentionally impeded in regard to moving into promotional and specialist roles, will raise awareness and promote local leadership to enable police women to succeed in their career development; and

- The formation and support of police women’s organisations that can provide both formal and informal support to women as they progress through their policing career and may go some way toward replacing the informal network that frequently favors men.

By strategically channeling time, resources and energy toward this problem in several complimentary ways, it can be expected that police organisations will be able to increase the numbers of women in promotional policing positions and in specialist roles. It is however clear that police leadership at both the senior and local level is not only influential but is critical in heralding such changes and can be the greatest factor in the success of implementing such a strategy.

REFERENCES


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Research Article

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE: RESILIENCE THINKING IN AUSTRALIA’S FEDERAL CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION POLICY

Kate O’Donnell†

Australia’s national security policy is set out in a number of complex and interrelated policy documents that span multiple agencies, impact all levels of government (federal, state and local) and require strong partnerships with the private sector. This study examines the emergence of the term and concept of critical infrastructure (CI) in modern policy and its development in Australia’s national security policy. Since its emergence in Australian federal policy, the term CI has evolved and stabilised. Yet, in the last decade CI policy has expanded to incorporate resilience thinking and the concept of critical infrastructure resilience (CIR) is now at the core of Australia’s federal CI policy. This study identifies the emergence and development of federal policy focused on protecting Australia’s most vital assets in peacetime. In doing so, it highlights that in Australian federal policy, CIR has been conceptualised in four distinct ways. However, resilience as a body of knowledge is still evolving. Articulating and analysing how resilience thinking has been incorporated into Australia’s federal CI policy, is an important next step in assessing policy focused on the protection Australia’s most vital and iconic assets.

Keywords: counterterrorism; critical infrastructure; infrastructure protection; resilience; policy

INTRODUCTION

With its genesis in the United States (US) in 1980s, the term critical infrastructure (CI) is now firmly part of the modern scholarly, political and policy lexicon (see for example Brown, 2006; Commonwealth of Australia,
2010a; Department of Homeland Security, 2009; Moteff & Parfomak, 2004; Rudd, 2008). While now a settled concept broadly referring to essential services and their networks and supply chains that support national security, economic prosperity and social and community well-being, conceptualising and defining what does (and does not) fit within the rubric of CI has developed and evolved. While it had been used in the 1980s, the term CI was cemented in the US policy discourse in the 1990s through the US Government’s response to the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City (Brown, 2006).

The term jumped the Pacific soon afterwards, and by 1997 had tentatively entered the Australian policy discourse, although without the clarity it later gained in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (O'Donnell, 2011). The Australian Government’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks included an immediate political and policy focus on protecting CI (Business Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure, 2002; Protective Security Coordination Centre, 2002). This response built on the arrangements that had been put in place to protect key civil infrastructures in peacetime through the Vital Installations (VI) Program of the 1980s and 1990s. In the decade since 9/11, Australia’s federal policy focus on CI has been sustained yet has developed and evolved (O'Donnell, 2011).

While there is reasonable international consensus on the concepts and definitions of CI, the concepts and definition of critical infrastructure resilience (CIR) remain malleable and under development. Reflecting the multidisciplinary nature of scholarly and policy attention, it is perhaps unsurprising that CIR itself has been conceptualised differently by scholars and policymakers alike. In this article, the emergence of the term CI in the US and its adoption into, and development within, Australian federal policy is firstly identified.

The concept of resilience and how it became a key plank of Australia’s CI protection policy is then examined. Through this analysis, it is clear that in Australian federal policy, four distinct ways of conceptualising CIR are evident. This has important implications for how the still evolving and developing concepts of resilience can be considered and incorporated into future policy. Within the Australian federal policy framework, CIR has been conceptualised in the following ways: as a policy concept; as a business model (organisational resilience); as cyber systems; and as engineering design and strategic asset
management. In policy terms, this evolved from an earlier concept of protecting CI from terrorism in peacetime.

**EMERGENCE OF THE TERM CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE**

In detailing the development of CI protection arrangements in the US, Brown (2006, p. ix) notes that ‘since the American Revolution, our greatest leaders have recognized that a key indicator of national strength is the development and maintenance of an advanced system of infrastructures’. In chronicling the development of policy and arrangements focused on protecting such assets from the 1790s, through the Great War, World War II and the Cold War, and into the post-Cold War environment, Brown (2006) establishes that it is the term CI and not the concept of CI that is new to modern policy. However, there remains debate about exactly when the term CI was coined.

While Brown (2006, p. 71) suggests that the term CI itself was first used in 1989 in a report presented to the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs that focused on infrastructure issues, Moteff & Parfomak (2004, p. 4) suggest it appeared in the US earlier in the same decade ‘in some form in many of the policy debates in the 1980s’. Nevertheless, the term itself had emerged in the policy discourse, however its meaning and definition remained somewhat elusive into the mid-1990s in the US, and into the post 9/11 era in Australia.

As part of the US government’s policy response to the April 1995 bombing of the Alfred P Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, then President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD 39), US Policy on Counterterrorism (Brown, 2006, pp. 71-72; The White House, 1995). Importantly, while the PDD 39 uses the term critical national infrastructure, an examination of its unclassified version offers little in the way of concepts or definitions of what may (or may not) have been specifically considered critical national infrastructure at the time (The White House, 1995). The PDD 39, did however, lead to the establishment of the Critical Infrastructure Working Group (CIWG). (Note that only part of PDD 39 has been made public.)

Reporting in 1996, the CIWG made two principle recommendations: the establishment of a group within the Federal Bureau of Investigation to ‘keep an eye on infrastructure issues for the short term’ and the establishment of “a full-time Presidential Commission devoted to looking at critical infrastructure” (Brown, 2006, p. 78). In July 1996, through Executive Order 13010, then President Clinton further instructed the establishment of a President’s
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (the Commission) (The White House, 1996). Executive Order 13010 described CI in the following way:

Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States. These critical infrastructures include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage and transportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems, emergency services (including medical, police, fire, and rescue), and continuity of government. Threats to these critical infrastructures fall into two categories: physical threats to tangible property (“physical threats”), and threats of electronic, radio-frequency, or computer-based attacks on the information or communications components that control critical infrastructures (“cyber threats”) (The White House, 1996, p. 1).

Over fifteen months, the Commission Chaired by General Robert T Marsh, considered the protection of CI in the US and reported to the President on its findings and conclusions in October 1997 (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997). Marsh reflected on the enormity of the task of the Commission, and in particular the challenges posed by conceptualising, defining and identifying CI: he specifically noted “one of the greatest challenges was: What is this infrastructure?” (Marsh cited in Brown, 2006, p. 98). More specifically, during the Commission’s considerations, a fundamental question was posed that provides rich insights into how the Commission was grappling with conceptualising CI, “(w)e talk about this critical infrastructure but do we know what we’re talking about?” (Marsh cited in Brown, 2006, p. 98). Therefore, it can be concluded that while the term CI had entered the policy lexicon of the US almost a decade previously, its precise technical and practical meaning remained somewhat elusive well into the 1990s. As part of the Commission’s report, a clear definition of CI was articulated and was settled in the following way:

Critical Infrastructures: Infrastructures that are so vital that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating impact on defense or economic security (President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, 1997, pp. B-1).
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE AUSTRALIAN POLICY CONTEXT

As US policymakers grappled with conceptualising and defining the term CI in the 1990s, it was used in Australia as part of the Tasmanian Lifelines Project, an emergency management focused project with the goal of identifying and protecting key parts of the State of Tasmania’s civil infrastructure in peacetime (O'Donnell, 2011; Tasmanian Government, 1997). As in the US, although the term CI was “new”, the concept had a longer pedigree. In the Australian context, the antecedents of a formal federal policy and structured program focused on the protection of key civil infrastructures in peacetime rests with the VI Program of the 1980s and 1990s and the terms “vital installations” and “vital national installations”. The genesis of this program was the response to the bombing outside the Hilton Hotel in Sydney on 13 February 1978.

As part of the Australian government’s policy response to the bombing, then Prime Minister Fraser appointed Justice Robert Marsden Hope to conduct a wide ranging protective security review (Commonwealth of Australia, 1979a). In his report, Justice Hope gave specific thought to how Australia’s key civil infrastructures could be protected in peacetime and distinguished between key civil infrastructures (that he termed vital points) and key defence infrastructures (that he termed key points) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1979b, pp. 150-155). While a clear definition per se is not evident in the report, “vital points” were described in the following ways:

\[
\text{... installations whose unimpeded operation is necessary for the orderly life of the community ...}
\]

\[
\text{... installations upon which the well-being and orderly life of modern industrial cities depend. They include power stations, water supply pumping stations, petroleum refineries, offshore oilrigs, natural gas pipelines and computer installations (Commonwealth of Australia, 1979b, p. 151).}
\]

Although Justice Hope recommended Australia develop a Vital Points Program to protect Australia’s key civil infrastructures in peacetime, it was the term vital installations that was adopted in Australia through the establishment in the 1980s of the VI Program (O'Donnell, 2011). In particular, the VI Program was designed for the identification and protection of ‘important parts of the civil infrastructure’ from terrorism (Sheldrick, 1986, p. 512). Mr John Lines, who
was a member of the Counter-Terrorism Branch of the Protective Security Coordination Centre, (1978–1992) explained that the VI Program was established in September 1980 coming on line by early 1981 (J. Lines, personal communication, May 2013). Its focus was infrastructure assets that were significant, but not necessarily from a military perspective (J. Lines, personal communication, May 2013). As part of the VI Program, there were two tiers of civil infrastructures: Vital Installations and Vital National Installations. They were distinguished in the following way:

A Vital Installation (VI) is a facility, installation or resource, the loss of the products or services of which would severely disrupt the orderly life of the community, or which, if damaged, would cause a major public hazard.

A Vital National Installation (VNI) is a vital installation in which the Commonwealth and one or more State/Territory Governments have substantial interests and responsibilities, and/or the installation is of major national economic importance (Sheldrick, 1986, p. 516).

While the term CI had tentatively formed part of Australian policy since the 1990s, co-existing with VI and VNI, it gained dominance in the post-9/11 era. The immediate policy response by the Australian government to the 9/11 attacks included an announcement on 7 November 2001, by the then prime minister, Mr John Howard, of his intention to form a Business Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure to give business greater input into the assessment of current arrangements to protect national infrastructure (Business Government Taskforce on Critical Infrastructure, 2002). A key document of the time identifies that key civil infrastructure was termed *critical physical infrastructure*, and was described by the Australian Government (Protective Security Coordination Centre, 2002, p. 8) as including:

- institutions, such as official establishments, key foreign missions/residences, Federal and State Houses of Parliament, and key Commonwealth government departments and military facilities;
- financial infrastructure, such as banking and stock exchanges;
- economic infrastructure, such as the NW Shelf oil and gas fields;
- other important facilities, such as the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor;
- public utilities, such as energy and water supply;
- logistic infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, rail and ports;
Australian symbols, such as the Sydney Opera House and Harbour Bridge, Australian War Memorial, prominent city buildings and major sporting facilities; and

- some elements of the National Information Infrastructure, such as the crucial telecommunications facilities, which also require protection from physical threats.

This highlights that in Australia, the very concept of criticality of infrastructure underpinning the earlier VI Program was reconsidered by the Protective Security Coordination Centre in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The way critical physical infrastructure was considered, expanded to incorporate Australian symbols as well as core infrastructure types, such as utilities and transport. Since then, while the concept and definition of CI evolved, its definition has remained notably and deliberately constant in Australian federal policy since the mid-2000s (O’Donnell, 2012). The Commonwealth, and State and Territory governments have agreed to define CI in the following way:

...those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies and communication networks which, if destroyed, degraded or rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly impact on the social or economic wellbeing of the nation or affect Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national security. [In this context, significant means an event or incident that puts at risk public safety and confidence, threatens our economic security, harms Australia’s international competitiveness, or impedes the continuity of government and its services] (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a, p. 8).

The shift to this definition of CI, signals a maturing of policy to one that conveys broad concepts of criticality of infrastructure without limiting the source or nature of threat to that infrastructure, and without limiting infrastructure types. This definition does, however, belie the complexity of networked and interdependent sectors and systems that collectively comprise Australia’s CI. This complexity is partly identifiable through the construct of the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN) that comprises seven sector groups (banking and finance; communications, energy, food chain, health, transport, and water services), two expert advisory groups (resilience and information technology security), one oil and gas security forum and various issues-driven communities of interest (Trusted Information Sharing Network, n.d.).
WHAT IS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE RESILIENCE?

Having settled the concept and definition of CI, what then is CIR? While the term CIR is cemented in the Australian CI policy, its concept and definition is diverse both internationally and within Australia. The meaning of resilience itself varies to the extent it has become somewhat of a catch-all term (Gibson & Tarrant, 2010; McAslan, 2010a, 2010b; Ridley, 2011). McAslan (2010a) identifies the long and rich history of the term and concept of resilience noting its introduction into the English language in the Seventeenth Century, its use in the nineteenth century in materials science and its much later introduction to ecology and the environment.

In describing the origin, meaning, and evolution of the term and concept of resilience, McAslan (2010a, p. 1) also notes the term itself has, in less than a decade, “evolved from the disciplines of materials science and environmental studies to become a concept used liberally and enthusiastically by policy makers, practitioners and academics.” Its adoption and integration in federal CI policy in Australia is no exception (see for example Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a; Commonwealth of Australia, 2010b).

As Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003, p. 41) identify, “defining resilience is clearly challenging.” Defining resilient infrastructure offers a further challenge. Boone and Hart (2012) note the proliferation of both literature and policy related to CIR and identify the complexity and difficulty in linking individual works to the broader body of knowledge. Noting the inherent difficulties in capturing CIR as a field of work, and drawing from military concepts, they set out, in respect of CI, the concept of full spectrum resilience (FSR): an organising principle “which relates individual elements of critical infrastructure work and scholarship to each other and to the body as a whole” (Boone & Hart, 2012, p. 4).

The concept of FSR has been designed as a form of classification to make sense of the range of “scholarship, research, publications, codes and standards for protection into a coherent whole” (Boone & Hart, 2012, p. 6). It makes a significant contribution to both scholarship and practice. FSR comprises three aspects: levels of resilience (strategic, operational and tactical); range of impact (national, regional, community, individual); and the all hazards environment (terrorism, accident, earth effect and deterioration) and offers one way of classifying and analysing CIR related policies and programs within a matrix of forty-eight different categories (Boone & Hart, 2012, pp. 5-6). In doing so, it
offers a practical way of articulating the focus and limits of specific policies and programs, how policies and programs can or should relate to each other, and a mechanism for assessing gaps in policies and programs (Boone & Hart, 2012, p. 6). While the focus of FSR is “establish a coherent framework for thinking about all related aspects of resilience and the body of knowledge as a whole,” its architects also identify that it should not limit creative thought (Boone & Hart, 2012, p. 6).

While individual policies and programs can be mapped within the matrix of FSR, within Australian federal policy, CIR has been conceptualised in four specific ways that risk being lost in the FSR matrix. In particular, in Australian federal policy, CIR has evolved and been conceptualised as: a policy concept; as a business model (organisational resilience); as cyber systems; and as engineering design and strategic asset management. Understanding the very different ways critical infrastructure resilience has been conceptualised in Australian policy will provide a stronger basis for policy analysis and evaluation.

1—Policy Concept

The adoption of CIR as a dominant policy concept in the Australian Government’s CI protection arrangements can be considered evolutionary, that shifted from a specific focus on terrorism to one incorporating consideration of broader threats and hazards. The practical impact of this is that for a broader range of infrastructures, a broader range of threats have been incorporated into the policy framework. Two policy concepts were at the core of the Australian VI Program of the 1980s and 1990s: a focus on terrorism that applied to VIs, and a broader focus on disruptions that applied to VNIs. The focus of the VI Program was on identifying and ensuring ‘adequate protective and contingency measures for installations in the program’ (Sheldrick, 1986, p. 518). Mr Roger Holdich, AM, who was formerly Deputy Secretary, Department of the Special Minister of State, and formerly Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, described how the two policy concepts co-existed within the VI Program:

[by 1986] Australia’s counter-terrorism arrangements were primarily focused around prevention and protection measures.

The planning to protect vital national installations was what would now be termed the ‘all-hazards’ approach to contingency planning. It included development of contingency plans for natural and accidental hazards, damage mitigation, alternative supply of products, restoration of supply
following loss or impairment of functions and counter-terrorist protective and reactive measures (R. Holdich, personal communication, July 25, 2011).

In 1986, Mr Holdich, at the direction of the then Special Minister of State, conducted a review of Australia’s counterterrorism capabilities. His report has never been released publicly.

The VI Program had effectively lapsed by the time of the 9/11 terrorist attacks that drew a significant and sustained policy response from the Australian government focused on CI protection (O'Donnell, 2011). The multi-pronged policy response to 9/11 included the formalisation and enhancement of a structured government and industry consultation forum in the form of the TISN that built on earlier arrangements. Mr Mike Rothery, who is First Assistant Secretary, National Security Resilience Policy Division, Attorney-General’s Department, explained that the policy response also included the establishment of the CI Protection Program in 2003 that would, from the outset, take a focus beyond terrorism to include CI protection in the face of increasing risks and hazards (M. Rothery, personal communication, November 1, 2012). Mr Rothery has also clarified the development of, and at times subtle differences in policy concepts:

The decision to form the TISN was taken by Cabinet and arose from the recommendations of the Business Government Taskforce that met in 2002. Built into the TISN model approved by Cabinet was an ‘all hazards’ focus.

In parallel, [the Council of Australian Governments] changed the National Counter-Terrorism Committee to examine [critical infrastructure protection] from a counter-terrorism focus, which naturally focussed on the identification and protection of assets.

The TISN has, since its inception, has taken an ‘all-hazards’ approach albeit with an initial focus on counter-terrorism. However, in recent years there has been a rebalancing/refocusing towards ‘resilience.’ The decision in recent years to ‘drop the P’ in Critical Infrastructure Protection and rename the program Critical Infrastructure Resilience was a deliberate move to ensure there was a differentiation from ‘guns gates and guards’ (M. Rothery, personal communication, June 30, 2011).

In the years leading up to 2009 when the Attorney-General publically announced the Australian Government’s intention to shift the CI Protection Program to a resilience footing, Australia’s federal CI policy continued to further incorporate
resilience thinking. This is seen through the formation in 2007 of the TISN Resilience Community of Interest, the 2007 review of the Australian Government’s CI Protection Program that recommended the program shift to a focus on resilience, the 2008 review of Australia’s homeland and border security arrangements that noted resilience was a feature of CI policy and should be promoted, and the 2009 review of CI protection arrangements that identified limitations in a singular focus on either counterterrorism or all-hazards (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a). In 2010 and in directly articulating resilience as an overarching goal, the Australian Government released its Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy, that linked CI to resilience in the following way:

The aim of this Strategy is the continued operation of critical infrastructure in the face of all hazards, as this critical infrastructure supports Australia’s national defence and national security, and underpins our economic prosperity and social well-being. More resilient critical infrastructure will also help to achieve the continued provision of essential services to the community. . . .

It is important to note that some elements of critical infrastructure are not assets, but are in fact networks or supply chains. For example, bringing food from the paddock to the plate is dependent not only on particular key facilities, but also on a complex network of producers, processors, manufacturers, distributors and retailers and the infrastructure supporting them. In the context of critical infrastructure, resilience refers to:

- coordinated planning across sectors and networks;
- responsive, flexible and timely recovery measures; and
- the development of an organisational culture that has the ability to provide a minimum level of service during interruptions, emergencies and disasters, and return to full operations quickly.

In this way, building capacity in organisations to be agile, adaptive and to improve by learning from experience is part of the concept of CIR. (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a, p. 8).

It is evident then, that CIR as a policy concept draws from the all-hazards policy concept and the concept of organisational resilience. Incorporating organisational resilience as part of the CIR policy concept extends the policy reach because of its clear impact on the owners and operators of CI assets.
2—Business Model (Organisational Resilience)

At the time the Vital Points Program was proposed by Justice Hope in 1979, the majority of key civil infrastructures were owned and operated by the state (either the federal or state and territory governments) (Commonwealth of Australia, 1979a; O'Donnell, 2011). However, the 1980s and 1990s saw a shift in ownership of key civil infrastructure assets to the private sector (such as telecommunications, energy, transportation and banking) to the extent that the majority of CI in Australia is now privately owned, or operated on a commercial basis (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a; Rudd, 2008). The influence of the shift in ownership and operation of CI assets from the state to the private sector is clearly seen through the emergence and adoption of a policy focus that includes organisational resilience and promotion of the concept that “good security is good for business” (see for example Commonwealth of Australia, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012b).

McAslan (2010b) argues the concept of organisational resilience itself is relatively new, emerging in 2003 as a management concept. However, in much the same way Brown (2006) identifies the term CI and not the concept of CI emerged in the 1980s, Kendra and Wachtendorf (2003) artfully analyse the rich seam of earlier organisational literature on which concepts of organisational resilience draw. While a precise definition of organisational resilience has not been settled, clarity is being pursued through the development of an International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) standard for organisational resilience based on the Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness and Continuity Management Systems standard developed in 2009 by ASIS International (McAslan, 2010a).

In noting the complexity of the concept of organisational resilience, McAslan (2010b, p. 1), describes it as the “ability of organisations to recover and return to normality after facing an alarming and often unexpected threat” and notes (2010b, p. 15) there remains some confusion on how best to apply the concept in a reliable and consistent manner.” Gibson and Tarrant (2010, p. 6) view organisational resilience as complex and multi-dimensional, more than simply an organisation’s ability to bounce back from adversity, as being founded in the understanding and treatment of risk and vulnerabilities, and something able to be conceptualised in a variety of ways.
Since its emergence as a term and concept, organisational resilience, has gained policy momentum to the extent of its formal adoption into Australian national security policy, in particular as part of CI policy and disaster management policy (see for example Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a, 2010b; Council of Australian Governments, 2011). Further, the construct of organisational resilience as a key part of the business model for CI assets, was formally endorsed as part of the Australian Government’s Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy to ‘help achieve the resilience of critical infrastructure in the face of unforeseen or unexpected hazards’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a, p. 12). It placed responsibility on achieving resilience with the owners and operators of CI by encouraging a business model that incorporates a focus on organisational resilience. It further identified the need to “promote a common understanding of, and body of knowledge about, organisational resilience” and in pursuit of this, has released a range of policy support documents (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 1).

The Australian Government recognises that organisational resilience is complex, is one aspect of the broader construct of resilience and means different things to different people (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 2). Within this policy context, the onus is broadly placed on businesses to pursue organisational resilience and to adopt management strategies to suit the individual business needs.

3—Cyber Systems

As noted, in Australia’s federal policy context, the concepts and definitions of CI shifted over time from a specific focus on physical assets to include information technologies and communication networks. The policy frameworks for both CI as physical assets and CI as information infrastructure essentially developed simultaneously and have converged to the extent that achieving the overarching objectives of the 2010 Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy is reliant on resilient networked systems.

In 1997, as the term CI was tentatively used in Australian emergency management policy discourse, the Australian Government was considering measures to protect Australia’s national information infrastructure (NII), noting that information networks were at the core of Australia’s “political, strategic and socio-economic well-being” (Attorney-General's Department, 1998, p. 1). In August 1997, Australia’s Secretaries’ Committee on National Security
considered *Australia’s National Information Infrastructure: Threats and Vulnerabilities*, a classified report prepared by the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) earlier that year that focused on information infrastructure (a grouping of information and communications systems) which at the time was distinguished from physical infrastructure (Attorney-General's Department, 1998).

While the Australian Government did, at the time, note that the US took a broader view and considered both physical and cyber systems in what it considered CI, its focus did include an all-hazards approach to the protection of the NII (Attorney-General's Department, 1998, p. 8). Importantly, DSD identified key industry groupings relevant to the NII (telecommunications, banking and finance, transportation, energy, water supply, information services and emergency services), essentially the same industry groups as those identified under the broader CI policy (Attorney-General's Department, 1998). Mr Ian Carnell, who was formerly the Deputy-Secretary Attorney-General’s Department and former Inspector-General of Intelligence and Security, explained that the growing policy focus on NII in the 1990s:

> In the 1990s, the security focus was increasingly on e-crime, cyber-vulnerabilities and IT system security. The lead up to Y2K helped bring this to the fore and this focus from a policy perspective was supported by the Defence Signals Directorate (I. Carnell, personal communication, July 13, 2011).

At the same time, Australian policymakers were taking a policy cue from the US and their focus on CI and information infrastructure. Mr Peter Ford, who was formerly the First Assistant Secretary, Information and Security Law Division, Attorney-General’s Department, explained how this occurred:

> In around 1997 I met with a visiting US delegation from the State Department. The US delegation suggested that bilateral engagement on what they described as the protection of critical information infrastructure would be valuable. The US delegation described the consultative arrangements in place with government and owners and operators of critical information infrastructure in the US.

> I reported on the talks with the US Delegation to the Attorney-General and recommended that Australia set up a somewhat similar consultative arrangement with the owners and operators of critical infrastructure. At the time, a key focus at the time was on critical infrastructure which was considered to be telecommunications, essential government services, public
utilities, transport services and food distribution. The Attorney-General agreed (P. Ford, personal communication, July 25, 2011).

Since then, the complex networked systems that underpin CI have continued to gain policy attention to the extent that cyber security forms an integral part of the overall CIR structure and arrangements. This is particularly evident in the ongoing work of CERT Australia (Australia’s national computer emergency response team), the IT Expert Advisory Group formed as part of the TISN structure, the 2009 Cyber Security Strategy and the 2010 Achieving IT Resilience: Summary Report for CIOs and CSOs (see Commonwealth of Australia, 2009, 2012a; TISN for Critical Infrastructure Resilience, 2004; Trusted Information Sharing Network for Critical Infrastructre Protection, 2010).

4—Engineering Design and Strategic Asset Management

McAslan (2010a, p. 2), identifies that while the term resilience entered the English language in the Seventeenth Century, it first appeared in scholarly work in 1818 as a term describing the rebound properties of timber. From this beginning, it gained further traction in the mid-eighteenth century through the concept of the modulus of resilience, ‘a means of assessing the ability of materials to withstand severe weather conditions’ later adopted by the UK’s Institute of Civil Engineers (McAslan, 2010a, p. 2). By the late-eighteenth century, resilience was formally defined as:

> a measure of a material to withstand impact, for if a shock or sudden blow be produced by a falling body, its intensity depends upon the weight and the height through which it has fallen, that is, upon its kinetic energy or work. Hence the higher resilience of a material the greater its capacity to endure work that may be performed upon it. The modulus of resilience is a measure of this capacity within the elastic limits only’ (Merriman 1885 cited in McAslan, 2010a).

In the twenty-first century, the modulus of resilience remains part of design codes used by civil and mechanical engineers as well as naval architects (McAslan, 2010a, p. 2). While significant technical and scholarly thought has been given over to resilience in the engineering and design fields and in terms of strategic asset management, it is noteworthy that within Australian federal CI policy does not specifically integrate it within the CIR policy framework. Rather, in the Australian federal CI policy context, resilience in terms of engineering design and strategic asset management is seen as an outcome (M. Rothery, personal communication, November 1, 2012).
As a result, in policy the onus rests with owners and operators of CI to ensure that relevant engineering and technical design and asset management meets relevant corporate needs and risk profiles (M. Rothery, personal communication, November 1, 2012). That one of the key success criteria of the Critical Infrastructure Resilience Strategy (Commonwealth of Australia, 2010a, p. 26) is “the need for investment in resilient, robust infrastructure being considered in market regulation decisions,” reinforces the subtlety in how CIR has been conceptualised in terms of engineering design and strategic asset management and therefore drawn within the policy framework. Within this policy context, Yates (2003) identifies the contribution the discipline of engineering can make to the protection of CI in Australia.

SUMMARY AND FURTHER RESEARCH

Since entering the policy discourse in the 1980s in the US and the 1990s in Australia, the definition of CI has evolved and developed. In Australia the definition of CI has been stable since the mid-2000s. We collectively know what we are talking about when we talk about CI. While this is the case for CI, it can be concluded that the same is not true for how scholars and policymakers alike have considered resilience and its application to CI policy both in Australia and internationally. As identified, concepts of resilience and critical infrastructure resilience are still evolving. Applying concepts of resilience to infrastructure protection has seen the emergence in Australian federal policy of four distinct yet interrelated ways of conceptualising resilient infrastructure. Considered separately, no one conceptualisation is complete and can achieve the policy intent of “achieving resilient critical infrastructure.”

While prima facie the conceptualisations appear disparate, they are on close analysis wholly interdependent. In the absence of legislation or regulation mandating approaches to protection and recovery across all the CI sectors, the policy intent of “achieving resilient critical infrastructure” can only be achieved through the government working with the owners and operators of CI. In Australia, the majority of CI is privately owned or operated on a commercial basis.

The policy goal of “achieving resilient critical infrastructure” is then in turn dependent on these diverse privately-owned and operated businesses individually embracing both organisational resilience (in terms of business models), and management of the physical infrastructures (in terms of effective
engineering design and strategic asset management). Individual infrastructures are then in turn supported by, and dependent on, robust cyber systems that provide both business and infrastructure enabling functions. While FSR offers a significant contribution to connecting resilience thinking in terms of CIR policy, in Australia it should be approached with caution. This is because it is underpinned by an assumption that the concept of resilience and its application to CI is settled. What the Australian situation demonstrates this is far from the case.

By drawing on its historical context, this paper sets out one way in which federal critical infrastructure resilience policy can be better understood and analysed in the Australian context. By identifying the ways in which “resilience thinking” has been incorporated into policy, it also provides a lens through which future policy change can be assessed and evaluated. However, the ways in which Australian states and territories have conceptualised and embodied resilience thinking within their respective policy frameworks remains under researched. It is only through extending research into these policy areas that a more complete picture of how critical infrastructure resilience has been conceptualised in Australia will emerge.

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Research Article

ROYAL COMMISSIONS INTO POLICING—AUSTRALIA

Alan Beckley‡

Royal Commissions and Inquiries have investigated every police force in Australia in relation to their integrity, accountability and effectiveness—a factor of major importance to every citizen in maintaining their freedom, safety and security. The crucial question this paper poses is whether such tribunals are effective or otherwise in terms of the benefits and outcomes accrued from their findings. The paper is in the form of a critical discussion which investigates and analyses the Inquiries using the method of desk research of official documents over the last 50 years from which it identifies common findings and recommendations contained in the official discourse. The research concludes that lessons have not been learned in relation to policing operations, accountability and integrity in a number of cases and highlights a variety of adverse issues that persist into current policing practice.

Keywords: Policing, corruption, misconduct, royal commissions, public inquiries

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to address a vital question regarding the effectiveness of Royal Commissions and Inquiries in terms of the benefits and outcomes accrued from their findings. In other words, does this mode of official discourse achieve what it sets out to do? This paper examines only those inquiries which have investigated the police and policing organisations with the purposes of establishing their integrity, accountability or effectiveness, efficiency and economy or otherwise over the last 50 years in Australia.

These are important issues as they directly relate to the ability of a state or territory to maintain peace, tranquillity and good order within its jurisdiction in order to enhance the public safety and security of its citizens. Indeed, in

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democratic policing systems, “what the police do critically affects the character of government” (Bayley, 2006:17); it is that important. According to New South Wales Police Force (NSWF, 2013), the modern mission of the police is to protect the community and property by: preventing, detecting and investigating crime; monitoring and promoting road safety; maintaining social order; performing and coordinating emergency and rescue operations. These functions relate back to the historical origins of the ‘New Police’ formed in the Nineteenth Century under the innovative Home Secretary, Sir Robert Peel in England who also established that the police could not operate effectively in democratic societies without the support of the public, as outlined in the famous nine principles of policing (Bronitt & Stenning, 2011). Royal Commissions and Inquiries are appointed to inquire into specific incidents or issues in society with the intention of the investigation being independent, objective and fair to ensure that the findings are accepted as valid by the majority of the stakeholders in society.

Readers might be surprised that the large number of such inquiries in Australia total more than 60, but the fashion for such formal inquiries changed during the 1990s when the first “independent oversight” bodies began to be appointed in a variety of models (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013). From that time the number of Royal Commissions diminished considerably in favour of inquiries originated by independent oversight bodies which were given their respective unique constitution by State and Federal governments. As reported elsewhere (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013), the oversight bodies in Australia all have different powers, roles and responsibilities, but the common feature is that they all have similar powers to those of Royal Commissions.

Independent oversight bodies were preferred because of their ‘standing’ nature; in that they could maintain a continuous and permanent scrutiny over the issue in question, whereas commissions and inquiries are set up as a ‘one-off’ organization whose work finishes after a final report when the inquiry team is disbanded. In addition, the oversight bodies were intended to build public support and trust over a longer period and several included facilities for research, investigation and training (Prenzler & Faulkner, 2010; Prenzler, 2011). Thus, the “set piece” ad hoc Royal Commission usually chaired by a high profile senior judge was superseded by statutorily defined organisations and their staffs of permanent or temporary investigators, sometimes of seconded police officers.
This paper will not examine the work of independent oversight bodies other than to identify them as the preferred method of the future to monitor police accountability (Prenzler, 2011). The content will include some descriptions of the topics investigated by Royal Commissions from around Australia and list the conclusions from these with the objective of identifying the changes (if any) of approach and attitude of the staff of police organisations (Lauchs et al., 2009) towards human rights and police ethics between 1963 and today. At the start of the period covered by this paper senior and executive police officers appeared reluctant to discuss or get involved in discussion (Finnane & Myrtle, 2011) about these subjects; indeed, they were accused of turning a blind eye to some human rights issues such as the treatment of indigenous people (Andrews, 1963; Sydney Morning Herald, 1963 May 4). From that date, the attitude of the police shows a more positive approach towards a duty of care for all citizens (e.g. NSWPS, 2007).

In fact, there was no independent oversight of police forces in Australia in 1963, the first Ombudsman being appointed soon after (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013). If there was a complaint against police actions or concerns about police corruption, these allegations were investigated internally by police officers, mostly operating from the “Internal Affairs” or “Professional Standards” department. For most onlookers, this was not a satisfactory situation of “the police investigating themselves” for a variety of reasons, not least the lack of openness, transparency and accountability (Lion, 2010).

High levels of legitimacy, integrity and accountability are essential to an effective system of policing in democratic countries. This recipe goes back to the founding principles of policing attributed to Sir Robert Peel (Bronitt & Stenning, 2011) and has been consistently asserted subsequently (Prenzler, 2004). Public and political pressure on police organisations has meant the necessity (Lewis, 1994:96) for the introduction of independent oversight arrangements for all police forces in Australia (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013), but this paper will examine the years between 1963 and 2004 which was the halcyon era of Royal Commissions.

TYPES AND FUNCTIONS OF INQUIRIES

In Australia it is recognised that there are three types of ad hoc tribunals of inquiry: Royal Commissions of inquiry; boards or commissions of inquiry; and parliamentary select committees. The functions of such inquiries, which are
invested with considerable means to uncover the truth using coercive powers, are to investigate socially impactive incidents such as: social evil; natural and man-made disasters; personal or corporate misdemeanour alleged or real (Borchardt, 1991:8). Borchardt, an expert on Royal Commissions through his assiduous tracking of their business (Borchardt, 1978), states that the history of inquiries such as Royal Commissions held under Royal Letters Patent goes back to the Twelfth Century in England. Several other authors (Gilligan, 2002; Hallett, 1982:17; Kennedy, 2004:13) trace the history back even further to “the first Royal Commission”; the Domesday Book commissioned by King William I (William the Conqueror) between the years of 1080 and 1086 with the purpose of recording all property from which to tax the people of England.

In Australia, since its European colonization, a different type of tribunal has been developed, generally regarded as inferior to the royal commission, but nevertheless as authoritative, influential and powerful as its royal cousin; called the “Board of Inquiry,” or committees or commissions of inquiry (Hallett, 1982:14). These appear to have been modelled on the military “Courts of Inquiry” and copied from the experiences of the early naval and military colonial governors in Australia (Hallett, 1982:19; Borchardt, 1991:10). The Chairman of the Beach Police Inquiry (1976), on day one of its sitting, made it very clear that for all practical purposes, there was no difference between a Board of Inquiry and a Royal Commission (Hallett, 1982:14).

The third type of inquiry, the parliamentary committee, is every bit as powerful but seems to be less popular in Australia than in England in the last few centuries. According to Borchardt (1991:11), there are three types of inquiry: “(i) Investigatory—appointed to establish the facts of a situation and to make recommendations to government on matters of policy; (ii) Inquisitorial – set up to determine, in the manner of the police, the facts of an incident or events of the past; (iii) Advisory—to formulate the basis of government policy.” The types of inquiry become apparent when one examines some issues that have been investigated.

**TYPES OF ISSUES INVESTIGATED**

Royal Commissions investigating policing frequently result from three basic sources: mass media “exposés” of police corruption/maladministration; political pressure to establish an inquiry (or sometimes to ease or defray political pressure) following exposure of police wrong-doing; “whistle-blowers” and internal
informants exposing corruption, misconduct or maladministration. A combination of this model formula is certainly how the Fitzgerald inquiry was initiated (Prenzler, 2009) and several others such as Wood (1997) which followed a similar process.

The formation of any sort of tribunal of inquiry is said (Borchardt, 1991:19) to be a last resort in politics as the legal systems in democratic countries such as Australia and the UK are perfectly capable of dealing with crimes directed against the state or persons. However, Borchardt (1991:20) argues that the composition of the commissioners appointed to inquiries is not impartial as they are nominated by the government of the day which could result in nepotism. In any event, the cost of inquiries is tremendous and the process takes a long time to eventually publish its report. According to Gilligan (2002) there have been too many Royal Commissions in Australia which have merely been used to “defuse an issue.”

Although Royal Commissions in England were largely replaced by departmental committees, their popularity remained in Australia; for example, overall, there were 74 Royal Commissions in Australia since 1970 but only 11 in England (Gilligan, 2002). Royal Commissions are conferred with wide-ranging and effective coercive powers for compelling attendance, producing documents, interviewing and compelling answers, and “contempt of court” (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013). Normal rules of criminal law evidence do not apply as there is no “defence” and “prosecution” but witnesses need to be prepared for all eventualities. For example, during the Teague Inquiry (2009) into the Victorian Bushfires, Ms Christine Nixon, ex-Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police claimed to be a victim when giving her evidence as she did not anticipate, nor was prepared, that the press and politicians were looking for a scapegoat for the loss of life from the fires (Nixon, 2011:318).

METHOD
The author conducted a survey of Royal Commissions and Inquiries in Australia that were commissioned between 1963 and the current day in order to establishing the number and types. The focus of the survey was related to policing, human rights, and police ethics issues that have occurred in all Australian States and Territories. The numbers are: Australian Federal Police 1; Commonwealth 17; New South Wales 14; Northern Territories 1; Queensland 7; South Australia 5; Tasmania 2; Victoria 9; Western Australia 4; total 60. These
data were obtained from a number of literature searches over a period of several years.

The main sources of information were: official reports of Royal Commissions and Inquiries; peer-reviewed journal articles and books relevant to the subject matter; information in the public domain from websites such as state, territory and government websites, and newspaper and television reports. Initial searches were conducted from the Australian National Library (Trove); the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM) Catalogue, and; the Library & Information Services of the NSW Police Force (Goulburn). Keywords for the searches were: “accountability,” “ethics,” “integrity,” “inquiries,” “oversight,” “police as subject of law & civil proceedings,” “police corruption,” “police or policing,” “royal commissions.”

The Inquiries disclosed by the searches were analysed from the perspectives of their themes and the human rights and fundamental freedoms that were infringed. Having described a brief history of Royal Commissions and Inquiries into policing in Australia, this paper will now move on to an analysis of their investigations.

ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH ON ROYAL COMMISSIONS AND INQUIRIES

The author considers that the Inquiries which had the most impact in terms of their wide-ranging effects on policing policies, practices and procedures and police organization structures were, in chronological order: the Beach Inquiry (1976) in Victoria; the Grieve Inquiry (1983) in South Australia; the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) in Queensland; the Wood Inquiry (1997) in New South Wales; the Harrison Inquiry (1997) into the Australian Federal Police; the Kennedy Inquiry (2004) in Western Australia. Upon analysis of relevant documents, what strikes the researcher is the remarkable consistency of the 60 Royal Commissions over the 50 years that were studied. That consistency is in the specific themes of the investigations, those lines of inquiry that they were asked to carry out in their terms of reference, which can be condensed into four major themes.

Themes of Inquiries

The largest number of investigations was into police accountability (19) or perhaps lack of accountability to operate in an open, honest and ethical manner.
The worst example of this is the horrifying complacency and lack of care displayed in some of the cases relating to deaths in police custody of Indigenous people (Johnston, 1991). The Johnston Royal Commission actually drew together the findings of inquiries into 99 aboriginal deaths in custody and despite the “no smoke without fire” suppositions and suspicions, the final report stated: “Commissioners did not find that the deaths were the product of deliberate violence or brutality by police or prison officers” (paragraph 1.2.2). However, the Commissioners did find that police officers lacked training in safeguarding the care, health and welfare of persons in custody.

The second highest subject of inquiry was corruption (15), and several Royal Commissions found systemic corruption; for example the Fitzgerald Inquiry found corruption (Prenzler, 2009:45) from the bottom to the very top of the Queensland Police Service; the Police Commissioner was found guilty of corruption and served a sentence of imprisonment. The other top themes were about the structure (Lusher, 1981), infrastructure or formation of police organisations (13) such as the establishment of the Australian Federal Police (Mark, 1978) and about specific police operations that went badly wrong (12) such as that examined by Morling (1987). This Royal Commission inquired into the wrongful conviction of Lindy Chamberlain over the death of her child who she rightly identified as being abducted and killed by a dingo in Northern Territory. The Chamberlain family was finally exonerated in July 2012 (after four inquests) from involvement in the death of baby Azaria at Uluru in 1980 (Bradley, 2013: 185–186); from the outset there were concerns over the police investigation and collection of evidence at the crime scene (Puddy, 2012).

The Royal Commissions and Inquiries in the preceding section illustrate how, if the accountability of police is less than optimum it can have fatal and terrible consequences. Being armed with lethal weapons and having additional coercive powers to those of the general public, police officers have been criticized many times for using excessive force (HLRC, 2011) out of proportion to the threat they faced (OPI, 2009; Ralston, 2013; Sydney Morning Herald, 2013). Also, criticisms have been levelled by the use of “less than lethal force” options such as Taser weapons (CCC, 2010; Olding & Davies, 2013) which sometimes end in fatal injuries.

On the subject of police corruption, Punch (2000) stated it is not possible to eradicate it entirely, although there is a need to monitor its presence constantly (Beckley, 2012:287) and take measures to reduce or mitigate its effects within
the police service and on members of the community (Beckley et al., 2012). Following from this point, one of the Inquiries into the structure of police (Lusher, 1981) found that there were serious management deficiencies in the police and there were inadequate procedures towards the prevention of likelihood of corruption.

Police forces in Australia are generally managed through a centralised structure with a “command and control” style of leadership; perhaps it is time to devolve power and finance away from headquarters and adopt a more localised and service-oriented approach (Goodman-Delahunty et al., 2012). This comment could be utilised to address the criticisms of failings of police operations and management (Beckley, 1997:211) as professional police officers should not make assumptions or rely on “stereotypes” when dealing with incidents; there should be an emphasis on customer service and quality of service (NSWPF, 2009).

Human Rights Issues

The subject matter of the investigations of the Royal Commissions and Inquiries can also be viewed from the perspective of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of citizens of Australia; Inquiries have been held into a wide ranging variety of police infringements on personal liberty and human rights. Because not all Australian States and Territories have specific human rights legislation (Gans et al., 2011:9–10), the contents of Inquiries were analysed against the Articles of the international standard of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948).

Not surprisingly, because the fundamental principle of policing is to safeguard the safety and security of members of the community, the overwhelming majority (38) of the Inquiries’ investigations were in that category. Inquiries into safety and security are exemplified in Fitzgerald (1989) leading to Operation Tesco (CMC, 2011) and in New South Wales, the Wood Commission (1997). There have also been a number of inquiries into child protection (Sturgess, 1985; Wood, 2008).

Relating to the fundamental right of the right to life, the inquiry into deaths in custody (Johnston, 1991) is a prime example. The case of the wrongful conviction of Lindy Chamberlain (Morling, 1987; Puddy, 2012) and other cases of wrongful conviction following unlawful arrest have been the subject of inquiries (Lee, 1990). There have been many inquiries which relate to privacy or
the right to private and family life which mainly revolve around freedom from government “snooping,” interception of communications or unlawfully keeping information on citizens (Hope, 1977; Mitchell, 1978; Samuels & Codd, 1995; Stewart, 1986; White, 1977). An inquiry into freedom of assembly investigated police tactics at a public demonstration that was held in Adelaide, South Australia (Bright, 1971). An example of discrimination against police staff internally in the organization was disclosed by the Ronalds (2006) inquiry which found sexual harassment and sexual discrimination in New South Wales Police Force (then “Service”).

Research by Goodman-Delahunty et al. (n.d.) identified 14 human rights specifically relevant to operational policing issues within the Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948) whereby actions of police officers could infringe the human rights of citizens in the process of the use of their police powers. Police powers should be used judiciously, fairly and proportionately (Beckley, 2000:18); the Inquiries listed above have investigated police for possible infringements of six or more of the human rights discussed in Goodman-Delahunty et al. (n.d.); many have found that police powers were used indiscriminately or excessively. This paper will now examine some of the findings and recommendations of the Inquiries.

FINDINGS

When researching the findings and allegations from the Royal Commissions and Inquiries there are again some consistencies and similarities that stretch across the years. Those depicted in the table 1 are from six authoritative Royal Commissions that cross Australia and have had the most impact on policing.

Between the Inquiries dated 1976 and 2004, a period of 28 years, the main allegations relate to police corruption and police involvement in serious criminal activities. This can only lead to the assumption that many of the conclusions of the royal commissions have not been heeded or effectively addressed by police organisations and police executives over the many years since 1963; the evidence is clear if the few sources listed in previous sections of this article are investigated (e.g. Fitzgerald, 1989).
Table 1: Findings/Allegations of Inquiries (not all proved)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serious criminal activity</th>
<th>Corruption</th>
<th>Excessive political interference</th>
<th>Negative police culture</th>
<th>Conspiring to give false evidence</th>
<th>Assault/excessive use of force</th>
<th>Harassment and intimidation</th>
<th>Perjury and fabrication of evidence</th>
<th>Failing to investigate complaints effectively / lack of independence</th>
<th>Suppression of evidence</th>
<th>Unlawful arrest</th>
<th>Improper disclosure of information</th>
<th>Poor leadership</th>
<th>Gender Issues</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
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42
Harrison (2004) made the point that the very same issues were the subject of that investigation as the recommendations from the Wood Royal Commission (Wood, 1997) 14 years earlier. A 2010 inquiry in Queensland identified the same issues (CMC, 2010). In table 1 readers might suspect apparent wilful blindness or complacency by police organisations into the frequency and lack of response to serious problems such as serious criminal activity, corruption and improper disclosure of information featuring strongly in Inquiries across the years. When the recommendations from Inquiries are studied, they again appear consistent and are depicted in the table 2.

### Table 2: Recommendations of Inquiries

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Independent Oversight of Police</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Police Complaints system</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New corruption prevention strategy</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civilian input/ Tertiary training</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Change to recruitment</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New promotion / appraisal system</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New organizational structure</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Community policing</td>
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<tr>
<td>Professionalization</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>New police procedures</td>
<td>✓</td>
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Two of the most consistently present recommendations in the six main Inquiries into policing in Australia were that of independent oversight of the police and new systems to manage complaints against police. As outlined in the introduction to this paper, before 1963 police organisations carried out investigations into their own staff internally whether the matter was minor or major and without the safeguard of scrutiny from any outside agency.

The above Inquiries recommended that the former situation was not adequate or acceptable to achieve integrity and accountability into police forces; such matters were too important to leave to the good intentions, competency and rigour of internal investigators. They should be subject to the intense external scrutiny of an independent, open, transparent and unimpeachable nature (Goodman-Delahunt et al., 2012). Further research by the author has not revealed that ideal situation (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013) and it should be noted that the recommendations in the Inquiries were implemented somewhat haphazardly.

In Victoria, although Beach reported in 1976, none of his recommendations were activated (Skelton & Shiel, 2004) until a subsequent report implemented a selection of them (Norris, 1978). A Deputy Ombudsman (Police Complaints) was appointed in 1988, then the Office of Police Integrity (2004) and finally (2012), the Independent Broad-based Anti-Corruption Commission (IBAC) which covers all public sector organisations (Proust, 2012). South Australia did, in fact, introduce the Police Complaints Authority in 1985 following the Grieve Report and will shortly introduce a wider based corruption commission similar to that in Victoria. Queensland introduced the Criminal Justice Commission during the Fitzgerald Inquiry (1989) which developed into the broader-based Crime and Misconduct Commission in 2001. New South Wales had appointed an Ombudsman in 1979 and, as a result of the Wood Commission, formed the Police Integrity Commission in 1996.

At Federal level, an Ombudsman was in place in 1976 but oversight was enhanced with the introduction of the Commonwealth Law Enforcement Integrity Commissioner in 2006. In Western Australia an Ombudsman was appointed in 1971 followed by the Anti-Corruption Commission (1996) which in turn, as a result of the Kennedy Inquiry, was succeeded by the Corruption and Crime Commission (2004). Northern Territory appointed an Ombudsman in 1976 and that arrangement remains to this day. Tasmania appointed an Ombudsman in 1978 but decided to enhance the capability against corruption by
introducing a wide-ranging Integrity Commission in 2011. (Further details of these arrangements are discussed in another paper by the author: den Heyer and Beckley, 2013) This paper will draw together some conclusions from the recommendations of the Inquiries and whether they were actually implemented.

CONCLUSION

The question arises as to whether royal commissions add value to or are effective in the process of anti-corruption measures in police organisations. Christine Nixon, when answering calls for a royal commission into police corruption during her tenure as chief commissioner in Victoria, while agreeing that the Wood Commission in New South Wales was probably the right thing, she did not want one on her watch:

> But I had also seen the damage the process of a royal commission could bring down on an organization. The paralysing effect on its everyday operations; the devastation of morale, reputation and motivation, the wounds inflicted on public confidence and good police; the loss of community trust; the massive costs; and the exploitation of the ponderousness of the process by some of the very worst offenders, who so often managed to make a quick, clean getaway. There had to be a way to elicit the gains of a royal commission without the time-wasting and the pain, and I felt we were on the right track for that. (Nixon, 2011: 259–260)

In addition to their gargantuan size, cost and their ponderous nature (Chan, 2007; Prasser & Aroney, 2009), one of the major problems, it seems, with Royal Commissions and Inquiries is their lack of authority following their publication. Sometimes this is because a change of government, a change of the situation (Ransley, 2009), but more commonly it is because of lack of will to follow through (Weller, 1994). The problem could even be diminution of political will or lack of perseverance when yielding to opposition by powerful bodies such as police unions (Finnane, 2002:1,8,83; Skelton & Shiel, 2004) as was experienced following the Beach Inquiry (Beach, 1976) and unethical use of political power and/or position (Fitzgerald, 1989; OPI, 2011).

Commissioner Moffitt claimed that his terms of reference were too narrow and that many of his recommendations were not activated and ignored by government (1985:71–75). The Woodward Royal Commission (1979) into Drug Trafficking also made numerous recommendations that were ignored and the
Williams Royal Commission (1980) made 246 recommendations on Drug Trafficking which were largely ignored.

One area in which the Royal Commissions and Inquiries were successful is that they recommended the introduction of the independent oversight bodies which now scrutinise the activities of police forces in most states and territories of Australia (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013:133). In fact only Northern Territory does not have an independent oversight body, contenting itself with oversight by the Ombudsman. It seems timely to consider the future worth and value of Royal Commission and Inquiries, although it should be noted that an investigation was commenced recently into a related matter (McClellan, 2013).

Gilligan (2002) concluded his article on Royal Commissions: “So, love them or hate them, Royal Commissions of Inquiry seem set to remain very much part of Australia’s political landscape for much of the next century as well.” It seems to this author that Gilligan arrived at that conclusion a little too soon in terms of policing inquiries as since that time in the author’s reckoning, there have been only 15 Inquiries, many of which were Parliamentary Inquiries and they appear to be settling down at the rate of only three per year across the whole of Australia. Whereas, if one looks at work being completed by the independent oversight bodies formed in the last few years, their work is plentiful (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013).

The conclusion this study arrives at is that although Royal Commissions commenced with good intentions, they did not achieve many of their objectives, recommendations or outcomes. Subsequent developments introducing independent oversight bodies for police and public sector organisations made the use of Royal Commissions and Inquiries obsolete (den Heyer & Beckley, 2013). Further research should be completed in the area of “official discourse” (Gilligan & Pratt, 2004, p.3) to substantiate this assertion and establish the cost-effectiveness of the ostensible conscience of the nation: Royal Commissions and Inquiries.

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GLOBAL LITERACIES FOR AUSTRALIAN POLICE: THINKING GLOBALLY, POLICING LOCALLY

Douglas Allan

Globalisation, immigration, and advancements in digital and information technologies present a range of complex socio-political, demographic, cultural and technological challenges for policing. Playing out across an increasingly diverse Australian society, these influences are progressively more likely to have a significant impact on policing, requiring a nuanced and flexible policing style with its attendant challenges for police education. Local challenges posed by regional and international migration, and national and international challenges posed by the cross-jurisdictional nature of crime in a global society are key sociological and criminological factors that police education programs must keep pace with. In a time of such global fluidity, it is argued that designers of police curricula must reassess the underlying principles that have historically shaped police education in Australia. This is a critical discussion that examines two key areas associated with globalisation and proposes the adoption of a definition of global literacies as a guiding principle for police education in the twenty-first century. The study concludes by offering three specific recommendations for the redevelopment of future police curricula.

Key Words: global literacies; police education; immigration, technology-aided learning

INTRODUCTION

Encompassing a multitude of significant changes at local and regional levels, globalisation is seen as a catalyst for the transition from local to global interconnectedness (Guttal, 2007; Kennett, 2006). Incorporating a range of complex demographic, cultural and technological changes, globalisation directly influences how police engage with Australian communities.

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When considering the broader topic of globalisation there are two significant aspects associated with this phenomenon that are important to analyse more closely: global migration and advances in digital and information technologies. Global migration with its corresponding demographic transformations enhances societal diversity, bringing into contact individuals and groups from various socio-political, religious and cultural backgrounds. While digital and information technologies compresses both time and distance resulting in increased exposure to information from an increasingly diverse range of sources.

This paper critically analyses the impact that both immigration and advances in digital and information technologies have had on Australian communities. It evidences the need for police education programs to position these influential factors at the center of future curriculum design thinking. The paper concludes by advancing a definition of global literacies framed in the context of Australian policing and makes three recommendations for the refinement of Australian police curricula.

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR POLICE EDUCATION IN A GLOBAL SOCIETY

Global Migration

Immigration and a heightened societal awareness of the cultural, traditional and religious differences between countries and across local and regional communities, influences the interactions between Australian police and their communities. In 2011 the global population moved past 7 billion (United Nations Population Fund, 2011, 2012) and with it global mobility continues to rise. Population movements between developing countries and developed countries, from north to south, from east to west and vice versa have now reached a point where the United Nations estimates that there are currently 214 million people living outside their country of birth (Zlotnik, 2010). This results in increased levels of intercultural contact between dominant and non-dominant cultural groups, both within communities, and through various forms of digital technologies that invade most spheres of life today.

Increased intercultural contact has not resulted in a single recognisable “global culture” (Berry, 2008). Rather intercultural contact results in the concept of acculturation, or “…the dual process of cultural and psychological change that takes place as a result of contact between two or more cultural groups…” (Berry,
Berry (2008) asserts that this may lead to four possible outcomes for global migrants:

- Integration—retaining traditional cultures whilst integrating into the host society;
- Separation—retaining traditional cultures and minimising contact with the host society;
- Marginalization—the loss of traditional cultures and exclusion from the host society; and
- Assimilation—the acquisition of new practices and attitudes from the host society.

The Cultural Diversification of Australian Communities

Recent immigration trends indicate a need for increased police awareness of cultural differences and a corresponding awareness of the potential for cultural displacement. As a nation built on immigration, Australia’s population is projected to increase from 22.7 million in 2011 (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2011) to 35.9 million by the year 2050 (The Treasury, 2010). Edgar (2001) suggests that nearly one third of Australia’s population originates from non-English speaking backgrounds, while the Department of Immigration and Citizenship (2011a) reports that between 2009 and 2010 net overseas migration contributed up to 53% of Australia’s overall population increase. Of this increase, 68.8% of immigrants (Department of Immigration and Citizenship, 2011b) declared their place of birth as outside the Western European and Others Group (United Nations, 2011). Such figures support the likelihood that intercultural contact will continue to increase between cultural groups within Australia. For police this has the potential for more calls for service where cultures intersect, as such this requires a more nuanced and flexible policing style with its attendant challenges for police education.

As Australia’s population continues to grow there is a corresponding expectation that cultural diversity will also increase. Significantly for police, any interaction with the public that either through a lack of cultural awareness or ignorance results in a negative experience for the immigrant may result in a negative acculturation outcome. Such outcomes could include Berry’s (2008) concept of separation where cultural groups opt to deal with rule breaking internally rather than through engagement with law enforcement agencies.
Cultural displacement poses a number of potential challenges for police, particularly when interactions are viewed negatively. Where police action devalues an individual’s perception of their own worth or standing within a community, the outcome is often a reduction in willingness to cooperate and engage with police services. This in turn leads to a rejection of “…influence[s] from the dominant [culture in preference for] a more “traditional” way of life…” Berry (2005, p. 701). Wallace (1956, p. 265) suggests that such “…deliberate, organized, [and] conscious efforts by members of a [minority] society to construct a more satisfying culture...”; one that offers an increased level of socio-cultural familiarity and one that builds identity within groups is instead a more attractive option than integration into the wider community.

The importance of this lies in the concept of developing identity. Tyler (1989) emphasises that people place great value in belonging to, and being part of social units. Consequently a desire to be valued by others within a group or community is critical to the individuals’ perception of standing (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Murphy and Cherney (2010, p. 15) suggest that “…people care about…how others perceive their standing...” and when interactions with institutional services like the police are negative in nature then there is a potential for reduced trust.

**Australian Institutions and the Preservation of Status Quo**

At an institutional level, Australian police forces have a legal and moral obligation to work with diverse communities across Australia. Understanding challenges faced by immigrants and minority cultures therefore becomes critical for police services. Australia’s institutional setting, which includes police services, is premised on a societal acceptance of a “…belief in the legality of enacted rules and the right of those elevated to authority under such rules to issue commands...” (Weber, 1968, p. 215). From an institutional perspective, settlement in Australia subsequently requires an acknowledgement or acceptance of this legal authority as imposed by its institutions. In essence learning how to ‘live’ in Australia requires compliance with institutional laws which often reinforce the cultural norms and practices of a nation’s dominant culture.

Outright compliance with institutional legal authority, without reciprocal levels of cultural engagement by Australian police forces does not constitute integration (Berry, 2008). Rather in instances where police and public interactions are framed in a negative manner, the traditional authority of cultural
communities is undermined. Traditional authority, or authority derived from countless years of traditional practice, is based on the “…established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them…” (Weber, 1968, p. 215). While cultural traditions are deeply rooted in the cultural psyche, institutional or legal authority takes precedence in many situations and as such triggers feelings of cultural mores and rules being devalued or overridden in immigrant communities (Berry, 2008; Weinstein, 2010). Subsequently negative cultural tension between the police and public is likely to lead to assimilation, separation or marginalization, rather than integration.

As a microcosm of the broader Australian society, police services inescapably have a significant role to play in the acculturation process occurring between dominant and non-dominant cultures in Australia. The existence of numerous police policies addressing multiculturalism and the policing of culturally diverse communities indicates an awareness of the importance of working with ethnic communities (New South Wales Police Force, 2011; Queensland Police Service, 2011; South Australia Police, 2011). Yet whether the dominance of Australia’s Anglo-Celtic culture as expressed thorough its institutional setting allows for the integration (retention of traditional cultures whilst integrating into the host society) of non-dominant cultures, or whether it results in assimilation, separation or marginalisation still remains to be seen (Ang, Brand, Noble, & Wilding, 2002).

**Intercultural Education and Police**

While Australia is considered by many as a multicultural society, the adoption of multicultural education as an approach by some police forces (New South Wales Police Force, 2011; Queensland Police Service, 2011; South Australia Police, 2011; Victoria Police, 2008) may actually detract from their good intentioned aims. Coffey (2012, p. 1) suggests that “…unequal power relationships are prevalent…” in institutions and schools as they seek to maintain the status quo through the use of sanctioned and authorised materials. Indeed as police curricula are mandated at the state level (Birzer, 2003; Oliva & Compton, 2010), and predominately by the dominant culture within that state, the ‘voice’ contained within a curriculum perpetuates the core culture while at the same time marginalising non-dominant cultures.
As an educational concept, multicultural education prescribes acceptance, cooperation and harmonious coexistence in culturally diverse communities, however by the 1980s support for this approach began to wane (Portera, 2008). Early global attempts at multicultural education mirrored assimilation by concentrating on assisting immigrant children to learn the host nations languages and secondly by providing immigrant children with the capacity to retain the languages and cultures of their home country so that they could make a return to their country of origin (Coulby, 2006; Portera, 2008). In practice, multicultural education became the exploration of similarities and differences between cultures and cultural groups. In other cases it became a standalone subject for immigrant children used when there was a need. This eventually led to increasing criticism that it assimilated immigrants rather than provided a pedagogy that developed understanding through interaction (Coulby, 2006; Portera, 2008).

Adopting an altogether different political voice is the concept of intercultural education. Suggesting that intercultural education is not a module that can be taught, Coulby (2006, p. 246) suggests rather that it “…is a theme, probably the major theme, which needs to inform the teaching and learning of all subjects.” Coming from an alternative political angle, intercultural education is interested in the intersections of culture and knowledge and in the ways in which they are mutually transformative. Effectively the concept of intercultural education addresses the complexity of a global society (Portera, 2008), which in turn offers police an approach that does not assimilate or study non-dominant cultures from a safe distance.

Rather intercultural education advocates interactive discourse between groups. It addresses problems by approaching community issues from multiple angles, thus allowing problems to be framed within different world views. The benefit of such an approach is that it brings different cultures to a position where the emphasis of learning is placed on interaction and parity rather than the identification of differences and power imbalances. Ultimately intercultural education offers police pedagogy the opportunity to examine a range of challenges facing immigrants as they integrate into Australian society. In doing this intercultural education may assist in the development of recruit’s global literacies so that they are better able to make informed and supported judgments within their evolving communities.
While representing a radical shift for police pedagogy, the movement from a model of education that perpetuates status quo (multicultural education) to one that focuses on the sharing of knowledge and power (intercultural education) is perhaps the best approach to address the development of recruit constable cultural literacies. Intercultural education can address both the need to “...enhanc[e] the capacity, confidence and capabilities of [the] entire workforce, to operate successfully in a culturally, linguistically and religiously diverse environment...” (New South Wales Police Force, 2011, p. 2), while at the same time producing staff that are capable of operating under both problem-oriented and community orientated models of policing.

**Impact of Digital and Information Technologies on Policing**

Perceptions surrounding the exact nature of policing in a modern society are often romanticized by sections of the media depicting a far more exciting profession than what may actually occur in a majority of cases. Indeed far from the depicted car chases and drug raids, Sheptycki suggests that policing is more akin to working within a knowledge society, than in an action orientated skills dominated industry, as police “...spend far less time directly protecting persons and property from crimes than is commonly supposed and far more time processing and exchanging knowledge about crime and insecurity” (1998, p. 59). Castells (2001a, p. 1) defines the concept of a Networked Society as one “...where the key social structures and activities are organised around electronically processed information networks.”

At present information technologies have a central role in the operationalisation of policing services. Nunn (2001) suggests the biggest area of information technology use within modern police forces is in the administration and control of crime. Therefore, in a time dominated by problem and community orientated policing approaches, a shift from reactive to proactive policing is likely to be carried out in a networked manner through an increased use of digital and information technologies (Brown & Brudney, 2003).

Improvements in digital and information technology increasingly influences how officers come into contact with, collate, analyse and manage information. While such a technical evolution has in part been driven by an internal search for greater operational efficiency (Nunn, 2001); external influences have also had substantial impact on the organization of modern day policing. The use of social media by criminal elements creates both challenges
and opportunities for policing. This was illustrated in the United Kingdom during the 2011 London Riots when numerous media organisations reported that social networking sites had been used to organize and instigate looting across parts of Britain (Bowcott, 2011; Lawless, 2011; Osuh, 2011). In the days following the initial outbreak of riots, the ability of both mainstream and social media outlets to spread awareness of the evolving riots in north London led to an increase of copycat disorder across a wider geographic region in a seemingly shorter space of time. This in turn created an element of randomness as to where and when disorder arose.

Police forces around the world now use various forms of social media as part of both their reactive and proactive efforts in maintaining societal stability. In the United Kingdoms’ West Midlands and London areas police forces utilized the very social media sites used by criminals during the riots to publicise photographs of looting suspects (Lee, 2011). In New South Wales Police Force Facebook is used, while other approaches include the use of social network analysis (SNA) as an increasingly viable investigative tool in the fight against crime (Hulst, 2009). Despite advances in information technologies, and an increasing dependence upon those technologies in the workplace, police curricula and classrooms are generally low tech affairs that do not adequately prepare recruit constables for their role in a networked, global knowledge society (Beare, 2000). Therefore, in an industry dominated by knowledge workers and associated technologies, the development of technological literacies becomes increasingly important (Sheptycki, 1998).

**Police Education and Technology**

In academy classrooms traditionally dominated by verbal and textual modes of literacy, and to a lesser extent gestural modes that are typically assessed through behaviourist orientated examinations, other forms of literacy such as digital tends to be overlooked. As such, the measurement of attainment in a majority of cases revolves around written examinations that unduly favor print based reading, writing and verbal literacy skills over a wider range of literacies that are required today (Henderson, 2008).

Permeating nearly every aspect of modern society, the growing range of information technologies has created a shift in how recruits access information; many of whom are now being called the Net Generation or Generation Y (Henderson, 2008; Merritt & Neville, 2002; Treuren & Anderson, 2010; Wilson
& Gerber, 2008). Because the digital literacy profile of the current generation of police recruits is significantly more developed than that of their parents,’ the often heard phrase of new technologies (Henderson, 2008) to this generation no longer reflects their actual experiences with digital and information technology.

Rather students bring with them a broader set of literacies than is given credit for in police education curricula. This change in the pre-employment profile of recruits presents a golden opportunity to harness their expertise in the development of a police curriculum that empowers greater ownership of learning (Henderson, 2008). Despite this, careful consideration must be given to the manner in which digital technologies are introduced into police curriculum. Poorly conceived attempts to introduce digital and information technologies as simply information repositories, offers recruits little in the way of actual knowledge and skills development outside of content acquisition. Instead strategies must add value to a recruit’s portfolio of literacy skills.

In order to add value it is necessary to understand what digital technologies can offer the recruit education process itself. Early educational technologies were primarily repositories for information; where a few deposited, and the majority accessed information to read. Increasingly, such approaches are being replaced by more innovative thinking. A key aspect of Web 2.0 and 3.0 is the increased ability to facilitate interactive collaboration between all users, so that anyone is able to create and communicate a wider range of information to a wider range of recipients (Imperatore, 2009).

With the flexibility of information technology creating new and interesting ways in which to explore a range of educational topics, Web 2.0 and 3.0 technologies engender greater use of the multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1993). At the same time Web 2.0 and 3.0 technologies also present new and innovative ways acquire knowledge and understanding in the search for answers (Barton & Hamilton, 2003). The capacity of users to source, create, and blend information from a wide range of literary sources and, working in collaboration with others to share that learning with a wider audience moves students beyond the passive absorption and recital of explicit knowledge towards a more active model in which the student’s engagement with the digital literacies brings learning to life.

Global Literacies

Increasing levels of immigration and advancements in the development and use of digital and information technology poses unique challenges for the provision
of police education now and into the future. To address such challenges, policing education must begin to reassess the underlying principles that have historically informed curriculum development. A key part of such a reassessment begins with a closer look at the literacies required by police officers in a global society.

In examining the concept of literacies from an Australian police education perspective it is useful to start with definition that as closely as possible describes this concept.

Literacy involves the integration of listening, speaking, reading, writing and critical thinking; it incorporates numeracy. It includes the cultural knowledge that enables the speaker, writer or reader to recognise and use language appropriate to different social situations. For an advanced technological society such as Australia, the goal is an active literacy which allows people to use language to enhance their capacity to think, create and question, in order to participate effectively in society. Australian Council for Adult Literacy Police Statement 1989 cited in (Wickert, 1989).

At its most basic level, literacy is “...using printed and written information to function in society...” (Kirsch, 2001, p. 6). Whether that includes signing one’s name, reading street signs or completing charge sheets, it describes the fundamental skill sets needed to function effectively as a police officer. However, literacy no longer relates solely to print based reading or writing. Richmond, Robinson, & Sachs-Israel (2008) suggest that literacy must increasingly encompass the multitude of methods by which we communicate with each other. Whether in our private, social or professional spheres of life, any definition must reflect both the diverse range of literacies used in modernity, while at the same time acknowledging the manner in which globalisation modifies the coding and decoding of such communications.

Policing in a knowledge society has evolved to the extent that police are often faced with large amounts of complex information that is in turn derived from an array of sources. In this vein literacies must include the concept of information literacy at its heart Sheptycki (1998). Sharkey and Brandt (2008) suggest that information literacy encompasses the capacity to locate, gather and use information that is relevant to the context within which the person is operating or investigating. In that regard information literacy involves or at least
requires both an awareness of the role that information plays in a specific context as well as the ability to gather and use that information in a meaningful manner.

Closely aligned to the context within which police locate and gather information, is the idea of cultural literacies. Hirsch (1987, p. xiii) suggests “to be culturally literate is to possess the basic information needed to thrive in the modern world.” Putting aside the debate surrounding the validity of Hirsch’s approach to cultural literacies (Hilton, 1989), the concept of possessing basic information with regard to policing in a culturally and technologically diverse society fundamentally requires police to understand and read a range of cultural indicators present within the communities they police. This can only be achieved in the first instance by developing a level of cultural awareness that in turn is able to inform the manner in which one communicates with another. However, idealistic as this may sound, it is inconceivable to suggest that recruits can be ‘taught’ every aspect of every culture within Australia. Rather what is achievable is to explore various aspects of policing within culturally diverse communities, and provide recruit constables with the skills to engage in the ongoing “…process of intellectual discovery...” as they interact with a wider range of cultures in the course of their duties (Hilton, 1989, p. 307).

The final aspect worth considering in the development of a definition of global literacies for police is the impact that information and communication technologies have on society and those who police it. An increased use of information technology highlights a greater requirement for a range of literacies to meet the increasing demands of those living within a global society (Sharkey & Brandt, 2008). Viewing technological literacy from an “…applied and outcome orientated...” perspective, insofar as the mastery of various technologies, aids the primary functioning of policing practice (Sharkey & Brandt, 2008, p. 87). However, this only addresses one side of the proverbial coin. Investigators invariably come into contact with, and need to locate, gather and analyse an increasingly diverse range of information contained within a myriad of electronic sources in the course of their duties. Therefore, it is necessary that recruit constable education adds value to the pre-existing technological literacies that recruits bring with them to their training so as to aid in their future roles.

Having presented the four preceding areas for discussion, the author suggests the following definition for global literacy:
Global literacy is the developing capacity to locate, retrieve, and make sense of a wide range of information from various sources in a global society. It is the developing capacity to understand how the socio-political and cultural contexts found in a global society impacts both directly and indirectly on how information is understood, processed and communicated; and it is the developing capacity to continually update technological skill sets in order to access, interpret and communicate a range of information in a meaningful manner to an audience of global origins.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The context of policing in Australia has changed noticeably over the past twenty years. Digital and information technologies have evolved to such an extent that recruit constables, both as students and early career police officers, now require increasingly complex literacies to filter, analyse and use the plethora of information and evidence available to them. At the same time the ebb and flow of global migration influences both the physical and cultural diversity of Australia’s communities.

This in turn creates a rich and diverse tapestry of technological and cultural influences that directly impacts on how policing is carried out in a modern, global society. The intricacy of this modern environment requires police officers to be well educated, well informed and self-starting learners capable of keeping abreast of such evolving societal factors as are found within their local and regional environments. To address the evolving nature of policing in global society it is proposed that the adoption of three recommendations will aid the development of police curriculum.

(1) Develop a definition of global literacies to inform future curriculum reviews and development, by examining the impact that globalisation is having at a local and regional level.

The quality of any curriculum review and redevelopment process is directly affected by the quality of the definition of the challenges faced. Putting this into its relevant context, a high quality, evidenced definition of the global literacies required by early career police officers will accurately inform the development of police curriculum, resulting in the development of officers capable of operating in a diverse and dynamic society.
(2) Embed intercultural education as a key theme throughout all facets of police curricula in order to challenge the cultural status quo that may exist within police organisations in an effort to enhance the distribution of knowledge and power across the community.

Increasing cultural awareness reduces the dangers of cultural ignorance and stereotyping by police. It produces several other positive outcomes including a developing awareness of the range of cultural behaviours within society and the need to understand individual’s actions from their own cultural perspective. It also aids in developing a level of awareness of how the dominant Anglo-Celtic culture present within Australia (Ang et al., 2002) may be reflected in the institutional practices and doctrine of the police organisations, thus raising an awareness of the impact this may have on minority cultures.

(3) Embed information and digital technologies into police academy classrooms and curriculum.

The use of digital and information technologies in police academy classrooms more accurately reflects the reality of technology use in modern day policing. In turn this provides a more authentic learning environment for recruit constables. Adding value to the recruit constables existing digital literacies will also enhance their abilities as early career police officers to interact with and access a wider range of information and evidence in the course of their duties.

Police education programs that combine both instructional components and student centered approaches to learning (Birzer, 2003; Cox, 2011; Oliva & Compton, 2010; Shipton, 2009) provides the best possible learning environment in which to develop early career police officers critical thinking and literacy skills. Combining the three recommendations presented in this article into such programmes affords early career police officers the best head start in what is a very demanding and challenging career.

Increased cultural awareness ensures that interaction with members of the public from different cultural backgrounds is not automatically impeded by misunderstandings or ignorance of cultural differences. While increased familiarity with a range of digital and information technologies enhances the capacity of early career police officers to take a more effective role within a global knowledge society (Sheptycki, 1998). Together these approaches signify a comprehensive and considered approach to recruit education for a modern, global society.
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Book Review

*Lawmen in Scarlet: An Annotated Guide to Royal Canadian Mounted Police in Print and Performance*

by Bernard Alger Drew

Scarecrow Press, Metuchen, New Jersey

1990, 276 pages, illustrations, index

ISBN 0-8108-2330-6

Reviewed by Dr Hank Prunckun

The Canadian Mountie is not only a national symbol, but a Canadian folk hero. The Mountie is also something of a folk hero to the rest of the world, with Australia being no exception. So, while exploring a second-hand book shop recently, I came across a well-preserved hardbound copy of Bernard Drew’s 1990 *Lawmen in Scarlet*. Although published some twenty-three years ago, this vintage text is an important historical reference work about the fictional treatments of the popularity of this fascinating character in policing history.

Although there is a plethora of works which address scholarly histories of the role of the Mounties, until the release of Drew’s *Lawmen in Scarlet* there was little attention directed toward an analysis of this legendary figure in either fictional print or drama. In this regard, *Lawmen in Scarlet* could have been seen as a long awaited addition to Mountie literature, especially for those who wanted to probe the legends surrounding this champion figure. I know of no other treatment of this topic that has been published since, so Drew’s book lays bare some of the distortions and myths that have come to encapsulate this force and are, hence, worth preserving.

At the time it was written, Drew was the managing editor of a regional Massachusetts newspaper and a part time historian. His scholarship resulted in him compiling a valuable guide to some five-hundred works of fiction and an excess of two-hundred motion picture titles. The text is divided into two parts; the first addresses prose and poetry and the second drama. The compiler also includes a brief history of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and a preliminary section which contains selected references works. Both parts are further subdivided
into sections which survey specific subjects. For example, the first part on prose and poetry contains works on Book Fiction, Magazine Fiction, Pulp Magazines, Comic Strips, Big Little Books, and Prose Selected Reference Works. The second part covers Motion Pictures, Television, Radio, Musical and Dramatic Theater, Opera, Drama, Selected Reference Works, and finally, a Major Actor Index.

Lawmen in Scarlet contains comprehensive author and title indexes, as well as the main performer index just mentioned. This latter index cites heroes and heroines, selected villains, sidekicks and animal companions from the musical, dramatic and operatic lists—a unique feature. There are also numerous photographs, drawings and cartoons depicting the lore of the Mountie interspersed throughout. Many of these have been selected from the dust-jackets of the books cited in the bibliography.

From first inspection, it is obvious, that an immense amount of research was devoted to writing Lawmen in Scarlet. Drew's bibliographical annotations are clear and concise, providing the user with succinct abstracts of the works under review. Drew also presents some interesting biographical information about the various authors; for instance, Ian Anderson from South Australia. According to Drew, Anderson was "... determined to become a Canadian Mountie at the age of six, and at seven wanted to be a writer. After serving briefly with the South Australian Mounted Police, he became a member of the RCMP, his first posting at Lethbridge, Fort MacLeod, Coutts, and Medicine Hat. He later served as a sub-inspector in the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, and worked as a private investigator in Melbourne." I found some of the background summaries of the various authors as fascinating as the subject material they wrote about.

The book is nicely presented in its hardbound library binding. It was printed on alkaline paper, thus assuring that it will remain a reference work for all times. Overall, Lawmen in Scarlet is a well-researched book worthy of a spot on the desk of anyone interested in the history of the RCMP, or for that matter, in police history generally. Check the book’s availability on the popular e-book websites that sell second-hand books; it will make a nice addition to your professional library.
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